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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 002831 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE/HARDING 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/30/2016 
TAGS: IS LE MOPS PGOV PREL PTER SY
SUBJECT: LEBANON:  ARMENIAN PATRIARCH ADVISES INDIRECT 
APPROACH TO SYRIA 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman.  Reason: Section 1.4 (b). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1.  (C)  Armenian Patriarch Catholicos Aram I suggested that 
now was an opportune time to pull Syria from the Iranian 
orbit.  He recognized the perfidious nature of the Asad 
regime and the considerable role it played in the shipment of 
arms to Hizballah, but the senior cleric also argued that 
Bashar Asad must realize his best chance for survival rests 
with Syria rejoining the Arab world.  Concerned that a U.S. 
approach would be misread by the Lebanese as an attempt to 
"sell out" Lebanon, the Patriarch believed that an indirect 
approach, through either Saudi Arabia or Egypt, stood the 
best chance of convincing President Asad that if he remained 
under the control of Tehran, Syria would have little leverage 
in the significant regional changes that are beginning to be 
discussed in the wake of the just-suspended Lebanon war.  End 
summary. 
 
¶2.  (U)  The Armenian Patriarch met the Ambassador and poloff 
at his summer residence in Bikfayya on August 30.  Patriarch 
Aram indicated he is planning to visit the U.S. in early 
December to attend conferences at Notre Dame University and 
in the Washington area.  The Patriarch said he had been 
intensively engaged with Lebanon's other religious leaders 
during the recent hostilities, particularly with Maronite 
Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir, Sunni Grand Mufti Mohammad Qabbani 
and Acting Chairman of the Higher Islamic Shia Council Abdel 
Amir Qabalan. 
 
RESCUING SYRIA FROM "PERSIA" 
---------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C)  The senior cleric to the region's influential 
Armenian community (most of whom in Lebanon are Orthodox, 
falling into Aram I's community) said that Hizballah remains 
the primary threat to Lebanon's stability.  Describing 
Hizballah as an organization that is Lebanese in form, but 
not in "essence," Patriarch Aram argued that the recent war 
has had far-reaching regional consequences, not the least of 
which is Iran's growing capacity to intimidate the region's 
moderate regimes.  Patriarch Aram said one possible strategy 
to thwart Iranian ambitions was to somehow pull Syria out of 
its orbit and return the country to its natural position as a 
key Arab state. 
 
¶4.  (C)  The cleric said he had no illusions about the 
duplicitous character of Bashar Asad, but said the real 
challenge was the tight inner circle surrounding the 
"inexperienced and not very impressive young leader" who were 
convinced that only by lashing Syria to an "ascendant" Iran 
could the Allawite regime survive.  Declaring that Bashar's 
father, Hafez Asad, would never have fallen into this 
"Iranian trap," Aram expressed his belief that by careful 
"indirect" diplomacy, Syria could be persuaded to rejoin its 
Arab brethren. 
 
BASHAR'S POOR JUDGMENT 
----------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C)  The Patriarch said all of Bashar's political 
calculations revolve around his survival, but Aram, who based 
his opinions on numerous interactions with the Syrian 
president, also said that Bashar is a consistently poor judge 
of international developments and their implications.  Aram 
understood that neither the U.S. nor the EU could approach 
Syria at this time, but he asked the Ambassador whether it 
might not be an auspicious time for a moderate Arab regime to 
engage the Syrians and explain the long-term consequences of 
their ill-advised interference in Lebanon and close alliance 
with the unstable Ahmedijihad. 
 
¶6.  (C)  When asked if such discussions might be 
misinterpreted in Lebanon as proof of the popular conspiracy 
theory that some type of deal would be cut with Syria to the 
serious detriment of Lebanon, the Patriarch admitted it was a 
grave danger, especially given the current anxious state of 
the Lebanese people.  But he asked what was the alternative. 
He concluded, in thinking about the Lebanese paranoia of 
being "sold out" to Syria, that it would be best for the U.S. 
to avoid an approach to Syria but to use intermediaries. 
 
BEIRUT 00002831  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶7.  (C)  If, as he said, the underlying cause of the most 
recent conflict lay in the long-unresolved Middle East peace 
process, the Patriarch argued it was essential to bring Syria 
in out of the cold.  He continued his thesis by pointing out 
that "Persian" Iran had no real interest in the Syrian regime 
and was simply exploiting its maladroitness in managing its 
foreign affairs.  If the more sympathetic regimes of Saudi 
Arabia and Egypt could persuade Bashar that he might fare 
better with his Arab brothers, not only would Hizballah lose 
its easiest means of resupply, it would also give Syria one 
more chance to play a constructive regional role.  Aram, 
whose church has a significant following in Syria, said it 
was risk worth pursuing. 
 
¶8.  (C)  Regarding the immediate future of Hizballah, the 
Patriarch said he sadly agrees that if the organization is 
able to re-arm itself, another round of hostilities with 
Israel was almost inevitable.  The Patriarch confided that he 
could never say so in public, but admitted he fully 
understood the Israeli reaction on July 12.  The cleric was 
also convinced that Israel, despite the costs and its current 
internal debate over the conduct of the war, would likely act 
in the same manner if Hizballah attacked again. 
 
OPTIONS FOR HIZBALLAH 
--------------------- 
 
¶9.  (C)  The Patriarch spoke conceptually about what might 
happen if Hizballah was finally forced to decide whether it 
was truly Lebanese or not.  Aram said the organization's 
militia may try to merge its fighters into the Lebanese army, 
but he felt that would be disastrous for the still unsteady 
LAF.  It would also disrupt the confessional balance within 
the LAF, which heretofore has not had divisions drawn 
exclusively from one sect.  A second option, which he 
admitted was unlikely, was that Hassan Nasrallah might 
actually shift the organization's focus to act as a purely 
political force.  Much more likely, he concluded, Hizballah 
would keep its militia as a "non-functioning" force, 
primarily to maintain its still-valuable reputation as the 
country's "heroic resistance."  This transformation, of 
course, was dependent on current efforts to prevent it from 
being re-armed with heavy weaponry.  The cleric indicated 
this last option was the most preferred and fed into 
Hizballah's fierce repudiation of any effort to "disarm" its 
militia, a term that Aram suggested should be avoided. 
 
THE PALACE VERSUS THE STREET 
---------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (C)  Lastly, the Armenian religious leader advised the 
U.S. to turn its attention from "the palace to the street." 
Aram said it was his opinion that the Arab street really felt 
no fundamental antipathy toward America, but believed the 
U.S. was only interested in the regimes, most of whom, 
according to the Patriarch, suffer a serious "legitimacy 
deficit."  The cleric maintained that most Arab regimes were 
perceived by their citizens to be corrupt, unresponsive, and 
unrepresentative.  Although he did not offer specifics, 
Patriarch Aram urged the U.S. to dedicate increased resources 
to the people of the region, rather than its leaders. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶11.  (C)  Despite his musings regarding a dialogue with 
Syria, Aram I is no fan of Syria and was one of those who 
applauded the departure of Syrian troops from Lebanon last 
year.  He can barely conceal his disdain for President Emile 
Lahoud (despite the fact that Lahoud's mother was Armenian 
and that he is married to an Armenian).  Aram's relations 
with the Tashnag party, Lebanon's largest Armenian political 
faction, are scratchy, too, because of the Tashnag's fealty 
to Lahoud and alliance with Michel Aoun:  the Tashnag's one 
Member of Parliament was elected on Aoun's list.  (As an 
aside, Aram I told us that he is telling the Tashnag to be no 
part of Aoun's attempt to overthrow Prime Minister Siniora, 
whom Aram I described as an excellent PM.)  What struck us 
most about this meeting with Aram I, however, was not what he 
said but what he didn't raise:  Turkey's participation in 
UNIFIL.  While other Armenians in Lebanon (including the 
Tashnag) express deep hostility to Turkey's involvement here, 
 
BEIRUT 00002831  003 OF 003 
 
 
the senior Armenian cleric, in a meeting that lasted over an 
hour and touched on many topics, did not raise it. 
FELTMAN