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Viewing cable 06BEIRUT3060, LEBANON: SINIORA ADDRESSES BILATERAL, DOMESTIC

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06BEIRUT3060 2006-09-20 16:20 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET Embassy Beirut
VZCZCXRO4823
PP RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
DE RUEHLB #3060/01 2631620
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 201620Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5696
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0310
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0143
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 003060 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/2016 
TAGS: KCRM LE PREL PTER SY GE
SUBJECT: LEBANON: SINIORA ADDRESSES BILATERAL, DOMESTIC 
ISSUES 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey D. Feltman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d 
). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1. (S)  Ambassador Feltman, S/CRS representative, and poloff 
met on 9/20  with Prime Minister Siniora (accompanied by 
aides Mohamed Chatah and Rola Noureddine) on a wide variety 
of issues.  Siniora welcomed the White House private sector 
initiative and was pleased by the U.S. delivery of assistance 
and plans for security sector support.  He expressed deep 
unhappiness by Qatar's refusal to put its reconstruction aide 
through the GOL, despite his personal interventions with 
Qatari officials, and he noted that Algeria is also a 
problem.   On the Hariri tribunal, Siniora said he would not 
table the draft statute before the Lebanese cabinet and 
parliament until he knew the UNSC was comfortable with its 
provisions.  He vowed that the land problem for UNIFIL 
billetting (that is slowing UNIFIL deployment) would be 
solved.  He also said that the Beirut I conference would be 
held on/about November 30. End Summary. 
 
WELCOMING THE WHITE HOUSE 
PRIVATE SECTOR DELEGATION 
------------------------- 
 
2. (C) Briefed by the Ambassador about the delegation headed 
by A/S Powell on 9/22, Prime Minister Siniora expressed 
enthusiasm about the White Hosue private sector initiative. 
He noted his close relationship with Occidental CEO Irani and 
said that he looked forward to meeting with the group on 
Saturday. 
 
PLEASED WITH THE UN,s VIEW 
OF 'LEBANESE EFFICIENCY' 
-------------------------- 
 
3. (C) Unsolicited, Siniora boasted that he had just seen UN 
reconstruction coordinator David Shearer and expected Shearer 
would soon issue a glowing press statement praising Lebanese 
efficiency as among the best Shearer had seen in his 
extensive career responding to disasters around the world. 
In particular, Siniora cited Lebanese progress restoring 
roads and the water supply as areas Shear praised highly. 
(Note:  We met separately with Shearer earlier in the day. 
Shearer did indeed offer this praise of Lebanon's quick 
transition from emergency/humanitarian to early recovery 
phases.  But, while admiring of how quickly the GOL had 
restored key infrastructure links, he was critical about GOL 
coordination efforts and lack of any kind of media strategy. 
End note.) 
 
REVIEWING AN OPIC AGREEMENT 
--------------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) The Ambassador noted that the Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation (OPIC) was interested in increasing 
its exposure in Lebanon.  Beyond its well-known insurance 
programs, OPIC had many new products that could help Lebanon 
in mortage and equity financing in the months to come.  But, 
the Ambassador noted, OPIC's agreement with Lebanon was 
signed in 1981 and is now outdated.  We would like to amend 
this agreement as quickly as possible, to bring it up to 
date.  The Ambassador passed for the Prime Minister,s review 
the current OPIC agreement as well as suggestions for 
amending the text.  Siniora responded that he did not believe 
he would need formal GOL permission to update the agreement, 
but he needed to check whether the original agreement went 
through parliament and cabinet approval. 
 
FINDING LAND FOR UNIFIL 
----------------------- 
 
5. (C) The Ambassador noted that UNIFIL Commander Alain 
Pellegrini had organized a P-5 briefing for the following 
day.  The Ambassador said that he hoped the problems UNIFIL 
was having in securing adequate troops for its new 
deployments would be on the way to being solved by the time 
Pellegrini briefed the Ambassadors.  Siniora expressed 
confidence that the GOL has adequate legislation in place 
allowing GOL temporary appropriation of private land under 
eminent domain during times of extraordinary circumstances. 
Siniora,s staff members were already been in communication 
 
BEIRUT 00003060  002 OF 004 
 
 
with UNIFIL regarding a list of properties it needs.  They 
were confident the GOL could obtain the use of more land upon 
UNIFIL request and would have the money to pay the 
landowners.  (Note:  This issue in part relates to past debts 
the GOL owes to landowners for current UNIFIL bases.  The GOL 
is in arrears to the landowners, who naturally do not wish to 
give up more land to UNIFIL.  Ministry of Finance officials 
told us separately that they expect that this week's cabinet 
session will authorize full payment of the arrears and a 
hefty advance payment for the new land.  End note.) 
 
WELCOMING A GERMAN MARITIME FORCE 
--------------------------------- 
 
6. (C) Asking by the Ambassador about the German and UNIFIL 
teams working on the airport, seaports, and land borders, 
Siniora stated that he has a meeting scheduled for Monday 
with UNIFIL officials, Minister of Defense Murr, Minister of 
Interior Fatfat, ISF Commander Rifi, and LAF Commander 
Sleiman.  He would know then what was being discussed for the 
border points. 
 
7.  (C)  As for the naval task force, General Shahaytli (who 
serves as the coordinator between the LAF command and UNIFIL) 
had just retuned from UN headquarters, where he completed 
negotiations with the Germans and others on the naval task 
force rules of engagement and terms of reference.  Siniora 
claimed that he had just learned that the German parliament 
had approved German participation in and leadership of the 
naval task force.  In passing, Siniora noted that he would 
visit Berlin and Strasbourg September 27-28. 
 
TRIBUNAL TIMING: 
AFTER UNSC APPROVAL 
------------------- 
 
8. (C) The Ambassador queried Siniora on his views for taking 
to the cabinet and parliament the UN-GOL draft statute on the 
special tribunal with international character for the Hariri 
assassination.  Siniora noted that, while the cabinet is 
ready "any day," parliament does not come back into session 
until October 7 or 10.  Moreover, he expressed reluctance to 
table the draft statute before he had word from the UN that 
UNSC members were comfortable with the draft.  He would not 
want to fight for cabinet approval of something, only to have 
to revisit the issue if the UNSC inserts changes. 
 
9.  (C)  As for the draft statute itself, he cited four 
remaining points of concern (while insisting that no 
significant resistance remained in the cabinet or the 
parliament).  First, the statute suggests that the tribunal 
could cover the crimes that took place from 10/1/04 to 
12/31/05 (if they are materially connected to the Hariri 
assassination).  The PM prefers that, rather than a period of 
time, the crimes be named specifically that could be 
included, if materially linked.  This, he said, would help 
reduce the fear by some that the tribunal will potentially 
find all sorts of new targets.  (Comment:  We wonder if he 
was making an oblique reference to Bank al-Medina, which 
potentially could entrap a huge number of Lebanese political 
figures, including at least one on his cabinet.  End 
comment.) 
 
10.  (C) Second, Siniora said that the tribunal must be 
located outside Lebanon, and that Cyprus was preferable to 
The Hague due to distance and cost advantages.  On the other 
hand, he joked, the further the tribunal was from Lebanon, 
the more removed it would be from vicious Lebanese politics. 
"Northern Alaska" might be fine, he laughed.  As the location 
is not part of the statute itself, the Ambassador asked 
whether identifying the location was linked to cabinet and 
parliamentary approval.  No, Siniora said; Parliament Speaker 
Berri's one-time insistence on a Lebanon-based tribunal no 
longer seemed to be a red line, he thought. 
 
11.  (C)  Third, Siniora said that financing for the tribunal 
had to be worked out, with the GOL playing a key role. 
Finally, the composition of the tribunal needed to be worked 
out.  Siniora expressed satisfaction that the current draft 
had a mixture of international and Lebanese figures. 
 
RECONSTRUCTION ASSISTANCE: 
QATAR, ALGERIA POSE PROBLEMS 
---------------------------- 
 
BEIRUT 00003060  003 OF 004 
 
 
 
12. (S) Responding to the Ambassador's concern that some 
countries seemed to be bypassing the GOL and passing 
reconstruction assistance directly to Hizballah, Siniora 
fingered Qatar as a particularly egregious example.  Calling 
Qatar the "prodigal son," he went into detail about the 
conversations he has been forced to have with various Qatari 
officials to try to get Qatar to work through GOL 
institutions.  Qatar keeps resisting, using various excuses 
to avoid working through the GOL.  Qatar has been fully 
briefed on the system Lebanon has set up for Arab donations 
(Central Bank accounts over which the donor country has 
signatory authority) but refuses to participate.  After 
complaining at length about Qatar, Siniora contrasted Qatari 
intransigence with the UAE's method of providing cash 
directly to Lebanese (in these case fishermen) in cooperation 
with Lebanon's Higher Relief Committee.  Even Iran, Siniora 
noted, is financing a few projects through the GOL.  He shook 
his head repeatedly about Qatar. 
 
13. (S) Algeria, Siniora continued, is also a problem.  The 
PM reported that he met with an Algerian parliamentarian two 
days ago to discuss the Algerian allegation on 
Hizballah-owned Al Manar that GOL corruption in aid 
distribution had allowed a shipment of water to be sold on 
the market rather than getting to intended aid recipients. 
Siniora said he showed the parliamentarian receipts and 
forced him to retract his statement.  He noted that Algeria 
is the one country -- aside from Syria -- that Siniora feels 
unwelcome in.  He tried to hint at visiting Algiers and the 
Algerians closed the door in his face.  While Qatar's 
problem-making has everything to do with Qatar's rivalry with 
Saudi Arabia, Algeria just sided with Syria, inexplicably. 
 
14. (S) More broadly, Siniora was clear that while the GOL 
was 'more permissive' during the war, letting aid in from all 
sources, it has now returned to a 'stricter application of 
the rules.' 
 
RECONSTRUCTION ASSISTANCE: 
PLEASED WITH U.S. RESPONSIVENESS 
-------------------------------- 
 
15. (C) Siniora and his advisors were pleased by the briefing 
by the Ambassador and S/CRS representative on United States 
assistance delivered to to Lebanon since the crisis and USG 
plans for help in the security sector.  They also accepted an 
informal non-paper on ideas of how to improve GOL media 
outreach and donor coordination (ideas which we will pursue 
with them later). 
RECONSTRUCTION ASSISTANCE:  BRIDGES, 
ROADS, VILLAGES "MOSTLY SUBSCRIBED" 
------------------------------------ 
 
16. (C) Siniora said that he considered his campaign to get 
donors to "adopt" various projects to be a successs.  Nearly 
all of the damaged bridges have already been claimed for 
reconstruction by foreign donors.  While only 40 percent of 
village projects have been covered, those already "adopted" 
cover 70 percent of the reconstruction needs.  Regarding the 
Mudarej Bridge which the USG has offered to rebuild (in 
cooperation with Italy, if Italy so desires), Siniora noted 
that the Embassy can expect a letter from the prime 
minister,s office authorizing our engineers to begin work, 
whatever our level of cooperation with the Italians. 
 
BEIRUT I DONOR CONFERENCE TENTATIVELY 
SCHEDULED FOR NOVEMBER 30 
------------------------------------ 
 
17.  (C)  The Ambassador noted that, on the margins of the 
IMF/IBRD meetings in Singapore, Minister of Finance Azour 
talked of holding the long-delayed Beirut I conference in 
late November/early December.  Siniora reacted that it would 
take place in mid to late November.  When the Ambassador 
reminded the PM of the U.S. Thanksgiving holiday on November 
23, Siniora and his staff, after a brief discussion, talked 
of November 30 as the date.  (Comment:  We would not book 
plane reservations yet for this date.  End comment.) 
 
SPECULATION ABOUT HIZBALLAH'S 
PLANNED RALLY ON FRIDAY 
----------------------------- 
 
 
BEIRUT 00003060  004 OF 004 
 
 
18. (C) In response to speculation that Hassan Nasrallah 
could announce his support for General Aoun for the 
presidency at the planned Hizballah 'victory rally' on 
Friday, Siniora thought Nasrallah would leave his doors open 
to other communities by not announcing his support for Aoun. 
He also queried whether the Ambassador had heard rumors that 
Hizballah had asked Qatar to ask Israel to make assurances 
that it would not attack the rally.  Siniora said he was not 
invited to the rally.  While the PM expected a show of 
intimidation by the size of the crowd Hizballah would muster, 
he did not expect violence. 
 
SYRIAN/SECURITY CONCERNS 
------------------------ 
 
19. (S) Siniora had heard Walid Junblatt's description last 
night on an LBCI television interview of an alleged Syrian 
threat to attack March 14 or UN forces in Lebanon in 
September, but had no further information.  He queried the 
Ambassador regarding current thinking about who was behind 
last week,s attack on the U.S. Embassy in Damascus, and 
suggested the fourth attacker who had been cooperating with 
investigators and subsequently died 'was suicided.' He 
followed with a request for an update on any other news on 
Syria and Syrian-sympathizers in country. 
FELTMAN