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RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN 000500 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/MTS, IO/UNP, AND PM 
SINGAPORE ALSO FOR DAO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/28/2016 
TAGS: MOPS MARR PRELL BX IS LE UN
SUBJECT: BRUNEI MAY DOWNSIZE PLANNED UNIFIL CONTRIBUTION 
 
REF: BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN 440 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Emil Skodon, reasons 1.4 (b) & (d) 
 
 ------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) As the original notion of a Indonesia-Malaysia-Brunei 
combined force contribution to UNIFIL fades away and is 
replaced by a more traditional pattern of separate but 
coordinated national contingents, the Government of Brunei 
(GOB) is looking at revising its planned contribution from a 
mechanized infantry company to (at least initially) a few 
medical personnel.  This reconsideration is driven by a 
combination of factors:  GOB nervousness about its capacity 
to carry out a PKO mission more robust than any it has 
undertaken before without the security blanket of a large 
combined force; a desire to scale its contribution to that of 
Malaysia to avoid contributing to any "loss of face" in Kuala 
Lumpur; and, the changing nature of the mission to be 
performed by the Malaysian national UNIFIL contingent to 
which the Bruneian military prefers to be attached.  The 
implication for the USG is that there will be fewer Bruneian 
troops to potentially take advantage of USG-provided lift, 
and so a greatly diminished likelihood that the GOB would 
respond positively to any USG request that it pick up part of 
the tab for that lift.  Should we wish to pursue such support 
from the GOB, Embassy recommends that we do so indirectly by 
quietly encouraging whatever ASEAN nation(s) might utilize 
USG assets for a UNIFIL deployment to approach the GOB 
independently for help in defraying the cost.  End Summary. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
BRUNEI RECONSIDERS ITS PLANNED FORCE CONTRIBUTION... 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶2.  (C)  As reported reftel, original GOB plans for a UNIFIL 
contribution called for an initial deployment of medical 
personnel, followed soon after by a mechanized infantry 
company as part of a combined Indonesian-Malaysian-Brunei 
force.  Mid-level GOB military planners are continuing to 
work on that basis; we understand necessary vehicle 
modifications are being completed and they hope to be ready 
for such a deployment within six weeks.  However, the final 
"go" decision will be a political one made by the Sultan on 
advice of civilian leaders at the Ministries of Defense (MOD) 
and of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT).  Over the past two 
weeks, our civilian contacts at those ministries have begun 
to emphasize only the initial contribution of a few medical 
personnel as part of a Malaysian contingent along with 
perhaps one or two military "observers," while downplaying 
the contribution of additional troops as something that could 
be done on an "as needed" basis but not until sometime in 
¶2007. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
...DUE TO CONCERNS ABOUT CAPABILITIES... 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) Why the shift?  From the time the Sultan of Brunei 
first committed to a UNIFIL contribution in a gesture of 
Islamic solidarity, some civilians in the MOD and MFAT 
appeared nervous about Brunei's ability to take on a PKO 
commitment more robust than any it had previously made. 
Those concerns were alleviated somewhat by the hope that 
embedding Bruneian troops in a combined southeast Asian force 
would allow the GOB contingent to piggyback on the greater 
capabilities of its larger neighbors, particularly the 
Malaysians, with whom GOB troops had already served in the 
International Monitoring Team in Mindanao.  As the original 
idea of a tripartite force withered in the face of Israeli 
objections to Malaysian participation in UNIFIL, however, and 
it began to look as if the Bruneians might have to link up 
with an Indonesian force going to UNIFIL as a traditional 
national contingent, some of the initial nervousness about 
GOB capabilities has begun to return. 
 
BANDAR SER 00000500  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
...PLUS REGIONAL POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS... 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C)  For the MFAT, the prospect of Brunei going to UNIFIL 
with the Indonesians while Malaysia was blackballed sparked a 
very southeast Asian worry about being seen to contribute, 
even indirectly, to a "loss of face" by one's friends -- 
especially a big, powerful, and sometimes grumpy friend in 
close proximity.  MFAT Permanent Secretary Pengiran Dato 
Osman told Ambassador flatly that Brunei could not 
participate in UNIFIL if Malaysia was barred.  He explained 
the GOB had to be "realistic" about its geopolitical 
position, and could not afford to be seen as tacitly going 
along with such a slight toward its much larger immediate 
neighbor.  The Ambassador's protestation that Kuala Lumpur 
could hardly hold the GOB responsible for Tel Aviv's position 
had no impact on Osman, who insisted that there could be no 
sizeable deployment of Bruneian troops to UNIFIL without 
their Malaysian counterparts. 
 
¶5.  (C)  The Ambassador subsequently raised this issue with 
Osman's boss, Foreign Minister II Lim Jock Seng, who took a 
less doctrinaire stance.  In response to Ambassador's query, 
Lim said no Malaysian official had approached the GOB to ask 
that it not participate in UNIFIL if Malaysia was barred. 
Lim believed it would be politically acceptable for Brunei to 
deploy with Indonesia alone if need be, while adding the 
caveat that this would depend on the "military feasibility" 
of such a deployment.  Lim noted that Brunei's military had 
focused on integrating tightly with Malaysian forces in a 
combined UNIFIL deployment, building on its Mindanao 
experience, and it could be difficult to change those plans 
to a deployment with Indonesia alone sans the Malaysians.  He 
also confirmed that the GOB had not yet formally offered any 
UNIFIL contribution to the UN, thus implying that it was free 
to adjust its plans since no specific commitment had actually 
been made. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
...AND CHANGE IN THE MALAYSIAN "PARENT FORCE" MISSION 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶6.  (C) Even taking Lim's statement at face value, it appears 
that planning to the military requirement would yield the 
same result as planning to Osman's perceived regional 
political requirement:  a reduction in the GOB's contribution 
to UNIFIL.  The reason is the changing size and nature of the 
parent Malaysian force to which GOB military planners prefer 
to attach their troops.  Post understands that UNSYG Annan 
and Malaysian PM Abdullah reached agreement on a much smaller 
than planned Malaysian contribution to UNIFIL, composed of 
medical and logistics personnel.  The originally envisaged 
GOB contribution of a mechanized infantry company makes less 
sense for that type of mission, and so a decision to scale 
back Bruneian participation to a few medical personnel now 
and "players to be named later" would constitute a sound 
military planning decision -- while also satisfying those GOB 
civilian leaders who worry about "showing up" the Malaysians, 
as well as those who were concerned about the robustness of 
the mission all along. 
 
------------------------ 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE USG 
------------------------ 
 
¶7. (C) However accurately we are or are not reading the 
complexities of GOB thinking, the bottom line is this:  GOB 
civilian leaders are now considering a much more modest 
initial contribution to UNIFIL than originally foreseen, 
maybe less than a dozen troops as opposed to the mooted 
number of 200.  An immediate implication for the USG is that 
there is correspondingly less rationale and incentive for the 
GOB to contribute to the cost of any USG-provided lift.  This 
is particularly true since the original idea of a combined 
southeast Asian force has been replaced by the more 
traditional notion of national PKO contingents, and the 
 
BANDAR SER 00000500  003 OF 003 
 
 
Bruneian troops are more likely to attach to the smaller 
national contingent (Malaysia) that has less need for USG 
lift anyway. 
 
¶8. (C) This is not to say that we cannot still encourage GOB 
financial support for the use of USG assets in a deployment 
to UNIFIL from southeast Asia.  We can, but we need to be 
smart about it and do so indirectly.  When it looked like a 
sizeable number of GOB troops might deploy on board USG 
assets as part of a combined force, it would have made sense 
for the USG to ask the Bruneians directly for help in paying 
the cost of that lift.  In the current situation, however, 
that dog won't hunt.  Chances of garnering GOB financial 
support for the deployment would be immeasurably improved if 
it could be arranged for such a request to come to the GOB 
from a brother ASEAN government -- presumably Indonesia, 
possibly Malaysia -- that wanted to move its UNIFIL forces 
via USG assets but could not afford the cost that remained 
after whatever the USG itself was able to pick up.  Such an 
indirect strategy will be frustrating, since we will have 
less insight and control over the pace and direction of the 
process, but is more likely to produce a positive result than 
would rattling the tin cup on our own. 
SKODON