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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 002841 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
NOFORN 
 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/29/2026 
TAGS: PREL PTER MOPS LE SY IS
SUBJECT: MURR: HIZBALLAH AND AOUN ARE PLOTTING SINIORA'S 
DOWNFALL 
 
Classified By: Jeffrey D. Feltman, Ambassador.  Reason 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
SUMMARY 
-------- 
 
¶1. (S/NF)  During an August 31 meeting with Ambassador 
Feltman and poloff, Lebanese Defense Minister Elias Murr said 
that Hizballah, Michel Aoun, and their allies are planning to 
launch a potentially violent civil disobedience campaign in 
November aimed at toppling the Siniora government and putting 
in a more pliant regime in anticipation of next year's 
presidential election.  Murr said he would immediately 
coordinate with Saad Hariri, Walid Jumblatt, and Marwan 
Hamadeh on how to respond to this threat.  He stressed that 
the international community could play a helpful role by 
supporting the GOL and pressing Israel to lift the air and 
sea blockade on Lebanon soon.  An international 
representative (Murr suggests British Ambassador James Watt) 
could also warn presidential-hopeful Michel Aoun that he can 
expect a full-scale diplomatic embargo on him -- much as with 
Emile Lahoud -- if he participates in this plot. 
 
¶2.  (S/NF)  Murr asked several times whether the blockade 
will be lifted soon.  The Ambassador asked Murr again to give 
the international community, and especially Israel, a clear 
understanding of what exactly has been done regarding 
stopping arms smuggling.  Murr agreed that the GOL needs to 
do more to convince the Israelis of their seriousness, and 
agreed to provide UNIFIL commander Alain Pelligrini with a 
helicopter tour of LAF positions along the Lebanon-Syria 
border and in the Bekaa Valley.  At the Ambassador's 
suggestion, he asked LAF General Shaatly (coordinating with 
UNIFIL in Naqoura) to share information with UNIFIL and the 
IDF regarding the LAF deployment along the border with Syria. 
 Murr said that the LAF has so far confiscated 90-100 
rockets, as well as a quantity of TNT belonging to Hizballah. 
 He said the TNT is being tested to see if it matched that 
used in last year's bombings.  At the end of the meeting, 
Murr whispered to the Ambassador to be careful and not travel 
outside of the Christian suburbs of Beirut.  END SUMMARY. 
 
A NOVEMBER SURPRISE 
------------------- 
 
¶3.  (S/NF)  Murr started the meeting by saying, "I have 
information, and you know my information is good."  Murr said 
that he has received word from sources inside Hizballah -- 
which he subsequently confirmed with sources in Aoun's Free 
Patriotic movement (FPM) -- that Aoun and Hizballah have 
concocted a strategy whereby they and members of the 
pro-Syrian March 8 movement will try to bring down the 
Siniora government.  For now they plan to continue their 
verbal sniping at the government -- labeling it crippled and 
corrupt and calling for a national unity governemnt -- 
through the end of Ramadan in late October.  This will give 
the Shia supporters of Hizballah a break, after the recent 
conflict, and a chance to enjoy Ramadan. 
 
¶4.  (S/NF)  After this, they will send their supporters out 
into the streets in a campaign of civil disobedience.  They 
hope to provoke the Internal Security Forces (ISF), viewed as 
a Hariri-controlled outfit, to fire on the protestors, at 
which point they will "break and burn Solidere" -- the 
downtown Beirut area rebuilt by Rafiq Hariri (a symbol of 
both Hariri and Lebanon's post-war rebirth).  They will also 
occupy and stage a sit-in at government offices and 
Parliament.  Their goal is chaos, and they hope their action 
will coax Lebanese Forces commander Samir Ja'ja to descend 
from his Bsharre mountain redoubt and to take up weapons 
against them.  Murr says that if Ja'ja joins in the clashes, 
Hizballah intends to arm Michel Aoun, provoking a rehash of 
the internecine Christian conflict of the late 1980s. 
 
¶5.  (S/NF)  The Ambassador asked what the March 8 forces and 
Aoun hope to achieve through this violence.  "They want to 
paralyze the country," Murr explained, "They want to make the 
government fall."  He said that they would do to March 14 
what the pro-independence forces did to former Prime Minister 
Omar Karami on 2/28/04 (when public protests sparked Karami's 
resignation).  They would then form a new Cabinet with fewer 
March 14 ministers, a neutral, do-nothing Prime Minister 
 
BEIRUT 00002841  002 OF 004 
 
 
(such as bland former Economy Minister Adnan Kassar), a 
Shi'ite Defense Minister (though not necessarily from 
Hizballahi), and, perhaps most frighteningly of all, Aoun as 
Minister of Interior.  The plotters plan to take control of 
the army, security services, and reconstruction funds.  The 
coup will reach its crescendo the following November, when 
the conspirators plan to install a sympathetic new President 
(probably Aoun) for a six-year, Lahoud-esque term. 
 
COUNTER-STRATEGY 
---------------- 
 
¶6.  (S/NF)  Murr said he had just sent a trusted officer with 
a message to Saad Hariri conveying this information. 
Otherwise, he had not told anyone else of the plot.  He 
intends to hold a council with Hariri, Walid Jumblatt, and 
Marwan Hamadeh in the coming days to discuss a preemptive 
strategy to head off the threat (Comment.  Murr did not 
mention that any Maronite would join the council.  He did say 
that Information Minister Ghazi Aridi - a supposed Jumblatt 
ally - is a "spy" and not to be trusted.  END COMMENT). 
 
¶7.  (S/NF)  According to Murr, the Murr-Jumblatt-Hariri 
strategy will focus on political, media, and security 
aspects.  On the political front, they will need to quickly 
build up the strength and presence of the state to face down 
the challenge to its legitimacy.  They will also send a clear 
message to Ja'ja' not to rise to the Hizballah-Aounist bait 
-- "Saad will need to tell him that if he decides to play 
this game, he will go back to prison forever."  The position 
of Nabih Berri will of course be crucial.  He will need to be 
wooed to the government side, though Murr predicted he would 
try and play a "UN" role, mediating between the two sides, 
while waiting to see who comes out ahead. 
 
¶8.  (S/NF)  From the media angle, the GOL will need to launch 
an organized campaign challenging Aoun and Hizballah's calls 
for a new National Unity government.  (Note:  Siniora made 
remarks to this effect during an al-Jazeera interview at the 
Stockholm conference on August 31, saying the GOL "enjoys the 
confidence of Parliament."  End Note.)  While Murr 
anticipates the Hizballah/Aounists will direct their media 
campaign against Israel and accusing March 14 of collusion, 
the other side should attack the Syria/Iran axis, as Hariri 
and Jumblatt have been doing. 
 
¶9.  (S/NF)  Regarding security, the GOL should ensure there 
is a sufficient LAF and ISF presence in the greater Beirut 
area.  Murr told the Ambassador that there are currently 
18,000 LAF troops on standby in greater Beirut and urban 
coastal areas.  Again, state institutions alone must ensure 
security.  If Ja'ja' comes down the mountain with his 
militiamen, warned Murr, that will divert the LAF's attention 
away from securing downtown Beirut against the 
Hizballah/Aounist assault.  Shaking his head when the 
Ambassador asked whether Ja'ja' had been smuggling arms into 
Lebanon, Murr said that Ja'ja' has been buying weapons on the 
local market, and could easily assemble "1,000 gangters" to 
engage Hizballah and Aoun.  Murr begged again for U.S. 
support in obtaining needed weaponry and supplies for the LAF 
and ISF from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE as soon as 
possible. 
 
THE INTERNATIONAL ROLE 
---------------------- 
 
¶10.  (S/NF)  Aside from arming and supplying the LAF and ISF, 
Murr said that the international community needs to prop up 
the Siniora government more generally.  The LAF/UNIFIL 
deployments and IDF withdrawal need to be completed as 
quickly as possible.  In addition, Lebanon needs the air and 
sea blockade lifted in order to breathe a little easier and 
revive the moribund economy.  The widescale international 
support for Lebanon's reconstruction should also continue 
apace.  Lastly, Murr suggested that someone from the 
international community -- he suggested British Ambassador 
James Watt -- communicate to Michel Aoun that if he takes 
part in this plot, he can expect a complete international 
diplomatic embargo on him, much like what Emile Lahoud has 
suffered. 
 
 
BEIRUT 00002841  003 OF 004 
 
 
¶11.  (S/NF)  The Ambassador asked whether Murr could wholly 
trust the LAF to support the GOL when the critical moment 
comes (Comment.  The coup would presumably have the support 
of at least two former army chiefs, Aoun and Lahoud. End 
Comment).  Murr said that current army chief Michel Sleiman 
"will follow my orders, or I will put him out of his post." 
The Ambassador asked if the LAF chief answers only to the 
President, to which Murr responded that the 1989 Ta'if 
Accords gives the Council of Ministers control over the army. 
 
 
BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN LAF MEASURES 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (S/NF)  The Ambassador noted that, in order to get the 
Israelis to lift the air and sea blockade, the GOL needs to 
convince them that it has carried out effective and credible 
measures to secure all points of entry.  Murr said that the 
GOL had made a formal request to the German chief of staff 
for maritime and border support, but that this would need the 
approval of the German Cabinet and Bundestag, which may take 
some time.  Murr believes the Iraelis would accept this 
arrangement, realizing that sophisticated technology (used 
correctly), is more efficient than large numbers of troops. 
Murr asked though that the Israelis not call publicly for the 
German support, as this would scuttle Lebanese Cabinet 
approval. 
 
¶13.  (S/NF)  The Ambassador noted that part of the trick is 
to figure out how to help the international community, and 
Israel, better understand what is actually happening on the 
ground.  He suggested it would be useful if the Lebanese were 
to offer to take a small group of UNIFIL officers on a tour 
of LAF positions along the border with Syria and in the 
eastern Biqa' Valley, to show off what the LAF has done so 
far.  "I will invite (UNIFIL Commander) Pelligrini on a 
helicopter tour of the area," Murr vowed.  The Ambassador 
also recommended the LAF pass information to the IDF through 
the UNIFIL coordination sessions which are currently ongoing 
at UNIFIL headquarters in Naqoura.  Hearing this, Murr 
immediately picked up his cell phone and called General 
Shaatly, the LAF liaison with UNIFIL (and also reportedly an 
AMCIT), and asked him to provide maps and information on the 
Biqa' deployment to UNIFIL -- while the IDF liaison is in the 
same room -- at the next coordination session on Monday, 
September 4. 
 
ROCKETS CONFISCATED 
------------------- 
 
¶14.  (S/NF)  Murr said that the LAF had confiscated another 
truck full of Hizballah rockets (he did not say whether these 
were coming from Syria or being transported internally), 
bringing the total number of rockets taken by the LAF to "90 
to 100".  The Ambassador asked about reports that an internal 
shipment of TNT was confiscated, which Murr confirmed.  He 
said the TNT had belonged to Hizballah and is now being 
tested to see if it is the same as was used in a spate of 
terror bombings in Christian areas last year.  The Ambassador 
asked if this information could be shared with UNIIIC 
Commissioner Serge Brammertz, which Murr said might be 
possible once the GOL had completed its tests.  Murr confided 
that he had planted a story about the TNT confiscation in 
al-Hayat newspaper.  Murr said that Hizballah, unhappy with 
the robust LAF measures against the group, sent a message 
directly to Murr's assistant Colonel Bayseri threatening that 
"a time will come for an accounting".  (Note.  After the 
meeting, Murr pulled the Ambassador aside and whispered that 
the movement of TNT within the country worries him greatly, 
and he asked that the Ambassador not travel outside of the 
Christian suburbs in which the Embassy is located.  The 
Ambassador asked Murr if he had any specific threat 
information against the Embassy or Ambassador, and Murr shook 
his head, commenting that it was "just a feeling."  End Note.) 
 
ASBAT AL-ANSAR 
-------------- 
 
¶15.  (S/NF)  The Ambassador asked Murr about the threat from 
sunni militant group Asbat al-Ansar.  Murr replied that the 
group is very dangerous and "fully-handled" by Syria. 
 
BEIRUT 00002841  004 OF 004 
 
 
Calling the group the "new Al-Qaeda", Murr said that Asad is 
handling the Sunni militants in order to create a "new Iraq" 
in Lebanon. 
 
POTENTIAL FOR MOVEMENT ON 1949 ARMISTICE AGREEMENT 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶16.  (S/NF)  The Ambassador noted that the Lebanese always 
refer hopefully to the 1949 Israel-Lebanese Armistic 
Agrement, while the Israelis consider the agreement null and 
void (in the aftermath of the 1968 Cairo Agreement) had see 
little appeal in tryign to revive it.  He asked Murr for his 
opinion on arranging political level discussions on the 
subject, to see what might be done.  Murr suggested that once 
the deployment/withdrawal phase is over, and after the 
November threat is thwarted, the GOL will make some suggested 
revisions to the Armistice Agreement, which the U.S. can 
share discreetly with the Israelis.  When there is some 
common ground reached, the GOL will publicly declare that it 
wants to return to the 1949 Agreement, but "we want the 
following items" -- already agreed to -- "included in the 
agreement."  As the weaker party, Murr said, Lebanon should 
appear as the instigator of the parley in order to gain 
approval from Lebanese.  Following that, the Lebanese and 
Israeli Ministers of Defense could set up a meeting on the 
Blue Line and under the auspices of the UNSYG (whoever that 
may be) to discuss the amendments to the Agreement. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶17.  (S/NF)  Murr sometimes picks up bits of information, 
combines it with accurate intelligence, considers the point 
of view of his listener, and weaves a fascinating story where 
the facts and the fiction nestle comfortably together.  But, 
while we would love to dismiss Aoun's dire predictions out of 
hand, the public comments of Aoun (especially), Nasrallah, 
and other pro-Syrian figures provide little comfort:  they 
are entirely consistent with the theory posited by Murr. 
Moreover, reporting in other channels suggests that Murr's is 
not simply assembling a melodramatic story in order to 
frighten us into accelerating our support to the LAF.  This 
is a prediction worth monitoring. 
FELTMAN