VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHCV #2852/01 2612130
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 182130Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6396
INFO RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L CARACAS 002852 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR WHA/AND, OFM, AND L/DL 
HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD 
DEPT PASS TO AID/OTI RPORTER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2031 
TAGS: ADPM MARR MASS PGOV PREL VE
SUBJECT: DIPLOMATIC CARGO IMPOUNDED 
 
REF: IIR-6-902-9077-06 DTG 051519Z SEP 06 
 
Classified By: Robert Downes, Political Counselor, 
for Reason 1.4(b). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.  (C)  The Venezuelan National Guard (GN) seized and opened 
part of an inbound U.S. Military Group (MILGP) shipment on 
August 23.  The seized cargo consists of household effects 
(HHE) and commissary rations.  A shipment of FMS materials 
ordered and purchased by the BRV and consisting of ejection 
seat components was also part of the shipment, but was 
cleared and removed from the area before the seizure and 
remain in MILGP possession.  The BRV handling of this 
incident quickly spiraled out of control, with senior 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (BRV) officials accusing the 
United States of wrongdoing.  While numerous theories as to 
BRV motivation exist, it is unclear and will likely remain 
unclear what confluence of events or strategies led to the 
seizure.  What is clear is that, due to a conscious, 
high-level decision by the BRV, an historically smooth 
diplomatic protocol has been compromised, and could have 
lasting ramifications.  END SUMMARY 
 
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HOW IT NORMALLY WORKS 
--------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C)  The Military Group (MILGP) receives a support C-17 
flight every two months, normally carrying household effects 
(HHE) for military staff assigned to the Embassy, as well as 
commissary rations.  Dangerous military cargo can be carried 
on these flights.  MILGP has received this support for 
decades and has routinely enjoyed the administrative and 
logistical support of the BRV.  On August 23, MILGP followed 
standard procedures, requesting and receiving clearance for 
the incoming aircraft, as well as for all vehicles and 
personnel picking up the cargo.  On this occasion, as in the 
past, airport and National Guard (GN) personnel allowed the 
convoy to pass through customs and agriculture checks without 
incident. 
 
---------------------------- 
HOW IT DIDN'T WORK THIS TIME 
---------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C)  Upon exiting the airport, the convoy consisting of 
four trucks split into two convoys, one each of two 
tractor-trailers and two smaller trucks.  While the two 
smaller trucks, carrying a few HHE items and the FMS 
material, reached Caracas without incident, the two larger 
trucks proceeded to a holding area as the route between the 
airport and Caracas is only open to heavy traffic during 
certain hours.  It was during this wait that the GN 
approached the heavy trucks, initially saying there was a 
paperwork issue and directed the trucks to return to the 
airport to clear up some customs problems.  Threats to open 
the crates came from various angles, and, at one point during 
the night, a GN Captain even distributed tools to his 
soldiers with orders to open the crates. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Caracas MILGP Commander spoke with the GN Core 5 
Commander, Major General Luis Matto, who was at the airport, 
in the early morning hours of August 24.  MILGP Commander 
underlined that the containers had been properly cleared and 
in any case were protected under the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations (VCDR).  Matto indicated that Minister 
of Defense Baduel had specifically sent him to open the 
containers and that they had "clearance" from the MFA that 
the cargo was to be opened.  Once two Venezuelan prosecutors 
validated customs agents' previous, erroneous declarations 
that the cargo was not diplomatic, and over the repeated 
objections of the MILGP transportation NCO present at the 
scene, the cargo was opened and the containers emptied.  The 
MILGP NCO departed the scene at this time, to avoid any 
perception that his presence could be misconstrued as 
acceptance of the BRV actions, including under Article 36 of 
the VCDR. 
 
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HIGH-LEVEL INVOLVEMENT 
---------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C)  The fact that Minister of Defense Baduel ordered a 
two-star general out to the airport in the middle of the 
 
night conclusively demonstrates this whole matter was a 
conscious decision by senior BRV leadership.  Minister of 
Interior and Justice Jesse Chacon held a press conference on 
August 25, during which he called out individual Embassy 
employees (both officers and FSNs) and accused the USG of 
bringing dangerous, even subversive contraband into the BRV 
under the guise of "diplomatic cargo." 
 
¶6.  (C)  Then-Vice Foreign Minister (VFM) for North American 
and Multilateral Affairs MariPili Hernandez received Charge 
and visiting Special Coordinator for Venezuela on August 28. 
Hernandez's reaction to our broaching of the subject 
suggested she was not fully in the loop and did not have all 
the facts.  Even as she emphasized the need to maintain these 
interactions in diplomatic channels and out of the press, 
Hernandez had just issued a press release regarding her note 
of protest to the Embassy on this very incident. 
 
¶7.  (C)  Charge spoke September 13 with Rene Arreaza, Chief 
of Staff to Vice President Rangel, regarding the release of 
the impounded HHE.  Arreaza indicated he had talked with 
Rangel, who had, in turn, talked with Chavez on the subject. 
According to Arreaza, new VFM Jorge Valero Briceno 
(MariPili's successor) has been directed to meet with us 
following his return from the NAM conference on or about 
September 15 to resolve the issue.  Arreaza reported that 
Rangel had spoken directly with Customs chief Jose Vielma 
Mora, who reiterated that there was no basis on which to hold 
the seized cargo.  (NOTE:  While the impounded material 
physically resides with SENIAT (BRV Customs), they have told 
MILGP personnel that prosecutor Damaso Garcia in the Public 
Ministry is responsible for approving the release of the 
material.  END NOTE) 
 
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POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS 
--------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C)  There are a number of possible explanations for BRV 
behavior in this case.  We do not have all the answers, but a 
couple of basic points bear noting. 
 
-- This was not a matter of a junior GN officer exceeding his 
authority.  The fact that a GN major general was at the 
airport in the middle of the night, stating that he was 
acting on orders of the MOD, establishes rather that this was 
a planned activity by the BRV.  Moreover, the rapid, detailed 
engagement by three different BRV ministries, all suggesting 
nefarious USG motives, supports this conclusion. 
(Interestingly, the MOD has had little to say on this issue, 
letting the MFA, MOJ, and even the AG carry the load.) 
 
-- This harassment is consistent with two reliable behaviors 
by the BRV in this pre-electoral period: first, its dedicated 
effort to posit a purported conflict between the United 
States and Venezuela; and second, its continuing effort to 
stage events to distract attention from intractable issues of 
governance (crime, housing, etc.), where the BRV's record is 
poor. 
 
¶9.  (C)  Among the explanations we have heard for why the BRV 
undertook such action are: 
 
-- an effort to embarrass the United States by "discovering" 
munitions (i.e., the ejector seat materiel) in the shipment; 
 
-- a related effort to suggest a fear of military coup 
plotting; (Minister of Interior Jesse Chacon harped on this 
theme in length in his intervention.) 
 
--  an effort to embarrass the Venezuelan Air Force, 
traditionally viewed as the most pro-American armed service; 
and 
 
-- a distraction from the BRV's current problems of 
governance. 
 
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COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶10.  (C)  Even in the embattled environment surrounding 
USG-BRV relations, we have enjoyed relative ease with regard 
to diplomatic shipments prior to this incident.  Post will 
continue to operate through available diplomatic channels to 
retrieve all of the seized cargo. 
 
BROWNFIELD