VZCZCXRO0675
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHUP #1953/01 2691343
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 261343Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0061
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BUDAPEST 001953 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO NSC - DAMON WILSON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2011 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM ECON HU
SUBJECT: BUDAPEST DEMONSTRATIONS: FIDESZ OUT FOR A SPIN 
 
REF: BUDAPEST 1941 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: Classified by POL/C Eric V. Gaudiosi; Reasons 1.4 (b) an 
d (d) 
 
 
FIDESZ OFFICIALS: A CRISIS FIT FOR AN EXPERT 
 
¶1.  (U) Addressing an "emergency session" of diplomatic and 
business community leaders at the Budapest Atlantic Forum 
September 26, former FM Janos Martonyi and MP Zsolt Nemeth 
presented FIDESZ's views on the demonstrations. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Martonyi cast the "Gyurcsany tape" in the context 
of the government's "creeping assault" on Hungary's 
democratic institutions, commenting that "only the PM's 
language should have surprised us."  The government, he 
continued, is "legal but no longer legitimate," and having 
"lost credibility" with the public it would inevitably "lose 
credit" from the international community.  FIDESZ MP Janos 
Horvath echoed this comment, attacking the "myth" that only 
the Gyurcsany government could implement reforms and 
insisting the financial community would care more about 
"credibility than any balance sheet." 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Turning to the October 1 local elections, Martonyi 
walked back from recent FIDESZ references to the vote as a 
referendum, characterizing it now as a "message."  "Whatever 
happens in the elections," he continued, FIDESZ believes the 
parties must "sit down October 2" to agree on the formation 
of a "one-year provisional government of experts" to "manage 
the crisis."  Although he believes the PM to be "morally 
dead," he would respect the MSZP's decision to have him 
participate in the talks. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Nemeth went further in his brief remarks, 
describing the PM as "a notorious pathological liar."  He 
cast the Gyurcsany government's policies as "living Kadarism" 
and stated, "this is about our past - about communism" and 
about the betrayal of "Hungary's judeo-christian values." 
That is why the nation had "spontaneously" and 
"fantastically" risen up in response.  Should Gyurcsany not 
pursue the government of experts, he concluded, there are 
"more negative scenarios" including a "declining moral and 
economic situation" and "growing social unrest and 
instability." 
 
¶5.  (C) President Solyom, known as a staunch proponent of the 
rule of law, sought out the Ambassador September 26 to make 
clear that his "first priority" is "Hungary's economic 
stability."  Although he commented that one cannot "tolerate 
lies," he indicated that he is focused on getting through the 
present economic straits rather than getting rid of PM 
Gyurcsany. 
 
COMMENT: USED ORBAN - GOOD ACCELERATION; BAD STEERING; NO 
BRAKES 
 
¶6.  (C) FIDESZ continues to spin ... perhaps slightly out of 
control.  With only days left before the elections, their 
leaders - albeit with Orban conspicuous in his absence - are 
trying to chart a course beyond the local elections.  Their 
call for a "government of experts," as Nemeth admitted to the 
Ambassador September 25, has no constitutional basis, and 
their argument that FIDESZ could better implement reforms 
lacks credibility given their campaign promises. 
¶7.  (C) This highlights FIDESZ's central dilemma: although 
the demonstrations have mobilized the party's base, it is not 
clear that they have expanded it.  The tape may reinforce 
criticism of Gyurcsany as insincere and even autocratic 
(heard even within the coalition), but thus far there is no 
sign that Hungary's critical swing voters are more offended 
by Gyurcsany's comments than they are by the opposition's 
actions.  Indeed, many doubt Orban is in any position to cast 
stones.  Despite his public comment this weekend that he has 
"never lied to the Hungarian people," our colleagues in the 
diplomatic community clearly recall Orban's remarks to EU 
Ambassadors during the campaign, in which he urged them to 
"pay no attention to what I say to get elected" and promised 
to pursue radical reforms upon taking office.  Orban has been 
largely silent - or silenced - since. 
 
¶8.  (C) The elections are a target of opportunity to attack 
Gyurcsany, and FIDESZ spokesmen appear to be setting few 
limits on their rhetorical outbursts, perhaps in part because 
they see little legitimacy in a regime they can only see as 
"communist."  But they may succeed only in making the mad 
madder.  Coalition insiders maintain that the demonstrations 
will increase their turn-out more than the opposition's, and 
recent polls indicate a 14% increase in those planning to 
vote on October 1. 
 
BUDAPEST 00001953  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
¶9.  (C) Although he has put FIDESZ on the offensive, it is 
important to remember that Orban is attacking from a position 
of tactical strength but strategic weakness.  His rhetoric 
notwithstanding, the local elections have no impact on the 
composition of Parliament.  The more he inflates their 
importance, the more he risks the perception that a poor 
showing makes him a three-time loser.  His government took 
little action to right Hungary's economic course, and he is 
offering few constructive alternatives to the Gyurcsany plan 
now.  In an open letter released September 26, Hungarian 
Democratic Forum (MDF) President Ibolya David criticized both 
the government and FIDESZ in equal measure, branding FIDESZ a 
"left-wing party" that had embraced "populist demagoguery" 
and "affiliated with right-wing extremists" because "the 
political stance of Victor Orban is simple: gaining power at 
any price."  There are already those in the party - even 
among its founding members - who believe the time has come 
for a change in leadership if FIDESZ is to remain a party 
rather than become a cult of personality. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FOLEY