VZCZCXRO8597
PP RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHHM RUEHJO RUEHLN RUEHMA RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHPB
RUEHRN
DE RUEHUJA #2508/01 2680831
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 250831Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY ABUJA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7244
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHZN/ENVIRONMENT SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COLLECTIVE
RUEAUSA/DEPT OF HHS WASHDC
RHFMISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHRN/USMISSION UN ROME 0022
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//USDP/ASD-HD//
RUEHPH/CDC ATLANTA GA
RUEHRC/DEPT OF AGRICULTURE WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 002508 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
USDA FAS WASHDC FOR FAA/RANDY HAGER 
USDA FOR APHIS/JOHN SHAW 
USDA FOR WAYNE MOLSTAD/OSEC 
USAID/W FOR AFR/WA ANGELA LOZANO 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: TBIO KFLU AMED EAGR EAID NI AVIANFLU
SUBJECT: NIGERIA AVIAN FLU UPDATE: SOUTHWESTERN OUTBREAKS 
 
REF:  ABUJA 2238 
 
ABUJA 00002508  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary.  Cooperation between the Ministries of 
Agriculture, Information, and Health on the issue of avian influenza 
(AI) remains an issue, and relations between Agriculture and Health 
officials remain tense over the extent of AI in Nigeria and whether 
to authorize poultry vaccinations.  The government's continued 
overall lack of focus against AI contributes to the inaccurate 
public perception that the virus's threat has abated.  The Ministry 
of Agriculture (MOA) opposes vaccinations and contends AI is under 
control, despite current outbreaks in Lagos and Ogun States.  Poor 
poultry-feed distribution practices contribute significantly to AI's 
spread in the southwest, as contaminated feed sacks carry the virus 
with them.  The MOA says improper vaccinations by farmers also are 
contributing to AI's spread.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Cooperation between Nigeria's Ministries of Agriculture, 
Information, and Health on the issue of avian influenza (AI) remains 
an issue and relations between Agriculture and Health officials are 
tense, including over whether to authorize poultry vaccinations. 
The current extent of AI in Nigeria, and whether the Government of 
Nigeria (GON) should permit poultry inoculations, are the main 
issues dividing the latter two ministries.  The government's 
continued overall lack of focus against AI contributes to the 
inaccurate public perception that the virus's threat has abated. 
 
¶3. (U) Nigeria's chief veterinary officer (CVO) said August 24 at 
the GON AI Interministerial Committee meeting that despite the 
current AI outbreaks in Lagos and Ogun States (details remain 
sketchy, though Lagos State appears to have suffered outbreaks on 25 
to 40 farms), there was no cause for alarm.  The CVO said AI has 
abated and is going away in Nigeria, and the situation could be 
managed using existing resources. 
 
¶4. (U) In particular, MOA officials have told USG officials they 
oppose vaccinations. The reason given are that available vaccines 
use live AI fowl pox; available vaccines confer immunity for only 
two months; the country would need 715 five-man teams to cover 30% 
of village and backyard flocks and 75% of commercial flocks for one 
month at an estimated cost of $0.20-0.57 per dose; and the 
possibility exists of introducing a new "strain/serotype" of the 
virus, as may be the case with foot and mouth disease. The CVO 
expressed concern that the National Agency for Food and Drug 
Administration and Control (NAFDAC) had permitted the import of AI 
vaccines, whose mandate comes under the MOA.  The CVO demanded that 
NAFDAC be directed to recall all AI vaccines.  He said emphatically 
it was his decision when or whether to vaccinate poultry in Nigeria, 
and he declared it forbidden.  The CVO and some other GON officials, 
as well as the GON's policy, continue to oppose vaccination. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Comment: The CVO likely believes that GON resources are 
inadequate to carry out inoculations properly, especially 
considering the poultry sector's fragmented nature.  Ministry of 
Agriculture officials appear to be basing at least some of their 
opposition to vaccinations on incorrect information.  The Web site 
of the Dutch animal-vaccine manufacturer Intervet says recommended 
AI vaccines are "inactivated (not live)" and that vaccines' 
efficacy, following two properly administered injections, is one 
year.  The GON's level of technical competency on the issue of 
vaccinations is not clear.  Internationally, the regulation of 
veterinary drugs typically resides with a CVO or a similar official. 
 Also, the U.S. Mission has received reports of NAFDAC-recognized 
medical doctors offering advice to poultry farmers on vaccinations, 
which is cause for concern. End comment. 
 
¶6. (U) The UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), however, 
recommends that a consultant carry out in Nigeria's north and 
southwest an assessment of the scope of vaccinations against highly 
pathogenic avian influenza.  The terms of reference for this study 
would be established by the MOA and the FAO.  Such a study could 
provide the GON with convincing evidence of the benefits of 
vaccination. The Ministry of Health, the FAO/World Organization for 
Animal Health, and the Veterinary Association of Nigeria think the 
GON should implement a controlled vaccination program, because they 
believe AI no longer can be controlled in Nigeria. 
 
 
ABUJA 00002508  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
Reasons to vaccinate commercial flocks in Nigeria 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶7. (U) Supporters of poultry inoculations believe the GON should 
authorize vaccinations of commercial flocks for a combination of 
reasons: 
 
-- Commercial producers are already employing poor vaccination 
procedures and, regardless of what the CVO directs, will continue to 
vaccinate using a variety of unregulated vaccines. 
 
-- Owners of large commercial flocks can afford professional 
services and already use trained veterinary services.  They could 
implement a proper vaccination program if the MOA legally permitted 
this. 
 
-- Nigeria's large size and the thinness of its rural highway police 
force mean the GON cannot effectively control poultry products' 
movement. 
-- Controlling AI's spread among medium and small poultry farms 
cannot reasonably be expected in the short term because of the lack 
of proper training and the failure to implement biosecurity 
measures. 
 
-- Even with adequate biosecurity training, farms' layout, method of 
construction, and the feed systems on medium and small farms are not 
conducive to good biosecurity.  Even if the proper procedures are 
implemented, avenues for AI's spread will continue:  unscreened 
buildings permit the entry of wild birds and rodents, dirt floors 
are difficult to decontaminate, and porous, rough-cut lumber cannot 
be sanitized. 
 
Flawed feed procedures in Nigeria spread AI 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (U) A USAID Abuja officer with substantial experience in 
commercial-sector animal disease control expressed serious concern 
about the continuing spread of H5N1 in southwestern Nigeria's 
commercial poultry sector, resulting from the industry's method of 
feed delivery.  To achieve world-class commercial biosecurity, it is 
necessary to deliver animal feed in bulk and to minimize recycling 
or farm contact with feed-delivery mechanisms or articles, 
especially recycled feed sacks.  Nigeria's small and medium 
commercial poultry farms do not use the bulk delivery of feed. 
Farms take delivery of feed in nylon sacks that are reused and 
recycled many times, because of the bags' high relative cost and the 
lack of automated feed-delivery systems. 
 
¶9. (U) Poultry feed is delivered from farm to farm in bags and is 
physically carried into each poultry house, where the sacks become 
contaminated with poultry dust and feces while being poured into 
poultry feeders.  The sacks act as a robust disease vector.  The 
contaminated feed bags then are taken back to the feed mill, where 
they are refilled and delivered to another poultry farm.  The entire 
feed mill becomes contaminated as the bags, including new sacks, 
touch the floor and various pieces of equipment. 
 
¶10. (U) AI then spreads rapidly through the portion of the 
commercial sector supplied by a particular feed mill.  The only 
Nigerian poultry farms immune from this are those that produce all 
their own feed and that also do not sell feed to outside farms -- 
but most large farms with their own feed mill sell bags of feed to 
smaller farms.  It is very likely the farms that rapidly became 
infected in Lagos and Ogun States shared the same feed-mill 
processing center. 
 
¶11. (U) The USAID officer expressed to the CVO and the local FAO 
representative his concerns about feed-sack contamination.  He 
recommended that they issue a brochure, to be delivered to the 
Poultry Association of Nigeria and commercial feed mills, which 
would recommend:  Buy disposable paper sacks from a local cement 
factory for use in interim feed delivery and dispersal and burn the 
paper bags after use.  When recycled, nylon feed sacks should be 
soaked in disinfectant for three minutes and then dried before 
refilling.  Do not take nylon feed sacks into a poultry house, but 
rather pour feed into buckets for carrying into poultry houses.