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FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2319
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 3637
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 2804
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 2955

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 004009 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
NOFORN 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, SCA/PAB, S/CT 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG 
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN 
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76 POLAND 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2015 
TAGS: PGOV PREL UNAF NATO PK AF
SUBJECT: SRSG KOENIGS' BRIEFING ON PROPOSAL FOR 
AFGHANISTAN-PAKISTAN POLITICAL DIALOGUE 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Neumann for Reasons 1.4 (B) AND (D) 
 
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Summary 
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¶1.  (S) In an August 27 briefing for resident embassy/mission 
representatives, SRSG Koenigs reported on his recent visit to 
Islamabad and sought support for his proposal for an 
organized political dialogue (as complement to the tripartite 
process and involving the UN, the NATO political 
representatives, and EU as well as the Governments of 
Pakistan and Afghanistan).  Koenigs said he had discussed his 
proposal with Pakistani ForMin Kasuri, Interior Minister 
Sherpao, and Deputy ISI MG Mustapha in Islamabad and also 
discussed it with Afghan ForMin Spanta and NSA Rassoul.  The 
SRSG credited his Pakistani interlocutors willingness to 
consider the idea of a political dialogue to recent events 
which have forced Pakistan to acknowledge the cross-border 
elements of the Afghan insurgency and to growing 
international pressure.  The GOP has become more willing to 
say it must do more despite a lack of resources, and may be 
willing to consider a structure political dialogue as a way 
forward.  Koenigs reported Afghan ForMin Spanta as being much 
more wary.  This likely reflects concern over the political 
risks to President Karzai.  Comment: Neither Koenigs nor any 
of the assembled mission representatives seemed aware of the 
recent ongoing quiet dialogues taking place between GOA NSA 
Rassoul and his GOP counterpart or incipient conversations 
which are beginning to take place between Afghan and 
Pakistani parliamentarian.  End Comment.  Koenigs reported 
"interest within the Security Council" for a briefing by 
ISAF, adding he supported the idea.  End Summary 
 
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Pakistan Officials Don't Say No to Political Dialogue 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶2.  (C)  On August 27, SRSG Tom Koenigs (joined by his Deputy 
Chris Alexander) briefed representatives of resident missions 
on his recent trip to Islamabad where he said he had outlined 
"a concrete proposal" for a regular political dialogue 
between Pakistan and Afghanistan, as a complement to the 
military-to-military consultations that take place within the 
Tripartite Commission process.  He said he had in mind 
high-level talks every two to three months, involving the two 
governments as well as the UN, NATO political representatives 
(FYI: NATO senior civilian representative Everts attended 
this meeting), and the EU. 
 
¶3.  (C)  Koenigs reported that he had in his most recent 
visit to Islamabad -- his third in as many months -- 
presented his idea to Deputy ISI MG Mustapha, MOI Sherpao, 
and ForMin Kasuri.  Each had shown interest in the idea and 
agreed there is room for a richer political discussion.  The 
SRSG highlighted growing and increasingly unified 
international pressure (citing Australia and Canada's recent 
efforts) as helping convince the GOP it needs to do more, 
despite limited leverage to affect events. 
 
¶4.  (C) Koenigs lauded what he described as a shift from 
Islamabad's "hands off approach" toward the Taliban to a more 
interventionist, law-enforcement approach.  He added that 
what recent efforts have uncovered has made it impossible to 
sustain the "fiction" that the situation in Waziristan was 
manageable or to deny that the Taliban and al Qaeda cycle 
through Pakistan to Afghanistan.  He reported that MOI 
Sherpao had said he had been "surprised when 'peace' in 
Pakistan had led to an increase in attacks in Afghanistan." 
In Koenigs discussion of his visit, he noted that it had been 
much more difficult to get into a discussion with Kasuri of 
the main issues without a lengthy and polite preamble 
avoiding any direct criticism of Pakistan,and that Kasuri was 
"totally" preoccupied by concern over public perceptions of 
Pakistan.  Sherpao, on the other hand was much more down to 
earth. 
 
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KABUL 00004009  002 OF 003 
 
 
Need for Careful Preparation and Orchestration 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶5.  (C) While expressing optimism that the GOP may becoming 
more open to the idea of a political dialogue, Koenigs 
underlined the need to lay the groundwork, including 
addressing the "persistence of a distorted view in Pakistan 
of the situation in Afghanistan."  Alexander compared the 
views from Islamabad and Kabul as analogous to looking 
through opposite ends of a telescope.  According to Koenigs, 
Islamabad sees the situation in the southern provinces as 
typical of Afghanistan as a whole, and considers the Karzai 
government as a rump government, controlled by the Northern 
Alliance.  Alexander characterized the GOP's view as "out of 
touch; out of date" including regarding the number of 
coalition and ISAF troops on the ground.  Koenig offered the 
aside that Pakistan's Ambassador to Afghanistan, Sardar Taria 
Azizuddin, has a good understanding of the situation -- but 
doubted if he influenced thinking in Islamabad. 
 
¶6.  (C) Note:  In a conversation on the margins of the most 
recent military tripartite, A/PolMil Counselor asked 
Afghanistan's Ambassador to Islamabad, Nanguyalai Tarzi, for 
his views on the possibility of a political process.  Tarzi 
had expressed skepticism, saying that for there to be hope of 
success, the GOA must be prepared to offer short, medium and 
long-term goals to match those of Pakistan.  He underlined 
the importance of the vision coming from the very top on both 
sides, as not even ministers would have the authority to make 
the kind of decisions that would make a difference.  He 
doubted if Afghanistan was prepared for such an effort. 
There would also be difficulties on the Pakistani side with 
the idea that "confidence-building measures" are required. 
Tarzi himself, given his understanding, would be willing to 
argue that, on the political side, it was precisely what was 
needed to address the massive distrust of Pakistan among 
Afghans at all levels.  Any political process would need to 
begin slowly, with carefully orchestrated first steps, to 
avoid deepening rather than relieving the distrust.  End 
Note. 
 
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Afghan ForMin and NSA Very Wary; Cite Risks to Karzai 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶7.  (C)  Koenigs reported that he had also presented his 
proposal to Afghan ForMin Spanta and NSA Dr. Rassoul.  While 
they both said they realized something along the lines of his 
proposal must be done, "they were not excited over the 
specific proposal."  Spanta in particular highlighted the 
(domestic political) risks.  The challenge would be how to 
protect President Karzai from being accused of "fraternizing 
with Pakistan," particularly if there were no significant 
payoffs.  Spanta emphasized that the effort would have to be 
at the sub-ministerial level; even ministers' involvement 
would be too public and thus too risky. 
 
¶8.  (S) EU Special Representative Ambassador Francesc 
Vendrell offered that he understood Spanta's wariness and 
emphasized the need to keep the entire effort under the 
radar.  He expressed concern that Pakistan might see the 
process as deflecting responsibility for addressing the 
cross-border issues.  Koenigs agreed there was a risk of 
"talk replacing pressure on the Taliban," but thought it 
could be managed.  The key would be united, coordinated, and 
sustained pressure and support from the international 
community.  The SRSG said he planned to travel to Islamabad 
within the next two weeks to brief missions there as part of 
his effort to build momentum in support of the process. 
Alexander expressed hope the Musharraf-Karzai meeting in 
September might include discussion of the proposal and set 
the platform. 
 
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SC Interest in ISAF Briefing 
---------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) Koenigs closed the meeting by reporting there is 
 
KABUL 00004009  003 OF 003 
 
 
interest within the Security Council in asking ISAF for a 
briefing.  According to Koenigs, this would be the first time 
the Council would be requesting a briefing by a non-UN 
mission, but, given ISAF's link to a SC Resolution, he 
supported the request as a sign of the close cooperation 
between the UN and NATO.  Vendrell agreed, but said he was 
sure it would have to be a joint SRSG-ISAF briefing.  He also 
speculated that "more than a little massaging" would likely 
be required to get France and Russia on board. 
 
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Comment 
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¶10.  (C) There are advantages and risks to having the UN 
foster diplomatic efforts that do not include the U.S. to 
broker greater Afghan-Pakistani cooperation against the 
Taliban.  The domestic risks to each party are substantial. 
Skepticism in Kabul about the proposal was underlined by the 
fact that, while ForMin Spanta expressed support for the 
concept of political dialogue (his preference would be for 
within the Tripartite Process), he did not mention Koenigs' 
ideas (Septel).  We believe Koenig's proposal is a long way 
from being concrete, but see its value as encouraging the 
parties to focus on the value of a political process.  We 
will want to use the upcoming meetings in Washington to 
reinforce this idea.  In the meantime, we continue to 
highlight the value of concrete confidence-building measures 
and work to ensure any proposals complement our own. 
NEUMANN