VZCZCXRO4548
PP RUEHPB
DE RUEHBY #1366/01 2510610
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 080610Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5633
INFO RUEHPB/AMEMBASSY PORT MORESBY PRIORITY 1633
RUEHSV/AMEMBASSY SUVA PRIORITY 1191
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 2356
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 4732
RUEHBN/AMCONSUL MELBOURNE PRIORITY 3059
RUEHBAD/AMCONSUL PERTH PRIORITY 1654
RUEHDN/AMCONSUL SYDNEY PRIORITY 1006
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CANBERRA 001366 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR PARM AS
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S INTRODUCTORY CALL ON OPPOSITION 
LEADER KIM BEAZLEY 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Robert McCallum, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
SUMMARY 
 ------- 
 
¶1. (C/NF)  Opposition Leader Kim Beazley told the Ambassador 
during his September 6 introductory call that the alliance 
continued to enjoy broad bipartisan support in Australia. 
The Labor Party, for its part, could be counted on to 
continue to support the alliance,s core elements of ship 
visits, the joint facilities, and joint exercises.  If 
elected to replace Prime Minister John Howard, Beazley would 
maintain Australian forces in Afghanistan, since they 
represented a key part of the GOA,s response to the 9/11 
attacks on the U.S.  While he would also leave Australian 
troops in Baghdad to protect Australian diplomats and 
Australian naval forces in the Gulf, Beazley would make good 
on his longstanding pledge to withdraw Australian troops from 
southern Iraq.  In other comments, Beazley urged that the 
U.S. release David Hicks if he could not be brought before a 
civil court, since most Australians would never accept his 
conviction by a military commission, maintained that the 
Howard government had had full knowledge of the Australian 
Wheat Board,s violations of the Iraq sanctions regime, and 
reiterated Labor opposition to any decision by the government 
to enrich uranium. 
 
BIPARTISAN ALLIANCE SUPPORT 
--------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C/NF)  The Ambassador began his September 6 introductory 
call on Labor Party head and Opposition Leader Kim Beazley by 
noting that he looked forward to remaining in close touch 
with the opposition during his time in Australia.  We greatly 
valued, he said, the bipartisan underpinnings for the 
Alliance here, and appreciated that Labor,s continued 
support for our close ties was of paramount importance.  In 
this connection, the Ambassador recalled he had already met 
with Shadow Foreign Minister Kevin Rudd, who had observed 
that the party leadership,s support for the alliance was not 
cost free, in terms of Labor,s internal dynamics (reported 
SEPTEL).  Rudd had also provided a candid description of 
where Labor differed from the U.S. approach on certain 
issues, while reaffirming the leadership,s ironclad 
commitment to the overall alliance. 
 
LABOR'S HISTORIC BACKING OF U.S. TIES 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C/NF)  Opposition Leader Beazley responded by recalling 
wryly that the Ambassador,s immediate predecessor, with whom 
he had enjoyed a very constructive relationship, was not 
adverse to taking Labor publicly to task on occasion. 
Although this had prompted criticism, Beazley said the former 
Ambassador was merely doing his job -- and doing it well -- 
of promoting his country,s interests.  Australian 
politicians needed to be mature, and recognize that U.S 
representatives would react if their country,s policies were 
attacked.  This came with the territory, and Labor officials 
had to be prepared to wear it. 
 
¶4. (C/NF)  Continuing, Beazley reinforced Rudd,s comments on 
Labor,s historically strong support for the Alliance, 
recalling that the immediate post-war Menzies-led Liberal 
government had real concerns over Washington,s policies at 
the time, which it believed promoted destabilizing 
decolonialization in Southeast Asia.  Labor, by contrast, was 
guided by Prime Minister Curtin,s embrace of the United 
States during World War II as the region,s primary hope for 
a lasting postwar peace. This said, Beazley recounted that 
Labor had long recognized the relative power disparity 
between the United States and Australia on the international 
scene.  The United States is invariably the elephant in the 
room, he said, and while Australia,s views may not always 
matter that much in Washington, the reverse was never true. 
Australians remained obsessed with the United States, and 
followed Washington,s every move, perhaps to a fault. 
 
HIGH-LEVEL U.S. ATTENTION 
------------------------- 
 
 
CANBERRA 00001366  002 OF 003 
 
 
¶5. (C/NF)  The Ambassador, in responding, cautioned Beazley 
against underestimating the esteem in which Australia was now 
held at the highest levels of the U.S. Government.  The U.S. 
media too often could ignore Australia, but policy makers 
were keenly aware of the multifaceted interests that our two 
nations share, and that were driving our relations ever 
closer.   In the meantime, the Ambassador told Beazley that 
he was committed to ensuring Washington had a comprehensive 
picture of Australian views, which meant those of the 
Opposition and well as those of the Government.  At the same 
time, the Ambassador stressed his understanding of the key 
personal role Beazley had played as defense minister under 
the Hawke Government in defending and strengthening the 
alliance during crucial periods in the 1980s. 
 
SOUTHEAST ASIA/PACIFIC FOCUS 
---------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C/NF)  Beazley affirmed that the alliance continued to 
enjoy broad bipartisan support in Australia.  This did not 
mean, as Kevin Rudd had noted, that the Labor leadership did 
not have to pay certain costs within the party when it argued 
the alliance case.  Nonetheless, Labor could be counted upon 
to continue to support the alliance,s core elements, which 
Beazley described as the joint facilities, ship visits, and 
joint training exercises.  At the same time, Labor and the 
coalition government had different strategic policy outlooks, 
with Labor more focused on Southeast Asia and the Pacific 
region and the government less so, as a result of its 
preoccupation with the Middle East.  The government, and 
Foreign Minister Downer in particular, had badly misstated 
the facts, Beazley charged, when Downer claimed in August of 
2004 in Beijing that a conflict between the U.S. and China 
over Taiwan would not necessarily trigger Australia,s ANZUS 
obligations to aid the U.S.   In the event of a war between 
the United States and China, Australia would have absolutely 
no alternative but to line up militarily beside the U.S., 
Beazley said.  Otherwise, the alliance would be effectively 
dead and buried, something Australia could never afford to 
see happen.  It was important for Washington and Canberra to 
do everything possible to prevent such a catastrophe, but 
Downer should have known better than to have given Beijing 
any notion that Canberra would be able to sit out a conflict. 
(COMMENT:  Prime Minister Howard, subsequent to Downer,s 
Beijing remarks (which he insisted had been taken out of 
context), made clear Australia,s ANZUS alliance 
responsibilities  would always play a key role in the 
nation,s decisions, while maintaining it was improper to 
speculate about hypothetical future situations.  END COMMENT.) 
 
REMAIN IN AFGHANISTAN, BUT LEAVE IRAQ 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C/NF) Beazley continued that Labor also disagreed with 
important aspects of government policy toward the Middle 
East.  Labor supported Australia,s military contributions in 
Afghanistan, and would continue to do so until Hell freezes 
over, since Australia,s actions clearly fell under its ANZUS 
obligations to respond to the 9/11 attacks on the U.S.  Iraq 
was different, he maintained, and was a terrible mistake 
because it damaged, rather than strengthened, the overall war 
on terror.  Labor would not commit an act of vandalism, 
however, if it came to power.  Australian troops in Baghdad 
guarding Australian diplomats would remain, as would 
Australian naval forces protecting gulf oil terminals against 
terrorist attacks, although Beazley would make good on his 
longstanding pledge to withdraw Australian troops presently 
in southern Iraq. 
 
FREE DAVID HICKS 
---------------- 
 
¶8. (C/NF)  David Hicks was a ratbag who had almost certainly 
been up to nefarious things, and should probably spend a long 
time in jail, Beazley said.  Still, he predicted most 
Australians would never accept his conviction by a military 
commission, even if the Administration manages to structure 
one acceptable to the Supreme Court.  Unless he can be tried 
by a civil court or by a fully constituted court marshal, it 
would be better, Beazley argued, to let him go.  The British 
citizens who were released would never pose a threat again, 
 
CANBERRA 00001366  003 OF 003 
 
 
since they were under constant surveillance by the UK 
authorities.  Hicks would be no different, and would quickly 
fade into well-deserved obscurity. 
 
AUSTRALIAN WHEAT BOARD 
---------------------- 
 
¶9. (C/NF) Beazley maintained the Howard government had had 
full knowledgeof the Australian Wheat Board,s appalling 
bribes that undermined the sanctions regime against Saddam. 
It had repeatedly turned a blind eye to numerous indications 
of wrong doing, and had lied about what it had known and 
when.  Not only had it sanctioned blatant wrongdoing, but the 
government had facilitated the destruction of the one 
mechanism that might have forced Saddam to satisfy 
international demands to prove he was not pursuing weapons 
programs.  The U.S. had every reason to be outraged with 
Howard, and Beazley urged that Washington express disapproval. 
 
NO TO ENRICHMENT 
------------------ 
 
¶10. (C/NF)   Australia should not pursue uranium enrichment, 
Beazley said, while repeating Labor,s public concerns that 
such a decision by Canberra would be detrimental to 
international counter-proliferation efforts.  Other nations 
in Australia,s region would use Canberra,s decision to 
start programs of their own, and it would be virtually 
impossible to convince them Australia would not seek at some 
point to use the technology as the basis for a nuclear 
weapons program. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶11. (C/NF)  Beazley's Chief of Staff David Fredericks and DCM 
were also present at the meeting, which was very cordial 
throughout.  Beazley, whose own personal support for the 
alliance has been evident for decades, clearly wanted to make 
the twin points that he has a deep understanding of its 
importance and that as Opposition Leader he recognizes most 
of the Australian electorate are not about to risk the 
country's security by choosing a prime minister with suspect 
credentials in this regard.  Although the reasons for Mark 
Latham's loss to John Howard in 2004 are legion, Labor 
recognizes that his multiple, embarrassing pronouncements on 
issues affecting the alliance represented blunders of the 
first order.  In this same vein, Beazley's office made a 
point of issuing a press release on his meeting with the 
Ambassador shortly after it concluded (which it cleared with 
us) underscoring Beazley's strong commitment to the ANZUS 
alliance. 
MCCALLUM