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DE RUEHBM #1444/01 2570901
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FM AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5167
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BUCHAREST 001444 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/NCE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/13/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PNAT MD EU RO
SUBJECT: DAS KRAMER DISCUSSIONS WITH FM UNGUREANU AND 
SENIOR ROMANIAN ADVISORS ON TRANSNISTRIA "REFERENDUM" 
 
Classified By: DCM Mark A. Taplin for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: During separate meetings with Foreign 
Minister Ungureanu and senior advisors in the offices of the 
President and Prime Minister on September 7 in Bucharest, EUR 
DAS Kramer provided the Department's perspective on regional 
issues including the upcoming independence referendum in 
Transnistria.  Kramer urged Romanian authorities to join the 
international community in forcefully rejecting the 
legitimacy of the referendum, and underscored the need to put 
the focus squarely back on Russia's unhelpful role in solving 
the Transnistria question.  Ungureanu readily agreed, noting 
that he would direct the Foreign Ministry to seek a clear EU 
position on the referendum at the next GAERC September 15. 
Ungureanu also said he would raise the idea of a Justice and 
Home Affairs peacekeeping mission as a way to push the 
Russians to withdraw their "peacekeeping" forces.  Senior 
advisors in the Prime Minister's office told DAS Kramer that 
the Romanian side wanted a bilateral agreement with Moldova 
to underscore joint commitment to a European "vocation" for 
the two countries, with a focus on concrete projects 
including transportation corridors, customs, and joint 
initiatives against organized crime.  Presidential counselors 
largely agreed with DAS Kramer's points regarding the 
illegality of the Transnistrian referendum, but at least 
initially counseled a low-key approach, citing the sometimes 
prickly nature of relations between Romania and Moldova.  All 
of our interlocutors appreciated the opportunity to hear our 
views from DAS Kramer and to coordinate our approaches.  End 
Summary. 
 
Meeting with Foreign Minister 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Foreign Minister Mihai Razvan Ungureanu heartily 
endorsed EUR Deputy Assistant Secretary David Kramer's 
outline of the U.S. approach to dealing with the 
Transnistrian conflict, including the need for the 
international community to be clear that it does not accept 
the Transnistrian September 18 referendum. DAS Kramer 
emphasized that the Transnistrian referendum was unlikely to 
reflect the popular will given the heavy-handed Russian role, 
the loaded referendum questions, and lack of a genuine 
democratic process.  He said that the USG, OSCE, EU, and 
Ukraine had issued clear statements that they will not 
recognize the referendum, and urged the Romanian government 
to take similar steps.  He added that if Russia recognizes 
the referendum, the international community should stop the 
"charade" of pretending there was an impartial Russian role 
in Moldova.  Saying that "You speak my language," Ungureanu 
agreed with Kramer that considerable emphasis ought to be 
placed on pushing Russia to make a clear choice --  either to 
make its opposition to the referendum clearly known, or to 
have its endorsement of the referendum lead to a 
reconsideration of Russia's role as an mediator on 
Transnistria. 
 
¶3.  (C) Ungureanu said some European colleagues had called on 
the EU to issue a statement on the illegality of the 
Transnistrian referendum during the EU's informal General 
Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) on September 
¶1.  He said all the new EU states as well as Germany strongly 
supported Moldova and referred to the referendum as illegal 
at that meeting.  Ungureanu tasked his staff with the need to 
"get a clear EU position" on the Transnistrian referendum at 
the next GAERC on September 15.  Ungureanu suggested it could 
be a powerful statement, coming either from European Council 
Secretary General Javier Solana or the Finnish Presidency of 
 
SIPDIS 
the EU.  He mentioned the Finnish were busy finalizing the EU 
partnership agreement with Russia and that a strong statement 
on Transnistria could make the Russians take note.  Ungureanu 
suggested it would be good for the U.S. to push for a strong 
EU statement condemning the referendum in Brussels and 
Helsinki as well. 
 
¶4.  (C) Raising the issue of Russian forces stationed in 
Transnistria, DAS Kramer commented that a much smaller 
contingent, perhaps a third of the size and consisting of 
300-500 police and customs personnel as well as a smaller, 
rapid-reaction kind of military force, could do the job. 
Ungureanu said he would raise the idea of a "Justice and Home 
Affairs peacekeeping mission" at the next GAERC meeting. He 
agreed that gathering the political commitments for such a 
force could help answer Russia's unwillingness to withdraw 
troops from Transnistria by offering an intermediate solution 
that would not leave a void and allow Russian participation. 
Kramer noted that structuring command and control of any such 
OSCE-EU Russia peacekeeping operation would be a delicate 
matter. 
 
 
BUCHAREST 00001444  002 OF 003 
 
 
¶5.  (C) In response to comments made by DAS Kramer in regard 
to Belgian efforts to solve Transnistria under its OSCE 
chairmanship, Ungureanu was likewise skeptical of their 
value.  He said he would look to pull aside the Belgian 
permanent representative to the OSCE in Vienna to discourage 
the Belgians' planned trip to Tiraspol the following week. 
Ungureanu said he would also raise issues of Transnistrian 
human rights violations in the Council of Europe, making sure 
to press on a "point that aches" for the Russian chair. 
Ungureanu also wondered whether the UN Mission in Kosovo 
(UNMIK) would consider issuing a statement rejecting any 
comparisons between Kosovo and other frozen conflicts such as 
Transnistria. 
 
¶6.  (C) Regarding Ukraine, Ungureanu said he believed FM 
Tarasyuk was uneasy in his position.  He felt he would 
however "take the challenge" and continue in his position, 
with the unfortunate result that he would be called upon to 
"whitewash" abroad the new government's actions.  Ungureanu 
agreed that it was critical to keep Ukraine on track in its 
actions regarding Transnistria.  Ungureanu was skeptical 
regarding Transnistria Supreme Soviet chairman Shevchuk, whom 
he believed could be tied to former Ukrainian national 
security and defense council head Poroshenko.  Regarding the 
changes within Ukraine, Ungureanu concluded that he "wasn't a 
false prophet in Sofia" when he was wary of Ukraine's 
readiness to join NATO. 
 
Engaging the Two Palaces 
------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) PM Chief of Staff Mihnea Constantinescu underscored 
Romania's continued interest in developments in Moldova, 
noting that Romania wanted a basic bilateral agreement to 
underscore the countries' commitment to European values and 
identity, and to a common European space.  (Note: referring 
obliquely to President Basescu's recent statements on 
unifying with Moldova, he added that he wanted to "dispel the 
myth" that the objective was to seek Moldovan acknowledgement 
of a common "Romanian" space.)  He acknowledged that these 
talks were complicated by matters of choreography, language, 
form, and titles.  While an empty "Soviet-style" friendship 
treaty made no sense, the Romanian objective was to clearly 
enunciate a common European vocation for Moldova and to focus 
on concrete matters including transportation corridors to be 
financed by the EU, customs, and joint initiatives to combat 
organized crime.  He said other Romanian initiatives 
currently underway were consistent with this approach, 
including moves to include Moldova as part of the Southeast 
European Cooperation process and in a Central European FTA 
(with Romania, Croatia, and Bulgaria.).  Foreign Policy 
counselor Calin Fabian said that the Moldovan preference was 
for concrete, pragmatic issues including improvements in 
transportation, gas, and petroleum infrastructure.  For 
example, they were interested in modifying their rail network 
to meet EU standards.   While the political picture in 
Moldova complicated the way ahead, Fabian stressed, 
growing economic relations and bilateral trade could provide 
a useful lever. 
 
¶8.  (C) Constantinescu said that he "totally agreed" with the 
approach Kramer outlined to confronting the validity of the 
Transnistrian referendum.  The issue would be a litmus test 
of the weight of the United States and the EU in Moldova, he 
went on, and might result in convincing Chisinau that relying 
on the support of the West could bring better results than a 
policy of just "being stubborn" or by seeking favors from 
Moscow.   Constantinescu said he was pleased that longtime 
Romanian warnings about the significance of Transnistria as a 
"black hole" of criminality and lawlessness were being 
heeded, but also added that the weakness of the Romanian 
position was that it was seen by many in terms of 
black-and-white stereotypes.  He said that the Romanian 
interest now was to be as persuasive as possible within the 
European Union, noting that that it could be a good platform 
for EU cooperation with the United States. 
 
¶9.  (C) DAS Kramer also met with the Romanian President's 
Political Advisor Claudiu Saftoiu, Foreign Affairs Advisor 
Anca Ilinoiu, and Deputy National Security Counselor 
Constantin Degeratu.  Ilinoiu said Moldova remained a 
priority of President Basescu's foreign policy agenda, and 
expressed appreciation for DAS Kramer's trip.  She bemoaned 
the fact that the international community appeared to be 
reacting to events in Transnistria rather than taking a 
proactive approach to frozen conflicts in general.  While 
confirming that Romania would not recognize the referendum, 
she urged DAS Kramer to "minimize" the significance of the 
event itself.  She also cited the need to link events in 
Transnistria with the lack of democratic institutions in 
 
BUCHAREST 00001444  003 OF 003 
 
 
Chisinau.   General Degeratu said that while Transnistria was 
not a military threat, one nevertheless needed to remember 
that there was a Soviet-style army there, with structures 
staffed by senior officials on the Russian payroll.  (note: 
Degeratu likened the Russian presence in Transnistria to that 
of the Republika Serpska officials on Milosevic's payroll in 
the former Yugoslavia.)  Saftoiu echoed Ilinoiu's call for 
"minimizing" the importance of the referendum, citing 
Voronin's unpredictable behavior and the history of difficult 
bilateral relations between Romania and Moldova.  He 
concluded, however, that "you can count on our commitment" on 
this issue.  As he did in other meetings, Kramer pushed 
strongly for Romania to take a firm, unambiguous position on 
the referendum.  He also gently chided Saftoiu and Ilinoiu on 
President Basescu,s recent "unhelpful" comments on 
unification with Moldova. 
 
¶10.  (C) Comment: The presidential counselors, especially 
Ilinoiu, appeared eager to be heard on the subject of 
Transnistria, but their points at first were not entirely in 
synch with the Foreign Ministry and Prime Minister's office. 
Saftoiu subsequently told Polcouns that he had wanted to 
express Romanian concern about putting too much pressure on a 
prickly Russia, but that Romania would nevertheless stand 
beside the U.S. position.  National Security Advisor Medar 
told us privately on the margins of the V-10 defense 
officials conference the next day that he would announce in 
Chisinau over the weekend that Romania would not/not 
recognize the legitimacy of the Transnistrian referendum. 
End comment. 
Taubman