VZCZCXRO6074
RR RUEHDE
DE RUEHAD #3565/01 2531138
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 101138Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6878
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0208
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 003565 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
NOFORN 
 
STATE FOR EB A/S DSULLIVAN, NEA/FO, NEA/ARPI, NEA/I, T, ISN 
TREASURY FOR DEPSEC RKIMMITT, DAS ASAEED, U/S SLEVEY 
NSC FOR DMCCORMICK, EABRAMS, NRAMCHAND 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL EAID ETTC IR IQ AE
SUBJECT: DEPSEC KIMMITT DISCUSSES IRAQ COMPACT, IRAN WITH 
ABU DHABI CROWN PRINCE 
 
REF: A. ABU DHABI 3097 
 
     ¶B. STATE 148160 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Michele J. Sison, for reasons 1.4 b and d. 
 
¶1. (S/NF) Summary. On September 9, Treasury Deputy Secretary 
Robert Kimmitt met with Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin 
Zayed Al-Nahyan (MbZ) to discuss the Iraq Compact Preparatory 
Group Meeting being hosted in Abu Dhabi the next day.  MbZ 
stressed that the UAE will do all it can to assist Iraq, but 
he also emphasized that the UAEG desires more consultations 
with the USG on the situation in, and plans for, Iraq.  MbZ 
said that the UAE does not want to be included in discussions 
only in cases where its assistance is needed.  MbZ and DepSec 
Kimmitt discussed the challenge of limiting and countering 
Iranian influence in Iraq, and MbZ inquired whether splitting 
Iraq might help achieve stability.  DepSec Kimmitt told MbZ 
that the USG is committed to ensuring that Iran cannot 
continue to use the international financial system to finance 
terrorism and WMD proliferation networks, and he informed MbZ 
that the U.S. had recently taken action against Iran-owned 
Bank Saderat.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (C) On September 9, DepSec Kimmitt, EB A/S Daniel 
Sullivan, Treasury DAS Ahmed Saeed, Ambassador, and Econoff 
met with MbZ, Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, 
and MbZ's International Affairs Director Yousef Al-Otaiba to 
discuss the September 10 Iraq Compact Preparatory Group 
Meeting.  DepSec Kimmitt began the meeting by thanking the 
UAEG for agreeing to host the next day's meeting, and he 
conveyed the appreciation of the President, Secretary Rice, 
and Secretary Paulson.  "It is good for the Iraqis to know 
that their Gulf neighbors are working for their success," 
Kimmitt said.  He expressed optimism for the success of the 
meeting and said that it would lay the groundwork to ensure 
that the meetings in New York and Singapore are effective. 
Noting that Iraq's delegation includes five ministers, DepSec 
Kimmitt said, "This meeting is the Iraqi's chance to lay out 
their economic development plan and to impress on the 
representatives from 20 different countries and international 
organizations the seriousness with which they take the 
challenges ahead of them." 
 
¶3. (C) MbZ said that the UAE will do everything it can to 
help improve the situation in Iraq.  He acknowledged, 
however, that agreeing to host the meeting had not been an 
easy decision for the UAEG, and he outlined some of the 
reasons for the hesitancy.  MbZ explained that the UAEG 
believes it has not been kept sufficiently in the loop about 
plans and intentions in Iraq.  He expressed concern that the 
U.S. and the international community reach out to the UAEG 
only when its assistance is needed, and that "when we are not 
needed, no one will tell us what is going on."  Noting that 
many people in the UAE and the region "do not see the light 
at the end of the tunnel," MbZ said that the UAE's views and 
opinions have often been discounted.  "We had an opinion 
about the best structure for the Iraqi Government, but no one 
was listening...And now, because of some of the decisions 
that were made, more people are dying."  He contrasted this 
with the situation in Afghanistan, where he felt the UAE had 
less at stake but greater visibility, and therefore a larger 
role.  Comment: The UAEG expressed frustration in 2003 when 
it felt the USG had not sufficiently consulted them regarding 
the United States' plans for Iraq.  MbZ's comments are likely 
a reference to the UAE's cumulative frustration, rather than 
a comment solely on the current level of dialogue.  End 
comment. 
 
¶4. (C) DepSec Kimmitt assured MbZ that the USG wants -- and 
has sought -- opinions and suggestions from Iraq's neighbors, 
and that the USG values the UAE's unique perspective. 
Kimmitt cited his July meetings in the UAE and the region as 
testimony that the USG recognizes the importance of 
consultation with the Gulf countries (ref A).  Pointing out 
that Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki's first trip abroad had been 
to the Gulf, Kimmitt assured MbZ that "both the U.S. and the 
Iraqi governments recognize that the first line of support 
for Iraq must come through the Gulf countries."  He noted, 
however, that it is up to the Iraqis to engage in direct 
communication with the UAEG and other Gulf countries.  MbZ 
concurred, but he noted wryly that "Maliki's visit to the 
Gulf did not go as well as you think." 
 
¶5. (C) MbZ asked if the USG had ever considered "splitting up 
 
ABU DHABI 00003565  002 OF 002 
 
 
Iraq."  DepSec Kimmitt replied that the USG assesses such an 
action would not bring Iraq long-term stability and might 
increase Iranian influence in southern Iraq.  "We believe the 
best chance for long term stability is to develop a unified 
government that rules from the center, but respects 
differences among its population."  Kimmitt told MbZ that 
Iraq's draft Hydrocarbon Law (which would be discussed during 
the Iraq Compact meeting) would be a good opportunity for the 
Iraqi government to demonstrate to its people that a unified 
government can fairly allocate resource revenues among the 
population. 
 
¶6. (C) Turning to a discussion of Iranian involvement in 
Iraq, MbZ noted that it is very difficult to "control" Iran's 
meddling in the country.  He noted that the close ties the 
Iraqi Government maintains with Iran (citing Maliki's planned 
September 11 visit to Tehran) makes it especially difficult 
to ensure that Iraq's political decisions are not influenced 
by Iran.  Kimmitt agreed and noted that the USG is concerned 
about Iranian meddling in the region, its continued support 
to terrorist organizations, and its continued efforts to 
develop missile and WMD programs. 
 
¶7. (S/NF) Noting that Iran uses formal financial institutions 
to finance its programs, DepSec Kimmitt told MbZ that the USG 
will be reaching out to governments and banks in Europe, the 
Middle East, and Asia to warn them about the dangers of 
conducting business with Iranian financial institutions.  "We 
are working with friends and allies to deny terrorist and WMD 
procurement networks access to financial systems."  In this 
vein, DepSec Kimmitt told MbZ that the USG had recently taken 
steps to cut-off Iran-based Bank Saderat from the U.S. 
financial system (ref B).  MbZ agreed with DepSec Kimmitt's 
concerns about Iran, and said that the UAEG will be happy to 
help the USG's efforts "wherever we can."  He also expressed 
his desire to be kept more "in the loop" about the U.S. plans 
and intentions for Iran and noted, "I think the region should 
be more aware of the plan for what will happen.  It is 
important to have a more open dialogue." 
 
¶8. (SBU) DepSec Kimmitt has cleared this message.  Iraq 
Compact meetings reported septel. 
SISON