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RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDT/AMEMBASSY DILI 2275

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 DILI 000452 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR EAP/MTS 
PACOM FOR POLAD AND JOC 
NSC FOR HOLLY MORROW 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREF PHUM PGOV UN ASEC TT
SUBJECT: MAJORITY OF DILI'S POPULATION STILL DISPLACED 
 
 
DILI 00000452  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
¶1. (U) Summary: Dili has become a city characterized by a large 
displaced population residing in over 50 separate camps. 
Resolving this issue and convincing internally displaced persons 
(IDPs) to return home is turning out to be a slow and 
complicated process, partially due to the complexity of the 
problems and partly due to slow planning and decision making. 
Despite the current government's emphasis on the issue as a top 
priority, clear policy decisions on a number of key issues 
remain outstanding and some confusion has emerged over what is 
official policy versus political statements.  The Government 
approved a policy framework for IDP return in late August, but 
implementation coordination has so far fallen short, in part 
because the policy presumed that it would be safe for the IDPs 
to return to their neighborhoods.  A number of government and 
civil society agencies are nonetheless implementing IDP return 
strategies consistent with the framework, but in an ad hoc 
manner.  Most international observers and many Timorese regard 
these efforts as a positive development, particularly insofar as 
they focus on a handful of camps that have become bases for 
gangs that destabilize surrounding neighborhoods.  This ad hoc 
and uneven return strategy, however, will result in a slower and 
less complete process than had been hoped for, and it also 
presents a risk that some IDPs will be returned prematurely to 
areas that are not yet safe.  In the meantime, IDP dynamics on 
the ground are constantly changing as an unknown number of IDPs 
are either leaving the camps altogether or relocating to other 
camps.  End summary. 
 
A city of the displaced 
----------------------- 
 
¶2. (U) IDP camps have become an entrenched part of Dili life 
since early May.  The city landscape is dotted with over 50 
separate campsites, ranging from smaller ones sheltering 100 or 
fewer to several large camps that have become home to thousands 
of displaced persons.  On any given night it is estimated that 
between 50% and 70% of the city's people are sleeping somewhere 
other than their homes.  The camps have also become a central 
issue in security developments.  Camps were from the beginning 
targets for intimidation by mobs and gangs.  Over the last 
month, this targeting has escalated.  Moreover, at least two 
camps have themselves evolved into staging areas for attacks by 
groups that commit gang violence in surrounding areas and then 
retreat to the protection afforded by them.  Dili's IDP 
population, while remaining displaced, is also integrated into 
city life.  Many reside in camps near their original 
neighborhoods and frequently visit their homes and a large 
number of camp residents continue in their regular employment. 
 
¶3. (U) The issues involved in returning people to their homes 
and reconstituting their communities are complicated and 
interrelated.  Among the issues involved are: layers of 
conflicting and unresolved land and property claims; community 
tensions that resulted from large numbers of people moving to 
Dili in recent years to compete for shrinking resources; a young 
generation lacking opportunities and feeling increasingly 
marginalized; and a less than fully functional justice sector, 
giving rise to a widespread perception that crimes go 
unpunished.  There is a broad consensus that the return of IDPs 
needs to address this range of issues or risk a return to and/or 
continuation of similar community conflict. 
 
IDPs are a central political issue 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (U) Upon his swearing in as Prime Minister, Prime Minister 
Jose Ramos-Horta placed resolution of the IDP problem at the top 
of his agenda, stating:  "Our immediate task is to consolidate 
the security in Dili and in all of Timor-Leste, facilitating the 
return to their houses of the thousands of brothers and sisters 
who during these weeks have taken refuge in several centers, and 
giving them necessary support to rebuild their lives."  He has 
continued to highlight the issue, publicly stating that all IDPs 
should return by the end of September and in several cases 
 
DILI 00000452  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
pushing for specific camps to be shut down immediately. 
 
¶5. (U) The IDP issue has also drawn the high level involvement 
of several key government ministers.  Minister of Labor and 
Community Reinsertion, Arsenio Bano, has taken a high profile in 
addressing IDP issues since the beginning of the crisis and has 
been widely praised for his effective coordination of relief 
efforts.  He is the primary government coordinator for planning 
and coordinating their return.  In addition, both Minister of 
Interior Alcino Barris and Minister for State Administration Ana 
Pessoa and their respective ministries have taken on high 
profile roles regarding IDP return planning, particularly with 
reference to security arrangements. 
 
IDP return policy approved but missing key policy elements 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
¶6. (U) Despite this high-level attention, progress has been slow 
on developing clear and realistic policies for the return of 
IDPs to their homes.  Although a working group comprising 
representatives from key government and international agencies 
was formed in mid-July to draft an IDP return policy, it was 
approved by the Council of Ministers only in late August.  The 
plan, called "Simu Malu" ("receive/accept one another") has four 
components. First the IDPs' neighborhoods will have to be 
prepared to accept their return.  This component it addresses 
security arrangements, including international and Timorese 
police presence in the neighborhoods , as well as dialogue 
within the receiving communities.  The second phase is the 
preparation of the IDPs themselves to return.  This step 
includes escorted visits of IDPs to their former neighborhoods, 
as well as further dialogue aimed at reconciliation with other 
elements in the community.  The third step is the return itself 
and the provision of food and other assistance to the returning 
IDPs, and the final phase consists of monitoring and continued 
assistance to the returnees and their communities. 
 
¶7.  (U) Some participants and observers complain that the "Simu 
Malu" plan does not yet sufficiently address specific practical 
problems.  For example, there remains no clear policy on how to 
address the land and property issues.  Security policies are 
addressed to some extent, but the plan assumes a far greater 
international police presence than currently exists in the 
receiving communities, as well as a speedier return of Timorese 
police officers (PNTL) to active duty in Dili than appears 
likely to happen in light of current disagreements about the 
PNTL screening and reintegration process.  Because of these and 
other unresolved issues, official approval of the Simu Malu plan 
has not resulted in any noticeable change in implementation on 
the ground.  The IDP return working group, which is now charged 
with coordinating the implementation, has been changed from a 
small representative group to a group of all stakeholders that 
is arguably too large for effective decision making.  The 
meetings of 30 to 40 people during the last two weeks have 
consisted primarily of presentations by government officials. 
Many organizations therefore remain confused regarding how to 
proceed.  Some church and non-governmental organization (NGO) 
representatives involved in operating and assisting the camps 
note, however, that the government plan might for speedy return 
of IDPs was probably too ambitious in light of ongoing security 
problems, so that the ongoing delays are on balance not a bad 
development. 
 
Political leadership sometimes contradictory 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) The coordinator of UN humanitarian aid, Finn 
Reske-Nielsen, expressed to us in early August his concern that 
both Ramos-Horta and President Xanana Gusmao were giving 
insufficient attention to the issue of IDP return.  Ramos-Horta 
has since become more engaged, but at times has been viewed as 
working at cross purposes with the relief agencies on the 
ground.  In August he made a surprise appearance at the camp 
near the port in the center of downtown Dili, which has been the 
 
DILI 00000452  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
most frequently cited instance of a camp from which resident 
gangs commit criminal activities in the surrounding 
neighborhood, to announce that it was to be shut down within 72 
hours.  This produced some panic in the camp and a flurry of 
meetings and in the end the camp remained in place.  More 
recently, Ramos-Horta has made public statements that 
humanitarian assistance would be suspended in camps identified 
as ready to close, again producing some uproar among the 
assistance agencies.  Some NGO workers, however, have privately 
shared with us their agreement with the messages Ramos-Horta is 
relaying that it is time for IDPs to return home and that 
justification for many of them to remain in the camps is 
dwindling. 
 
¶9. (SBU) A number of other political actors have also taken 
initiatives apparently uncoordinated with the return planning 
process, creating some confusion regarding what is official 
policy versus a political statement.  Of particular note is the 
controversy surrounding the question of whether fixed police 
posts should be established in neighborhoods throughout Dili to 
address returnee and community security concerns.  Many Timorese 
have cited this as a necessary step for them to feel secure and 
key government officials, and substantial police presence in the 
neighborhoods appears to be a central assumption of the 
government's "Simu Malu" return plan.  However, the leadership 
of the Australian Federal Police (AFP) have contended that such 
an approach would absorb virtually all policing resources and is 
simply "not good policing" from a law enforcement effectiveness 
perspective.  This position has generated widespread criticism 
from Government of East Timor (GOET) officials, including 
Ramos-Horta and President Xanana Gusmao, and from ordinary 
Timorese who complain that the current AFP strategy of 
responding to house burnings and other gang violence only after 
they are in progress has neither prevented nor deterred such 
criminal activities in their neighborhoods.  On August 25 
policing authority in Dili officially shifted from the 
Australian-led international forces to the new United Nations 
Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT), and Special Representative of 
the Secretary General (SRSG) Sukehiro Hasegawa has made several 
public statements promising the establishment of fixed police 
posts in troubled neighborhoods.  AFP sources complained to 
Emboffs that Hasegawa was attempting to pre-empt their 
objections to this tactic and to create an unrealistic public 
expectation.  The latest development is that the acting UNMIT 
Police Commissioner has announced the establishment of six 
police posts in problem neighborhoods as a down payment on the 
60 posts that were initially announced. 
 
Meanwhile, reality is moving ahead of the policy process 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶10. (U) Simultaneous with the above policy and planning 
discussions, the reality on the ground is changing day by day. 
During the last two weeks there were numerous reports from camp 
administrators that IDPs had returned home or relocated of their 
own volition, and various actors were moving forward with 
facilitating the return of additional IDPs.  During the last few 
days, in response to resurgent violence in some neighborhoods 
and to tension over the escape of dissident Major Alfredo 
Reinado and reported sightings of members of the armed forces 
(FDTL) conducting operations in Dili and elsewhere in what is 
generally believed to be an effort to recapture Reinado, returns 
have slowed and some IDPs have returned to their former camps. 
Camp managers have been unable to accurately quantify the IDP 
movement, and official counts still place the number of 
Dili-based IDPs at around 70,000.  But the fluidity of the IDP 
situation means that it has been weeks since this number was 
quoted with any certainty, and many displaced people are no 
longer in camps but in homes of friends or relatives.  Several 
anecdotal examples illustrate the various dynamics at work.  The 
camp adjacent to Ramos-Horta's house completely shut down 
earlier this week when all its residents decided to return home 
in response to what was reportedly a forceful personal appeal 
from  Ramos-Horta.  The camp adjacent to the UNOTIL compound 
 
DILI 00000452  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
lost about 50 percent of its inhabitants after a series of rock 
throwing attacks a couple weeks ago; however, those who departed 
are mostly believed to have relocated to other camps.  A number 
of camps have, in contrast, registered increased populations. 
 
¶11. (U) A number of initiatives to facilitate IDP reintegration 
into their neighborhoods began prior to the official approval of 
the policy framework.  Both the Ministry and Labor and the 
Ministry of Interior have been organizing community dialogues in 
accordance with the draft plan guidelines.  In addition, a 
number of the NGOs working with IDPs decided early on to move 
ahead with implementing aspects of the plan and not to wait for 
official approval.  The Catholic Relief Services (CRS) country 
director told us that they and others are "just going ahead and 
starting".  However, she emphasized that this will naturally 
result in duplication of efforts in some areas and neglect of 
others, slowing the overall return process. 
 
¶12. (U) Comment: The IDP issue is viewed as the key indicator 
that things have yet to return to normal.  Therefore, it is one 
of the main issues by which the Ramos-Horta government is likely 
to be measured.  If large numbers of IDPs remain in Dili beyond 
another month or so, the negative implications for stability and 
security will continue to increase.  In addition, as 
humanitarian assistance organizations have been pointing out, 
the continued existence of a large IDP population when the rainy 
season begins (usually in late fall) could have serious public 
health consequences.  On the other hand, premature return of 
IDPs to neighborhoods that are not yet secure --- and 
particularly any violence that should befall such returnees --- 
could lead to increased instability and set the process back 
even further.  One important next step is for the "Simu Malu" 
planning process to become more closely coordinated with efforts 
by GOET, UNMIT, AFP, and others to increase security in the 
neighborhoods to which IDPs will be returning.  End comment. 
REES