VZCZCXRO7705
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHRL #2654/01 2550602
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 120602Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO RUEAHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEFHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5172
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNFRG/FRG COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BERLIN 002654 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DHS FOR PROSENZWEIG 
STATE FOR EUR/AGS, EUR/PGI, EUR/ERA, S/CT, EB, INL AND L 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2016 
TAGS: PTER KHLS EAIR PGOV PREL GM
SUBJECT: DHS COUNSELOR ROSENZWEIG PUSHES FOR CT PROGRESS IN 
BERLIN 
 
Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Economic Affairs Robert F. Cekuta 
 for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  Regarding Interior Minister Schaeuble's 
planned September 24-26 trip to Washington, German Interior 
Ministry Director General Guenter Krause told visiting 
Department of Homeland Security Counselor to the Assistant 
Secretary for Policy Paul Rosenzweig September 4-5 that 
 
SIPDIS 
Schaeuble's priorities include fighting terrorist use of the 
Internet, Visa Waiver Program access for German Children's 
Passports (Kinderpass), and a registered traveler biometric 
pilot program.  Counselor Rosenzweig said U.S. priorities 
included visa lookout data sharing (HSPD-6) and fingerprint 
data sharing.  The two also discussed the PNR issue, which 
Krause said would not interrupt flights because Lufthansa 
would continue to provide the data even without any agreement 
in place and other countries' airlines were not subject to 
German data protection rules.  Krause mentioned German plans 
to create a combined counterterrorism database.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
MINISTER'S VISIT DELIVERABLES: U.S. PRIORITIES 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶2. (C) HSPD-6: Counselor Rosenzweig said DHS Secretary 
Chertoff would have no higher priority than the expanded 
sharing of terrorist watch list data.  The two sides should 
build on the data sharing to boost security for the World Cup 
by institutionalizing it reciprocally, he said.  Krause said 
Germany favored more data exchange: the Pruem agreements 
greatly expand data sharing with select EU partners; Germany 
needs to think about how to conduct further data exchanges 
with the U.S. but the procedures need not be complicated. 
Experts from both sides should meet to discuss it, Krause 
said repeatedly.  The U.S. experts should read the Germany's 
Pruem treaty with Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Spain, and tell Germany 
about U.S. concerns regarding German data protection 
provisions, he continued.  Krause handed Counselor Rosenzweig 
an English language (EU "Limitee") text of the Pruem 
agreement.  Germany wants to be able to answer inevitable 
questions from the Bundestag, for example on data protection, 
Krause said.  Counselor Rosenzweig noted the concern about 
Visa Waiver Program vulnerabilities in Congress, especially 
after the London airplane plot and added the GAO report to be 
released September 7 was titled "Stronger Actions Needed to 
Mitigate the Risks of Visa Waiver Program."  Congress needs 
to see that the USG was addressing risks that might be 
associated with the VWP through measures such as via broader 
data exchange. 
 
¶3. (C) Fingerprint Data Sharing: Krause responded to 
Counselor Rosenzweig's proposal by saying case-by-case 
fingerprint sharing with the U.S. is no problem.  However, 
broader sharing would require a new law and the MOI would 
face many questions.  Is it truly necessary to exchange all 
data, or only part?  Which part?  How would data be handled? 
Will data be deleted, and when?  What will the U.S. do with 
the data?  It is complicated, Krause explained, but should be 
possible if it is reciprocal and acceptable to the Bundestag. 
 Experts should meet and find a way to proceed said Krause. 
A hit/no hit system would be easier to imagine than full 
access, he continued.  Krause asked about the status of 
Interpol's fingerprint data exchange program.  Counselor 
Rosenzweig replied it was still a long way away; but in 
theory it is a good idea in the long term.  Krause noted that 
a pilot fingerprint data sharing project with Austria in 
preparation for the Pruem treaty going into force on November 
11, 2006 had produced many fingerprint "hits" -- i.e., 
individuals either convicted or suspected of crimes on both 
sides of the German-Austrian border. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
MINISTER'S VISIT DELIVERABLES: GERMAN PRIORITIES 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶4. (C) Terrorism and the Internet: Krause reported Minister 
Schaeuble decided to make this issue a focus of German G-8 
and EU Presidency and would be sure to raise it with FBI 
Director Mueller (in Berlin Sept. 19) and in his meetings in 
Washington.  The Internet had played a key role in 
radicalizing the German train bomb plotters and in teaching 
 
BERLIN 00002654  002 OF 003 
 
 
them how to build a bomb, Krause added.  Krause explained 
Germany wants to coordinate Internet surveillance, 
concentrate on it in the German Joint Counterterrorism Center 
(GTAZ), and voluntarily share the workload by sharing 
analysts' reviews of websites.  Germany had begun discussions 
with its EU partners: France is prepared to cooperate and 
Spain is doing some work in the area, Krause reported, but 
Italy has not turned to the issue and the UK is unwilling to 
share its analysts' conclusions.  The G-8 is not as far 
along, Krause said, and so Germany would only send forward a 
proposal for a questionnaire and a best practices paper. 
Counselor Rosenzweig responded the Department of Justice or 
the intelligence community, not DHS, were more engaged in 
website analysis.  In principle, the U.S. favors sharing 
information, but other agencies had the lead on the issue, 
and the U.S. had First Amendment concerns.  Taking action 
(i.e., shutting down websites) would be harder for the U.S. 
to agree to, although when a site crossed a line and got 
involved in terrorist activity, then the U.S. could take 
action, Counselor Rosenzweig said. 
 
¶5. (C) Kinderpass: Krause said Germany wants to resolve the 
Kinderpass (Children's Passport) issue.  Germany does not 
want to fingerprint children under 14 because their 
fingerprints change, Krause said.  (NOTE: A German 
Kinderpass, although it is machine-readable and contains a 
digital photograph, does not contain an RFID chip.  German 
parents can and do, however, also obtain regular RFID 
biometric passports for their children, and like all other 
new German passports, a child's regular German passport does 
contain the digital photo on the RFID chip.  End Note). 
 
¶6. (C) Registered Traveler Biometric Pilot Project: Krause 
asked about the status of the U.S.-Dutch initiative and 
pointed out Germany had its own pilot project in Frankfurt. 
Counselor Rosenzweig explained the U.S.-Dutch project has not 
yet started and he outlined several issues that had come up. 
The Netherlands, for example, had sought a program for all 
Schengen residents, but DHS would only agree to one for Dutch 
citizens due to the need for thorough background checks. 
Dutch citizens had to give consent for the background check 
and DHS wanted to understand the depth of the background 
check, the grounds for any denials of access to the program, 
and the names and biographic data of anyone denied.  Lastly, 
there are administrative and logistical challenges to 
implementing the program in U.S. airports.  Counselor 
Rosenzweig concluded by offering that experts meet to discuss 
the program. 
 
¶7. (C) Counterterrorism Center Personnel Exchange: Krause 
noted U.S. officials already work closely with the German 
GTAZ counterterrorism center, but German authorities are 
prepared to invite a staff member from NCTC or other 
appropriate U.S. CT center to visit and observe the work of 
the German GTAZ for a week. 
 
---------------------------- 
PASSENGER NAME RECORDS (PNR) 
---------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Noting the U.S.-EU PNR discussions Sept 8 in Brussels, 
Krause said the EU had to solve the PNR problem, that it made 
no sense to have different solutions for the 25 member 
states.  Krause said a one year interim agreement was also 
unsatisfactory; the German Bundestag would need to ratify it, 
a process which would take a year.  There needs to be a PNR 
final agreement.  Given the approaching deadline, Germany had 
reluctantly agreed to try to find its own solution, Krause 
said.  Counselor Rosenzweig replied the UK airline bomb plot 
has sensitized the U.S. Congress and DHS is interested in 
going beyond the previous PNR agreement, as Secretary 
Chertoff had outlined in his recent op-ed article.  The UK 
has decided to solve the problem with an "Air Navigation 
Order" to authorize the provision of PNR data, but the draft 
agreement from Brussels is problematic, Counselor Rosenzweig 
said.  Krause responded Congress' position is clear and the 
U.S. is in a strong position, but the problem in the EU is 
the transfer of data to other U.S. agencies.  Krause noted he 
had told Minister Schaeuble that the end result of the 
European Court of Justice decision is that EU countries' 
airlines would return to the status quo before the U.S.-EU 
agreement, with airlines forced to provide the data of they 
 
BERLIN 00002654  003 OF 003 
 
 
wanted to fly to the U.S. 
 
¶9. (C) MOI Official for Air and Sea Security Holger Sperlich 
said PNR is "not such a big problem" because Lufthansa would 
continue to provide PNR data to be able to continue its 
flights, despite the risk of a lawsuit by data protection 
authorities in the German state of North Rhine - Westphalia, 
where Lufthansa is incorporated.  Krause appeared angry to 
hear German state, rather than federal, data protection 
authorities might intervene.  Counselor Rosenzweig asked 
whether obtaining passenger consent might resolve the issue. 
Sperlich replied MOI data protection officials said it would, 
but North Rhine - Westphalia data protection officials had 
said it would not.  Krause said the state authorities should 
leave the issue to the German federal government.  He said 
skeptical German data protection authorities did not realize 
that EU travelers were better off with the agreement in 
place, because it constrained U.S. use of the data.  Sperlich 
clarified that U.S. (and other, e.g., Asian) airlines flying 
to the U.S. from Germany are not subject to the German 
federal or state data protection rules that applied to 
Lufthansa. 
 
---------------------- 
NEW GERMAN CT DATABASE 
---------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) Krause explained Interior Minister Schaeuble and the 
interior ministers of the sixteen German federal states had 
agreed September 4 on the framework for a combined 
counterterrorism database after years of wrangling caused by 
state/federal, law enforcement/security service, and 
political party differences.  The agreement is better than 
MOI had previously expected due to the ministers' concerns 
about the train bomb plot, Krause commented.  The MOI's 
research had shown that different German agencies had 
different information about terrorist suspects -- even when 
they thought they had shared their information.  The MOI has 
not yet drafted implementing legislation, Krause noted, but 
the new database would have two tiers of access: virtually 
all police and security personal would have access to check 
names and obtain simple biographic data from all other 
agencies.  If they wanted additional information, they would 
need to inquire with the office that held it.  The database 
would also include instructions, for example, on which people 
to arrest, which to question, and which to simply report 
having observed. 
 
------------ 
OTHER ISSUES 
------------ 
 
¶11. (C) Krause briefly touched on several issues he said 
Minister Schaeuble would not discuss with Secretary Chertoff 
in Washington.  These issues included the Schengen 
Information System, the Container Security Initiative (CSI), 
Megaports, and Southeast Europe Cooperative Initiative 
(SECI).  In the same vein, Krause said U.S. access to Europol 
data hinged on Irish ratification of the third protocol; then 
a basis for U.S.- data exchange could be resolved.  Counselor 
Rosenzweig observed there were Megaports enhancements on the 
horizon, with first phase pilot projects in Hong Kong and 
elsewhere. 
 
¶12. (U) This message was cleared by Counselor Rosenzweig. 
TIMKEN JR