VZCZCXRO1167
PP RUEHCHI RUEHNH RUEHPB
DE RUEHDT #0463/01 2560204
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 130204Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY DILI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2967
INFO RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0684
RUCNARF/ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE
RUEHXX/GENEVA IO MISSIONS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0756
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY 0671
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0509
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0535
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 0609
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 0403
RHHMUNA/USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDT/AMEMBASSY DILI 2298

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 DILI 000463 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR EAP/MTS 
PACOM FOR POLAD AND JOC 
NSC FOR HOLLY MORROW 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KPKO PHUM ASEC CASC PREF AU PO TT
SUBJECT: DILI SECURITY UPDATE: GANG DISTURBANCES BECOMING ENTRENCHED 
 
REF: DILI 424 
 
DILI 00000463  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: Following a spike in gang activity in early 
August in the period immediately following the arrest of 
dissident Major Alfredo Reinado, there was a reduction in such 
incidents later in the month.  However, gang incidents have 
gradually escalated during the ensuing weeks, particularly in 
certain neighborhoods.  Loromonu versus Lorosa'e (West v East) 
divisions remain a dominant theme, and much of the activity 
appears to be aimed at terrorizing people into departing Dili 
permanently for their home districts, but there also appears to 
be an increase in robberies and other financially motivated 
crimes.  There has been a gradual ratcheting up of the response 
by international forces, including increased use of non-lethal 
means of force and the return of an overt Australian Defense 
Force presence in the streets.  However, it is becoming 
increasingly clear that the effectiveness of the international 
forces is limited and that most gangs continue to operate with 
relative impunity.  While private foreign citizens have 
generally not been targeted in these incidents, some have been 
caught in the crossfire.  Embassy Dili has issued an updated 
warden message regarding the ongoing security concerns.  End 
summary. 
 
¶2. (U) Following a spike in gang activity in early August in the 
period immediately following the arrest of dissident Major 
Alfredo Reinado, there was a reduction in such incidents later 
in the month, apparently resulting from a combination of 
dialogue and reconciliation efforts and adjusted police tactics 
(Reftel).  However, the assessment that underlying factors 
remained unchanged has been borne out over the ensuing weeks as 
regular gang incidents have become entrenched and have gradually 
escalated in Dili, especially in certain areas.  There is now a 
fairly regular rhythm of attacks and clashes in several areas of 
the city.  Among the sites that flare up with regularity are the 
internally displaced persons (IDP) camps located at the airport, 
the seaport, the hospital and the UN barracks.  In addition, the 
neighborhoods of Comoro and Delta, Bebonok, and Fatuhada each 
see regular clashes. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Rock throwing attacks are by far the most frequent 
tactic used by street gangs and it has become fairly common in 
Dili to see cars with smashed in windows.  Other common weapons 
are slingshots employing "rama ambon"(small metal arrows that 
typically result only in injuries but can be lethal) and 
machetes, which are also common household agricultural tools. 
Typical incidents involve the gathering of a group of young men, 
with alcohol consumption a frequent element, who then launch an 
attack on the targeted IDP camp or neighborhood.  However, there 
is often a fair amount of organization involved, especially with 
the use of cell phones for coordination and warning purposes. 
There have been numerous reports of various behind the scenes 
actors supporting the attacks, particularly through the 
provision of money and alcohol, but establishing by whom is 
difficult.  Allegations range from dissident armed forces 
members from the West, such as Major Marcos Tilman, to former 
Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri. 
 
More sophisticated gang attacks 
------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) In addition to the frequent rock-throwing and slingshot 
incidents, there have been a few attacks involving more serious 
weaponry as well as more sophisticated orchestration.  On 
September 1 there was an incident at the seaport IDP camp in 
which the attackers, including two identified as members of the 
national police (PNTL), employed a pistol and a rifle, both PNTL 
issued, resulting in gunshot wounds to about a half dozen camp 
residents.  (This attack was atypical in several respects.  It 
was reportedly in retaliation for an attack the night before on 
the PNTL members by young men residing in the IDP camp, and it 
is not known whether the perpetrators of the retaliatory attack 
had engaged in previous violence.) On September 8, an attack on 
the IDP camp adjacent to the UN barracks employed riot gas 
launched into the camp to drive people out.  (Riot gas is also a 
 
DILI 00000463  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
PNTL-issued item, used normally only by the Rapid Intervention 
Unit (UIR).)  Attackers were then staged at the points of exit 
to attack the panicked camp residents with stones and 
slingshots.  This demonstrated a greater level of orchestration 
than previous IDP camp attacks. 
 
¶5. (U) Although the causes of gang activity remain 
multi-faceted, Loromonu versus Lorosa'e (West v East) divisions 
remain a dominant theme, and much of the activity appears to be 
aimed at terrorizing people into abandoning their homes or, in 
the case of IDP camp residents, to depart Dili permanently for 
their home districts.  For example, the IDP camp at the UN 
barracks is predominantly occupied by Lorosa'e residents and 
most observers believe the attack described in paragraph 4 was 
aimed at increasing the pressure on residents to depart.  That 
gang activity is primarily aimed at driving people out of the 
targeted camps and neighborhoods through intimidation is 
underscored by the fact that despite the high volume of 
incidents, the rate of injuries and deaths resulting remains 
relatively low.  International police have not yet produced a 
cumulative set of statistics, but an Australian Federal Police 
(AFP) source was anecdotally able to recall only a handful of 
murder cases over the last month. Despite the frequent political 
and/or regional dimension to gang attacks, there has also been a 
dramatic increase in reports of crime that appears to be 
financially motivated, including robberies of taxi drivers and 
protection rackets targeting stores and businesses. 
 
¶6. (U) International police have gradually increased their 
levels of force in response to the persistence of gang 
disturbances.  This has included increased use of non-lethal 
means of force, such as riot gas and rubber pellets, by all 
international forces.  There has also been increased use of 
warning shots, most frequently by the Portuguese Republican 
National Guard (GNR).  An overt Australian Defense Force (ADF) 
presence has also returned to the streets of Dili.  The ADF had 
gradually withdrawn as police took on responsibility for 
security, and they were mostly out of sight throughout August, 
but foot patrols by ADF soldiers began to return in early 
September and within the last week ADF armed personnel carriers 
have resumed regular patrolling throughout the city.  ADF has 
deployed an additional infantry company to East Timor in 
response to recent security developments. 
 
Permanent police presence needed 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) While international police and military have had some 
success in limiting the occurrence and duration of incidents, it 
is becoming increasingly clear that their effectiveness is 
limited and that many gangs continue to operate with relative 
impunity.  The typical cycle is: 1) gang disturbance begins; 2) 
police are notified; 3) police arrive with variable response 
times depending on other incidents needing concurrent attention; 
4) gangs disperse; 5) police depart; 6) gangs reassemble and 
another incident occurs.  Local residents often note this cycle 
and complain that this allows the gangs to continue activities 
with little deterrence and that this approach often fails to 
facilitate the identification and arrest of key actors by the 
police.  Many Timorese argue that a more permanent police 
presence in their neighborhoods is necessary both to provide a 
more effective deterrent and to increase police understanding of 
the dynamics and players at work.  As it stands, international 
police have no "beat" within the city, so any given officer 
could be called on to respond to disturbances in any part of the 
city, an arrangement that allows greater maneuverability to 
respond to incidents as they occur, but that constrains the 
development of area-specific knowledge. 
 
Local perceptions of international police souring 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Beyond complaints of ineffectiveness, many local 
residents are increasingly likely to perceive the international 
 
DILI 00000463  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
police as lacking impartiality in their response.  This is 
partially a result of the pattern of response described above. 
The result is often that police arrive as an attacking group 
disperses and encounter the angry members of a community that 
has just been attacked and proceed to focus their law 
enforcement efforts on that community.  Emboffs recently visited 
the Fatuhada neighborhood in Dili, which has been subject to 
almost daily attacks from an adjacent neighborhood attempting to 
drive its Lorosa'e population out.  Residents there told Emboffs 
the police consistently refuse to enter the attacking 
neighborhood, instead focusing on the area where the incident 
occurred and arresting members of the attacked community.  They 
view this not as a result of misunderstandings but rather as a 
deliberate strategy on the part of the international police 
forces.  Perceptions of bias have been further exacerbated by 
real and/or perceived problems with local translators. 
Complaints that the translators working with the police skew 
their interpretation in accordance with their own loyalties and 
agendas have become widespread. 
 
¶9. (SBU) The combination of frustration with limited police 
effectiveness and perception of bias by the police has resulted 
in some deterioration of police relations with many local 
residents.  There have been cases of police arriving at the 
scene of an incident and then being subject to attacks by the 
very people they are there to assist.  Police operating in this 
environment have expressed their own frustration and 
demoralization to Emboffs and other internationals in response 
both to lack of significant progress in reducing gang activity 
and to the negative response they are getting from some 
Timorese. 
 
¶10. (U) Although international police have increasingly come 
under fire, this has not spilled over into noticeable targeting 
of other foreigners.  That said, a few foreigners have been 
caught in crossfire or in random attacks.  There has also been a 
notable change in how foreigners are treated since the initial 
emergence of widespread gang activity in May and June. 
Previously when foreign citizens encountered incidents in 
progress, gangs would typically cease their activities and step 
aside, even engaging in polite conversation.  Now, such courtesy 
is rarely extended and anyone attempting to intervene in 
incidents runs the risk of having the attack turned on them. 
 
¶11. (U) Taking these changed dynamics into account, Embassy Dili 
has issued a new warden message to American citizens reminding 
them of ongoing security issues and advising continued caution 
in their movements in Dili. 
REES