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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 003132 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/SINGH 
STATE FOR NEA/ELA, NEA/FO:ATACHCO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/26/2016 
TAGS: LE PGOV PREL PTER KDEM
SUBJECT: LEBANON: SHIA HEALTH MINISTER EVALUATES HIZBALLAH, 
POLITICAL ALLIANCES 
 
 
Classified By: Jeffrey D. Feltman, Ambassador.  Reason: 1.4 (d) 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (S) Shia Health Minister Khalifeh (Shia, allied with Nabih 
Berri) told the Ambassador that while Hizballah is cornered 
in a security sense, it remains potent and dangerous 
politically and could even make major inroads into Lebanon's 
Sunni community.  He speculated that Hizballah is using 
Michel Aoun to push for a national unity government because 
Hizballah could not otherwise expand its influence 
sufficiently in a cabinet which already has its quota of 
Shiites.  He speculated that Hizballah would soon be 
compelled to disarm one way or another.  Meanwhile, relations 
between PM Siniora and Speaker Berri remain difficult 
following the "unnecessary" Jezzini affair, and Shia-Sunni 
relations in general are tense.  One way out of Lebanon's 
current political blockage may be to propose early elections 
and push for a new electoral law.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (S) The Ambassador and Polchief called on Shia Health 
Minister Mohammad Khalifeh (one of three Shia ministers in 
the cabinet who are allied with Nabih Berri) in his office 
September 27 to discuss the Lebanese political scene. 
Khalifeh was troubled by what he saw as an "escalation" in 
the tone of the political discourse; provocation is going out 
of control.  There were "too many" in the crowd at the 
Hizballah rally last Friday; this is not the time for the 
other parties to confront them. 
 
HIZBALLAH IN A BOX, BUT POLITICALLY DANGEROUS 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (S) Now that UNIFIL is here in force, Khalifeh continued, 
we must focus on technical issues.  Hizballah is not as free 
to move around, the Ambassador suggested, and Khalifeh 
agreed.  They know their old freedom is over, but they need 
to come out with a moral victory and a propaganda victory. 
Then, he continued, we need to bring them into the inner 
circle.  We can't get rid of them; they are making too much 
of a reputation for themselves looking after the poor. 
 
¶4. (S) If they get their internal organization right, 
Khalifeh said, Hizballah, with its financial resources, will 
be in a position to control a large part of the Sunni 
population of Lebanon also.  That would be our nightmare 
scenario, he said. 
 
¶5. (S) Hizballah is under careful watch from Tehran, Khalifeh 
said, but cannot do much in south Lebanon at present. 
However, if Syria fails to make an arrangement with UNIIIC 
and the Hariri tribunal,0 Hizballah will make our lives hell, 
he said, and there will be a return to car bombs and terror 
attacks.  Syria can also use its Palestinian proxies and 
sleeper agents in Lebanon. 
 
¶6. (S) If Syria does make a deal on the UNIIIC inquiry, 
Hizballah will make our lives hell politically, he said. 
Syria has also been making inroads in Tripoli by inviting 
Sunni clerics and other leaders for training and 
indoctrination in Syria. 
 
NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT 
------------------------- 
 
¶7. (S) The Ambassador noted that Hizballah has been using a 
negative marketing campaign to obtain its goal of a national 
unity government.  Khalifeh agreed, and added that Hizballah 
is only coordinating with Aoun because there is no other way 
for them to expand their influence in the cabinet.  There are 
five Shia members of the Council of Ministers, he noted, and 
that number can't be changed to six or four.  Even if the 
cabinet is expanded to 30 members, only one additional Shia 
seat is gained.  Thus, Hizballah has expanded to be as 
influential as it can be without controlling minister slots 
belonging to other confessional groups -- i.e., Christian 
ministers.  That is why the alliance with Aoun is so 
important to Hizballah, to allow Hizballah to gain a blocking 
minority inside the cabinet by including Christian ministers 
belong to Aoun. 
 
BEIRUT 00003132  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶8. (S) When the LAF deployed to the south, Khalifeh added, 
Hizballah entered into political difficulties, and this lay 
behind its increasing emphasis on a government of national 
unity.  He observed that the present government cannot be 
dissolved before forming a new one, because not only will 
President Lahoud withhold the new government's approval but 
the political maneuverings to form a new cabinet will be 
endless.  Therefore Aoun's proposal of a national unity 
government remains Hizballah's only recourse to expand its 
power.  Aoun would ask for a "main ministry" such as Justice, 
Khalifeh suggested, as well as a number of new ministers 
without portfolio. 
 
¶9. (S) How could Lahoud be made to agree, the Ambassador 
asked.  Khalifeh responded that Lahoud can't stand against 
the Christians (meaning, presumably, Aoun and his followers). 
 Lahoud has few interests other than survival -- delaying the 
time at which he will have to leave the office.  After 
Ramadan, Khalifeh suggested, the government will be under 
greater pressure to form the national unity cabinet. 
 
¶10. (S) What would Hizballah gain, the Ambassador asked; they 
already have means to exercise power.  Khalifeh suggested 
that the party wants blocking power in the cabinet (i.e., 
one-third plus one of the ministers).  They want assurances 
over UNSCR 1701, including that the resolution won't be used 
"for political purposes" or for controlling the border. 
 
HIZBALLAH MUST DISARM 
--------------------- 
 
¶11. (S) Hizballah must change, Khalifeh said.  They can't 
refuse to.  UNSCR 1701 has finished them as an armed group. 
They will disarm in the same exercise as other parties 
following the Civil War.  They should be incorporated into 
the LAF, and they will then fade away as an identity within 
7-10 years, as no new generations of Hizballah fighters will 
be recruited.  When asked why Hizballah -- or Iran -- would 
agree to such a future, Khalifeh said that "everyone will 
oppose them, including the Shiites in the south."  They want 
the government to return to their lives, Khalifeh said, and 
that means the LAF.  Hizballah has 4-5,000 full-time 
followers, Khalifeh estimated. 
 
¶12. (S) The Ambassador noted that some had interpreted 
Nasrallah's speech last Friday to say that Hizballah would 
not disarm until there was a "clean and just government" in 
place and that Nasrallah was the sole arbiter of when the 
government achieved that state of cleanliness and justice. 
The Minister suggested that that was a misinterpretation, and 
that Nasrallah may not have been watching his words carefully 
if he left that impression. 
 
¶13. (S) Khalifeh noted that in three cases, Hizballah 
redlines had been crossed.  The LAF had deployed to the 
south; UNIFIL was given an expanded mandate; and UNIFIL had 
taken on the role of maritime patrolling, all against 
Hizballah's will.  On the latter, he noted the personal role 
he had played in getting Council of Ministers approval, 
making the proposal himself in the cabinet in order to 
provide cover for Speaker Berri and Shia Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Salloukh to support a maritime role for UNIFIL. 
Although the Shia on the cabinet split over the decision, 
with Hizballah dissenting, the Ambassador noted that the 
current cabinet has not been a bad one for Hizballah. 
 
JEZZINI AFFAIR 
-------------- 
 
¶14. (S) The Minister said that the recent flap over Surete 
Generale chief Wafic Jezzini had added unnecessary tension to 
the relationship between Speaker Berri and PM Siniora. 
Jezzini is with Hizballah, and therefore Berri doesn't care 
for him anyway, Khalifeh added.  However, he explained, there 
was a deal between them that Siniora broke by not addressing 
in last week's Council of Ministers meeting the proposal, 
which Siniora himself had added to the agenda, of creating a 
committee to examine the question of whether or not Jezzini 
was under the authority of Acting Interior Minister Fatfat. 
Siniora had gone on to support Fatfat's move to refer Jezzini 
 
BEIRUT 00003132  003 OF 003 
 
 
to the state prosecutor's office, raising the temperature. 
 
¶15. (S) The Ambassador characterized as scandalous the fact 
that Jezzini had permitted Syrians to enter and leave Lebanon 
without a record, and Khalifeh agreed that the security 
services should be placed in a coordination mechanism and 
answer to a "higher commission." 
 
SHIA-SUNNI TENSIONS AND ELECTIONS 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶16. (S) In general, Shia-Sunni tensions are "high, but not at 
a peak" Khalifeh said.  The Ambassador noted that the PM 
needs to rebuild his partnership with Berri, which is 
currently broken.  Khalifeh noted that Berri is also not 
supporting Siniora or Hariri with the institutions of 
government.  The Ambassador recounted that he had suggested 
to Berri that if the National Dialogue remains impossible, 
that he should look at issues such as the electoral law to 
focus the energies of different factions toward a common goal. 
 
¶17. (S) The Minister suggested that a proposal for early 
elections could focus politicians on reforming the electoral 
law.  The Minister continued that he would soon table an 
election law before the Council of Ministers and also push 
for early approval of ambassadorships for Washington, New 
York and other key posts. 
FELTMAN