VZCZCXRO0090
PP RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHCHI #0159/01 2690553
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 260553Z SEP 06
FM AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0279
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK PRIORITY 0552
RHMFISS/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI PRIORITY 0317
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CHIANG MAI 000159 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  9/26/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KDEM MOPS ASEC TH
SUBJECT: AFTER HELPING TO PLOT COUP, THIRD ARMY COMMANDER CALLS THE 
SHOTS IN THE NORTH 
 
REF: CHIANG MAI 120 (THIRD ARMY COMMANDER CHALLENGES THAKSIN'S NORTHERN POWER BASE) 
 
CHIANG MAI 00000159  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Beatrice Camp , Consul General, Consulate Chiang 
Mai, State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  The general in charge of northern Thailand came 
out blazing Friday with allegations that coup planning began 
months ago and that the former government wiretapped the Privy 
Council and the palace.  He asserted a need to clear out Thaksin 
loyalists in the region and proposed that the military help 
screen out bad political candidates. These statements and others 
by 3rd Army Commander LTG Saprang Kalayamitra portray him as a 
key instigator of the Sept. 19 coup. With most of former Prime 
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra's politically connected relatives 
and allies effectively shut out of power, Saprang is calling the 
shots in his northern fiefdom. End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) Gen. Saprang, by his own account one of the most 
committed coup plotters, made his first post-coup appearance in 
the north on Sept. 22 after returning from Bangkok to his 
headquarters in Phitsanulok.   In anticipation of his return, 
media figures and heads of government agencies were summoned to 
Phitsanulok for two separate Friday sessions. Northern media and 
government Public Relations Department officers met with Saprang 
in the morning, followed by an afternoon meeting with heads of 
government agencies, including governors from all 17 northern 
provinces, to explain why the coup was staged, how it was 
conducted and what further steps the military-led Council for 
Democratic Reform under the Constitutional Monarchy (CDRM) would 
take in this region. 
 
Anger Over Wire-Tapping 
--------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C)  The outspoken general vowed to revamp the police and 
National Intelligence Agency (NIA), which he accused of 
monitoring anti-Thaksin individuals rather than focusing on 
counter-terrorism or counter-narcotics information gathering. 
He claimed that these agencies had wire-tapped him after his 
headline-generating criticism of Thaksin in July (reftel). In a 
separate conversation with the director of the Office of 
Narcotics Control Board-North (ONCB-North), Janya Sramajcha, 
Saprang went further, accusing Thaksin's brother-in-law Pol. 
Gen. Phriewphan Damaphong and former NIA chief and Thaksin 
classmate Pol LTG Jumpol Manmai of wire-tapping not only 
military leaders but also members of the Privy Council and the 
king "via highly sophisticated devices exclusively procured for 
the Thaksin camp."  He described these actions as "beyond 
toleration" and "a breach of professional intelligence 
etiquette." 
 
¶4. (C) At the Sept. 22 afternoon meeting, Saprang warned 
provincial governors from Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai that they 
will "pay the price" for their "excessive" loyalty to the 
Thaksin regime, most likely by being transferred.  Saprang also 
singled out for attention certain local politicians and 
community radios for their potential provocative role against 
the CDRM. 
 
Coup Was Planned Months Ago 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) In contrast to the impression given by coup leaders in 
the media, Saprang said that the overthrow of the Thaksin 
administration had been mapped out since early this year. 
Citing internal instability, the lack of decent political 
leadership, and widespread cronyism, Saprang described how for 
several months he "sent messages via the media" that went 
unheeded by politicians and government officials.  As political 
polarization intensified and crept into the military 
establishment, "administrative reform" became necessary to 
prevent the nation from breaking apart, Saprang told his 
afternoon audience. 
 
¶6. (C) According to Saprang, only he and army chief Gen Sonthi 
Bunyaratkalin were truly committed and contributed to the 
success of the Sept. 19 coup.  Other commanders played 
supportive roles, he said, describing the 2nd army commander as 
"too gentleman-like" during and even after the coup by allowing 
freer movement of Thai Rak Thai party (TRT) leaders and 
anti-coup broadcasts from some community radios in the 
northeast. Meanwhile, in Chiang Mai, Saprang positioned armored 
vehicles in front of the municipal office early on Sept. 20 just 
hours after the coup and that morning issued instructions to the 
Governor to shut down all community radio stations. 
 
 
CHIANG MAI 00000159  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
¶7. (C) Reports from Saprang's address to provincial leaders said 
the general named individuals and agencies the CDRM is targeting 
for their roles in the Thaksin regime, including former cabinet 
ministers Newin Chidchob and Yongyut Tiyapairat - both targeted 
for mobilizing the pro-Thaksin/TRT grassroots activities. 
Saprang also called out three government agencies - Forestry 
(under Yongyut's supervision), NIA, and the Police Narcotics 
Suppression Bureau (PNSB) - for what he labeled "anti-royal" 
actions. The latter two, he said, were involved in the phone 
tapping.  According to Drug Enforcement Administration officials 
in Chiang Mai, military units raided local PNSB offices on Sept. 
20 and confiscated weapons. 
 
Military Will Help Guide Thai Politics 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶8. (C) During his Sept. 22 meetings, Saprang made it clear that 
he intended to purge Thaksin loyalists out of Chiang Mai. In his 
meeting with Janya, he spoke of cleansing Thai politics, saying 
"we need to create a system that would encourage and screen good 
people to enter politics. The military can help with this idea; 
we would offer to stop or ward off those 'bad guys' from the 
contest while we are ready to canvass for the 'good guys.'" 
Saprang also asked Janya to take good care of the U.S. Consulate 
General in Chiang Mai, as "I see the U.S. as our great ally." 
 
¶9. (U) As earlier reported in the media, Saprang is moving to 
Bangkok as assistant army chief.  He said 3rd Army corps 
commander LTG Jiradet Kocharat, a close ally, would be his 
successor. 
 
¶10. (C) COMMENT: As a long-time and well-known Thaksin foe, 
Saprang is taking advantage of his position as key power broker 
in the North. In comparison to other regional commanders, 
Saprang has acted much more aggressively to rein in Thaksin 
allies and stifle potential opposition to the CDRM.   In this 
Third Army fiefdom, media figures and officials are being 
summoned to Saprang's headquarters in Phitsanulok for briefings 
or, in the case of Chiang Mai Mayor Boonlert Buranupakorn, 
weekly attendance checks.  With CDRM leaders pre-occupied in 
Bangkok, Saprang has the local authority to neutralize Thaksin's 
closest allies in his former home base and pursue government 
agencies viewed as dominated by Thaskin cronies. 
 
¶11. (C) Even allowing for some self-promotion, Saprang's 
comments support his contention that he was indeed one of the 
key instigators of Thaksin's overthrow.  Now slated for a new 
assignment in Bangkok, Saprang is likely to end up with a more 
visible role in the CDRM leadership.   In such a position, his 
oft-stated patriotism and passion for protecting the monarchy 
combined with his deep distrust of the former prime minister and 
tendency to say what he thinks could mean headaches for those in 
power.   End Comment. 
CAMP