VZCZCXRO1332
OO RUEHDE
DE RUEHAD #3619 2560616
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 130616Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6920
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0210
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

S E C R E T ABU DHABI 003619 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EB A/S DSULLIVAN, NEA/FO, NEA/ARP, NEA/I, T, ISN 
TREASURY FOR DEPSEC RKIMMITT, DAS ASAEED, U/S SLEVEY 
NSC FOR DMCCORMICK, EABRAMS, NRAMCHAND 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL EAID ETTC MNUC PARM EINV IR IQ AE
SUBJECT: DEPSEC KIMMITT DISCUSSES IRAQ COMPACT, IRAN WITH 
FOREIGN MINISTER ABDULLAH 
 
REF: A. ABU DHABI 3565 
 
     ¶B. ABU DHABI 1422 
     ¶C. STATE 120913 
     ¶D. ABU DHABI 2358 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison, reasons 1.4 b and d. 
 
¶1. (S)  BEGIN SUMMARY.  Treasury Deputy Secretary Robert 
Kimmitt met with Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed al 
Nahyan (AbZ) on September 10 to thank him for the UAE's 
hosting of the Iraq Compact Preparatory Group meeting.  AbZ, 
who had just met with Iraqi Deputy PM Barham Salih, 
emphasized the UAE's commitment to the Compact process. 
After AbZ conveyed the UAEG's concerns over Iranian 
intentions, DepSec Kimmitt briefed him on U.S. action against 
Iran's Bank Saderat and discussed the export control and 
transshipment challenges the UAE faces.  Although AbZ 
acknowledged the U.S. request for UAE participation in the 
land-based component of the planned October Leading Edge PSI 
exercise, he made no commitment.  AbZ also raised Dubai Ports 
World and DPW's efforts to sell P&O Ports North America.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (S)  On September 10, DepSec Kimmitt, EB A/S Dan Sullivan, 
Treasury DAS Ahmed Saeed and Ambassador met with Foreign 
Minister AbZ to review the progress made during that day's 
Iraq Compact Preparatory meeting, hosted by the UAE.  The 
Compact was an Iraqi effort, he emphasized, and Deputy PM 
Barham Salih had laid out an ambitious work plan focused on 
political, security,  and economic goals, including progress 
on the fuel import, investment and hydrocarbon laws.  The 
goal of the Iraq Compact would now be to keep up with Iraq, 
Kimmitt noted.  AbZ emphasized that the UAE wished both to 
help Iraq and to "help our American friends" help Iraq. 
 
¶3. (S)  However, it was important to counter the Iranian 
threat, AbZ stressed.  "Even without a bomb, Iran is a threat 
to the region...they are manipulating the world," AbZ 
exclaimed.  It would be "smart to make Iran weaker by 
chopping off its allies" in Lebanon, Central Asia, and 
Afghanistan, he continued.  The UAE and other Gulf states 
"sit on top of a very source of life to the rest of the world 
-- oil," AbZ noted.  "We can't allow Iran to get hold of 
this."  DepSec Kimmitt described USG moves to cut off 
Iran-based Bank Saderat from the U.S. financial system and 
shared U.S. concerns that Iranian banks had facilitated 
financial transactions related to procurement for Iran's 
ballistic missile and nuclear programs.  The discussion then 
moved to the importance of an export control regime and the 
challenges face by the UAE on Iran-related transshipment 
cases. As he had in an April 2006 meeting with Under 
Scretary for Arms Control and International Securit Robert 
Joseph, AbZ asked that UAE be seen as "a last resort" in 
dealing with such transshipment cses (ref B).  Ambassador 
took the opportunity toremind AbZ of the pending request for 
UAE particpation in the U.S.-hosted Proliferation SecurityInitiative "Leading Edge" exercise (ref C).  AbZ acknowledged 
the request but made no commitment. 
¶4. (S)  The Foreign Minister then turned to the P- 1 Iran 
incentives/disincentives package.  He wa clearly still 
rankled that the USG had been unale to provide detailed 
information to the GCC over the inclusion a security element 
in the package(ref D).  The U.S. and the EU had "kept the 
GCC in the dark," he complained, and it had in the end been 
Iran which shared a copy of the package with the UAEG.  "We 
did not understand why our friends had gone and talked to our 
enemy Iran, on regional security." 
 
¶5. (S)  AbZ then turned to the Dubai Ports World issue, 
citing the August 31 letter that the company had written to 
Members of Congress providing an update on the sale of P&O 
Ports North America.  AbZ noted that although the UAE was 
looking at various other investment opportunities in the 
United States, DPW "had made us hesitant." 
 
¶6. (U)  This message has been cleared by EB A/S Dan Sullivan 
and DepSec Kimmitt. 
SISON