VZCZCXRO3364
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV
DE RUEHBW #1407/01 2441200
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 011200Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9275
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BELGRADE 001407 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/SCE; PLEASE PASS TO U/S BURNS, A/S FRIED, DAS 
DICARLO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: TADIC AND KOSTUNICA 
 
Classified By: Amb. Michael C. Polt for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
Summary and Introduction 
--------------------------- 
 
¶1.  (U) As Tadic heads to Washington, we would like to share 
some additional observations about him, about how his views 
on key issues compare with Kostunica's, and why his visit 
represents an opportunity different from Kostunica's July 
visit. 
 
¶2. (S) Tadic tends to take a more realist, pro-Western tack 
than the prime minister on major issues.  In contrast with 
Kostunica, Tadic attaches more importance to U.S.-Serbian 
relations; he privately accepts the reality of Kosovo's 
independence and is focused on "the day after;" he openly 
calls for Mladic's arrest; and he publicly supports Serbia's 
membership in NATO. 
 
¶3. (S) As leader of Serbia's largest democratic party, Tadic 
faces a daunting task of balancing his electoral ambition 
(and bringing his DS into a leading position in government) 
and the need for good relations with Kostunica.  His desire 
to avoid conflict with Kostunica and to maintain his party's 
poll numbers makes him less bold than he should be on some 
key issues. 
 
¶4. (S) Tadic is perhaps the best interlocutor we have to 
manage the Kosovo endgame and other key issues, and he is 
likely the democrats' best shot to lead Serbia toward a 
stable, democratic and prosperous future (although any future 
democratic government would almost certainly be centered 
around a Tadic-Kostunica coalition).  We therefore have a 
clear interest in supporting him and urging him to be bolder. 
His visit to the U.S. gives us a good opportunity to do this 
- by reinforcing his pro-Western vision for Serbia, by 
demonstrating to the Serbian people the benefits of a strong 
relationship with the U.S., and by strengthening the 
President's role in the defense and security area 
(particularly important as we approach the Kosovo 
denouement). 
 
Some examples of where Tadic's approach differs from that of 
Kostunica: 
 
Kosovo 
------- 
 
¶5. (S) While the PM refuses, publicly or privately, to 
acknowledge the likelihood of Kosovo independence, Tadic 
privately recognizes the importance of preparing for 
independence and securing what is possible for Serbia and 
Kosovo's Serbs.  He has appealed directly to us on two 
occasions to "give him a good deal on decentralization and 
churches" to help him through elections.  You might recall 
that it was Tadic who, at great political risk, called on 
K-Serbs to participate in the October 2004 elections in 
Kosovo.   Kostunica refused to do so, and Tadic's numbers 
dropped (a fact that has made him more gun shy about sticking 
his neck out on Kosovo in future).  As DefMin in March 2004, 
Tadic played a crucial role in ensuring a calm and 
responsible reaction to violence in Kosovo. 
 
¶6. (S) Tadic has recently begun focusing on "the day after" 
Kosovo's status is decided.  In private meetings with 
Ambassadors Polt and Wisner, he has emphasized that he will 
begin the day after Kosovo's settlement to strengthen 
relations with the three axes of Serbian foreign relations - 
the U.S., Europe and, inescapably, Russia.  Although he might 
publicly toe the government line and stand behind Kostunica, 
his head is in the right place to accept the inevitability of 
Kosovo's independence and help his country move forward 
toward Euro-Atlantic integration. 
 
War Crimes 
----------- 
 
¶7. (S) Tadic will be more receptive to messages on ICTY 
cooperation than Kostunica.  Tadic openly calls for Mladic's 
arrest and appears committed to real action in bringing him 
and the other fugitives to justice.  From the beginning of 
his term in office, Tadic recognized the importance of ICTY 
cooperation, whereas Kostunica has only reluctantly been 
cornered into taking on the ICTY issue (when he became PM in 
2004, he stated that ICTY cooperation was not a priority). 
Last year, Tadic visited Srebrenica on the 10th anniversary 
of the massacre, gave an emotional address to the nation 
after viewing the gruesome Skorpions video, and delivered an 
apology in BiH for Serb war crimes.  (He did later visit the 
site of Serb victims in eastern Bosnia, but refused a demand 
 
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from Bosnian Serbs to visit that site during his Srebrenica 
trip.)   By contrast, Kostunica met with several PIFWCs on 
their way to surrender to ICTY, has never pronounced the word 
"arrest" in relation to Mladic, and called Srebrenica a 
necessary cou 
nteroffensive on the part of Bosnian Serbs. 
 
Montenegro 
----------- 
 
¶8. (S) Tadic's approach to the Montenegro referendum also 
gives us some insight into how he might be more amenable in 
the Kosovo endgame.  Although Tadic, like Kostunica, publicly 
advocated the preservation of the State Union, he also 
supported the EU/Lajcak process (Kostunica tried to work 
directly with Solana, without consulting Montenegro leaders, 
e.g. trying to get the 260,000 Montenegrins in Serbia on the 
voters list).  Tadic immediately recognized the results of 
the referendum and visited Podgorica three times in the 
following weeks, all while Kostunica continued to grumble 
about the process and initially made an effort to bring into 
question the outcome. 
 
Relations with the U.S. and NATO 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (S) Unlike Kostunica, Tadic is committed to building 
U.S.-Serbian military cooperation.  Also, unlike Kostunica, 
Tadic openly supports Serbia's membership in NATO and has 
actively pushed key security agreements with NATO and the 
U.S. (GLOC, SOFA).  Kostunica publicly criticized the GLOC 
initially and hesitated in his support for the SOFA.  He has 
been overly timid on some counts - delaying the naming of a 
new reform-minded chief of defense or retiring old-school 
generals from the military, for example.  Tadic's visit 
offers a good opportunity to bring home deliverables (with 
SOFA, discussions with Ohio) to improve U.S.-Serbian military 
cooperation. 
 
¶10. (S) While Tadic differs from Kostunica on these key 
issues, he is caught in a balancing act as the country nears 
elections.  Tadic is assuming he will have to work with 
Kostunica after elections, and is therefore careful not to 
alienate him.  Under any scenario in which democratic forces 
beat the Radicals, Tadic and Kostunica will need to work 
together to some extent.  However, if Tadic heads into 
elections with strong support (including from the U.S.), he 
feels he can afford to take bolder action to lead the 
democratic forces to an electoral victory. 
 
¶11. (S) In sum, despite his shortcomings as a leader, Tadic 
will be a much more receptive interlocutor during his visit 
than the Prime Minister, especially on the major questions of 
Kosovo, ICTY and mil-mil cooperation.  This visit offers the 
opportunity to secure at least private assurances from Tadic 
of even more decisive cooperation on these issues, and to 
help shape his leadership plan as elections near. 
POLT