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  VZCZCXRO3486
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHKV #3532/01 2571439
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 141439Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY KIEV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1431
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KIEV 003532 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/2016 
TAGS: PREL PBTS KDEM UNMIK PGOV UN YI MD UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: MFA OFFICIAL WORRIES THAT KOSOVO 
INDEPENDENCE COULD COMPLICATE TRANSNISTRIA 
 
REF: A. STATE 151189 
 
     ¶B. STATE 136492 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Kent Logsdon for reasons 1.4(b,d) 
 
¶1. (C) Polcouns updated MFA Acting Director General for 
Political Affairs Olexander Tsvietkov September 12 on the 
situation with respect to Kosovo, drawing on information from 
ref b.  Knowing that the situation in Kosovo was to be 
discussed, Tsvietkov presented us with a non-paper, text in 
para 4 below, regarding Ukraine's view of the Kosovo 
situation.  In response to our presentation regarding the 
U.S. position, Tsvietkov expressed uneasiness with the idea 
of concluding negotiations by the end of 2006, wondering if 
this would be too fast and destabilizing for the region.  He 
also noted the participation of Ukrainian forces in Kosovo, 
suggesting that it would be useful to know what their 
potential role would be in case of agreement on a negotiated 
settlement. 
 
¶2. (C) We also drew on the "if asked" points from ref B, in 
response to Tsvietkov's non-paper regarding the possible 
"precedent" of Kosovo independence for post-Soviet "frozen 
conflicts," particularly Transnistria, and his inquiry 
regarding possible USG reaction if "Belgrade does not agree 
to independence for Kosovo."  Tsvietkov cited Kosovo 
developments, Transnistria's September 17 independence 
"referendum," and the Transnistria region's "presidential" 
elections, recently set for December 10, as events that were 
distracting Transnistrians and complicating Ukrainian efforts 
to restart the suspended five-plus-two negotiations. 
Stressing the importance of face-to-face discussions, 
Tsvietkov opined that Ukraine might resort to other formats, 
 
SIPDIS 
such as "three-plus-two" or "five-plus-one," i.e., presumably 
bringing together all participants except Transnistrian 
representatives, if Transnistria was unwilling to meet soon, 
since all other parties including Russia had indicated their 
readiness to restart the talks. 
 
¶3. (C) Comment:  This is not the first, and probably not 
last, time that MFA has fretted to us about the impact that 
Kosovo independence will have on other separatist regimes, 
especially Transnistria.  Tsvietkov softened the position by 
acknowledging the differences inherent in Kosovo, but pointed 
out that figures such as Transnistrian leader Igor Smirnov 
would gloss over the differences and focus only on the 
outcome.  He also bemoaned the fact that, starting from 
different assumptions, the Ukrainian and Russian positions on 
the issue have ended up coinciding.  End comment. 
 
¶4. (U) Following is text of September 2006 (MFA) Political 
Department non-paper, "Ukraine's Position Concerning 
Settlement of Kosovo Issue."  We have made minor grammatical 
and spelling corrections. 
 
Begin text. 
 
As an active contributor to international stability, Ukraine 
is closely observing the situation in southeastern Europe and 
in Kosovo in particular. 
 
From the very outset of the Kosovo crisis, Ukraine made 
efforts with the aim to settle it by political means and was 
assisting the post-conflict stabilization in the autonomous 
region.  Ukraine is actively participating in the 
peace-keeping efforts of the international community in 
Kosovo. 
 
Ukraine advocates the negotiating process between Belgrade 
and Pristina and the search for a mutually acceptable 
compromise settlement.  Within this context, regarding the 
future status of Kosovo, Ukraine respects relevant decisions 
of the UN Security Council, including Resolution 1244. 
 
Ukraine warns against hasty steps which can destabilize the 
situation in the Western Balkans and set dangerous 
precedents.  We support such decisions as to Kosovo status 
that would strengthen security and stability in the region 
and in Europe. 
 
Ukraine proceeds from the necessity of the final settlement 
of political, economic, and security situation in Kosovo 
creating conditions for the return of the non-Albanian 
population and guaranteeing the human rights and rights of 
all ethnic groups of the region. 
 
We regard that the negotiating process on Kosovo should be 
continued based on recognized norms and principles of 
international law, and a non-admission of a change in state 
borders with the use of force or unilaterally. 
 
 
KIEV 00003532  002 OF 002 
 
 
Besides, we consider it necessary to hold a consecutive 
dialogue on a diplomatic level, in mass media, 
non-governmental organizations, and research institutions 
within European and world formats in order to work out a 
balanced and optimal decision that will have a substantial 
impact on the development of international law and practice 
of international relations concerning conflict settlement. 
 
End text. 
 
¶5. (U) Visit Embassy Kiev's classified website: 
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev. 
Taylor