VZCZCXYZ0089
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUNV #0650/01 2431750
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 311750Z AUG 06
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5371

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000650 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/31/2021 
TAGS: AORC IAEA IR KNNP
SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: DG'S REPORT: NO SUSPENSION, NO FURTHER 
PROGRESS ON VERIFICATION 
 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (SBU) The DG, as mandated by UNSCR 1696, reported that as 
of August 31 Iran has not suspended uranium enrichment 
activities, halted construction of the heavy water research 
reactor at Arak, cooperated with the IAEA to resolve the 
outstanding issues, voluntarily implemented the Additional 
Protocol, or provided the transparency required to confirm 
the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program.  The report 
also notes that Iran has recently denied Agency requests to 
access some accounting records at the pilot enrichment plant, 
 to grant one-year, multiple-entry visas, and to access the 
underground enrichment halls at Natanz, although Iran 
relented at the eleventh hour on the last two issues.  As a 
result, "the Agency remains unable to make further progress 
in its efforts to verify the completeness and correctness of 
Iran's declarations with a view to confirming the peaceful 
nature of Iran's nuclear program." 
 
¶2. (SBU) The report details a litany of unfulfilled Agency 
requests for access to individuals, documents, and 
facilities.  There has been no progress on the LEU/HEU 
contamination and P1/P2 centrifuge issues.  The Iranians have 
not allowed the Agency to retain a copy of the HEU metal 
casting document and confiscated inspectors' notes.  Iranian 
"clarifications" have not resolved inconsistencies regarding 
their plutonium experiments.  Iran began a new round of 
uranium conversion in June (expected to produce 160 tons of 
UF6), and resumed feeding UF6 into a 164-centrifuge cascade 
in late August.  A second 164-machine cascade my be 
operational in September.  The Agency has substantiated 
Iranian claims of achieving 5 percent enrichment, but the 
Iranians have not provided some information required to 
complete the analytic records.  The Iranians have denied 
access to the former head of the PHRC at Lavizan and 
equipment from that site, and have refused to discuss Green 
Salt and weaponization issues noted in previous DG reports. 
End Summary. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Developments Since the June Report 
---------------------------------- 
 
-- Suspension of Enrichment Related Activities 
 
¶3. (SBU) Iran has continued to test P1 centrifuges at the 
Natanz pilot facility, with operation of the single machines 
and 10- and 20-machine cascades mostly occurring under 
vacuum.  Testing of the 164-centrifuge cascade with UF6 
occurred between June 23-July 8. Feeding of UF6 into this 
cascade resumed August 24. 
 
¶4. (SBU) June 2006 Iranian claims of 5 percent enrichment 
were substantiated by information from the mass spectrometer 
that the Iranians provided; however, Iran (time unspecified) 
denied access to information regarding product and tails 
assays, which are required to complete the analytic records, 
but subsequently provided "some" information about product 
assays on August 30. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Installation of a second 164-machine cascade is 
nearly complete and the Iranians plan to have it running 
under vacuum in September. The Agency has been allowed to 
install additional cameras to monitor this area, but the 
Iranians have refused Agency requests to install remote 
monitoring capabilities. 
 
¶6. (SBU) The Iranians denied Agency access to the underground 
enrichment halls at Natanz from August 11-14, but granted 
access to this site between August 26-30 to conduct design 
information verification (DIV). 
 
--Suspension of Reprocessing Activities 
 
¶7. (SBU) The Agency has been monitoring the use of hot cells 
at the Tehran Research Reactor and other sites through 
inspections, DIV, and satellite imagery, but has not detected 
any ongoing reprocessing activities 
 
--Heavy Water Research Reactor 
 
¶8. (SBU) Construction of the heavy water reactor at Arak 
continues. 
 
--Outstanding Issues 
 
¶9. (SBU) Iran still has not provided a time table for 
resolving the litany of outstanding issues, despite its 
assurances in April to provide one "within three weeks." 
 
--Contamination 
 
¶10. (SBU) There has been no further progress on this issue, 
and the report notes that a full understanding of the scope 
and chronology of Iran's enrichment program, as well as full 
implementation of the Additional Protocol, is necessary for 
the Agency to provide credible assurances regarding the 
absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities in 
Iran. 
 
-- Acquisition of P1 and P2 Centrifuge Technology 
 
¶11. (SBU) Iran has provided no new information on this issue. 
 The Agency submitted a letter to the Iranians on April 24 
seeking clarifications about senior Iranian leader's comments 
about P2 progress, and the Iranians responded on June 16 
saying they were studying different types of machines and 
that this was "an ongoing and progressing R&D activity 
without using nuclear material." 
 
-- The Uranium Metal Document 
 
¶12. (SBU) The Agency is investigating information and 
documents that may have been provided to Iran by foreign 
intermediaries.  The Iranians are still refusing to provide a 
copy to the Agency, and in August, they would not allow 
inspectors to retain notes they had made while reviewing the 
document. 
 
-- Plutonium Experiments 
 
¶13. (SBU) Since June, the Agency has evaluated explanations 
provided by Iran and examined the copy of the notebook kept 
by the researcher responsible for the experiments, and has 
concluded that they did not provide sufficient clarification 
of the outstanding issue. The Agency in July met with a 
reactor operator and the researcher, who also did not provide 
the data necessary to clarify the issues.  The Agency sent an 
August 10 letter to Iran indicating that the outstanding 
issues could not be resolved unless Iran provided additional 
information.  Iran has also been asked to provide information 
about the presence of HEU particles detected on a container 
sampled in August 2005 at the Karaj Waste Storage Facility. 
 
-- Other Implementation Issues 
 
¶14. (SBU) The Agency has concluded that the Physical 
Inventory Verification of nuclear material at the uranium 
conversion facility (UCF), concluded in May, was within the 
measurement uncertainties normally associated with similar 
size conversion plants.  It also notes that in April 2006, 
the Iranians removed a UF6 cylinder from the UF6 withdrawal 
station without prior notification to the Agency, which 
resulted "in a loss of continuity of knowledge of nuclear 
material in the process." However, "in light of the PIV, the 
Agency will continue to follow up on this question as a 
routine part of its verification" work. 
 
¶15. (SBU) In June, Iran began a new round of conversion at 
the uranium conversion facility (UCF) that is expected to 
produce about 160 tons of UF6.  This campaign had produced 
about 26 tons of UF6 and is expected to end January 2007. 
Iran in July informed the Agency of plans to build at the UCF 
a "standby" process line for converting ammonium uranyl 
carbonate into UO2. 
 
--Other Matters 
 
¶16. (SBU) During a July 2006 DIV at the Fuel Manufacturing 
Plant at Esfahan, Iran told inspectors that full 
commissioning of the plant is scheduled for 2007.  Civil 
engineering is about 80 percent complete and equipment is 
being installed. 
 
¶17. (SBU) From late July until August 29, the Iranians 
refused to issue one-year, multiple-entry visas to designated 
inspectors as agreed to by Iran in the Subsidiary 
Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement; however, Iran on 
August 30 provided such visas for two inspectors, and on 
August 31 informed the Agency that "following the normal 
administration process the multiple- entry, one-year visa for 
remaining designated inspectors will be issued by September 
10." 
 
--Transparency Measures 
 
¶18. (SBU) Iran has not responded to Agency requests for 
clarifications concerning, and access to carry out 
environmental sampling of, equipment and materials related to 
the Physics Research Center (PHRC). Iran has also not 
provided access to the former head of the PHRC. 
 
¶19. (SBU) Iran "has not expressed any readiness" to discuss 
Green Salt, high explosives testing, and the redesign of a 
re-entry vehicle mentioned in previous reports. 
 
-- Summary 
 
¶20. (SBU) The summary notes specifically that Iran has not 
suspended enrichment activities or acted in accordance with 
the Additional Protocol.  While Iran has been providing the 
Agency access to nuclear material and facilities, and has 
provided the required reports, Iran continues to deny access 
to "certain operating records" at the Natanz Pilot Plant. 
Iran also has not addressed the outstanding issues or 
provided the transparency required to remove "uncertainties 
associated with some of its activities." The report concludes 
by noting that the Agency remains unable to make further 
progress in its efforts to verify the correctness and 
completeness of Iran's declarations with a view to confirming 
the peaceful nature of its nuclear program. 
 
¶21. (C) The report, in our judgment, could have been even 
harder hitting. It did not for example, explicitly state that 
Iran had failed to comply with UNSC or Board of Governor 
requests. Nor did it recite past statements that the IAEA 
could not certify the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear 
actions, making this point only indirectly. That said, the 
report clearly demonstrates Iran's failure to suspend its 
activities at Natanz and Arak and to cooperate with the IAEA 
across a series of issues, providing ample basis for further 
action in the Security Council. 
 
¶22. (C) We suspect that the DG played a role in toning down 
the report, though he could not escape the facts of Iran's 
behavior. We also suspect that the DG is disappointed that 
Iran resumed introducing UF6 into the 164-centrifuge cascade 
on August 24. He undoubtedly hoped that the Iranians would be 
spinning the cascade on a vacuum, so he could argue this was 
some form of suspension. 
SCHULTE