VZCZCXYZ0009
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUM #0609/01 2220817
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 100817Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0231
INFO RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW IMMEDIATE 0021
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE 0016
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHHMUNA/PACOM HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
RUCJACC/CENTCOMREAR MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 5171
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 2391

C O N F I D E N T I A L ULAANBAATAR 000609 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/09/2016 
TAGS: MARR PREL MG IZ PL
SUBJECT: FM TELLS AMBASSADOR NSC WILL DECIDE 7TH IRAQ 
ROTATION SIZE 
 
REF: A. STATE 123080 
 
     ¶B. ULAANBAATAR 575 
     ¶C. ULAANBAATAR 553 
     ¶D. ULAANBAATAR 550 
 
Classified By: Acting DCM Patrick J. Freeman, for reasons 
1.5(B) and (D). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary and comment:  Ambassador, accompanied by 
Polish ambassador, met on August 9 with Foreign Minister 
Enkhbold to urge Mongolia to reconsider its decision to 
reduce the 7th rotation to Iraq to a few staff officers. 
Ambassador noted that Washington welcomes Mongolia's decision 
to send a 7th rotation, but is disappointed at the late 
notice, and concerned about the force protection effect at 
Camp Echo.  The Polish ambassador stated that the Mongolia 
contingent is very important for the security of Polish 
soldiers and that Mongolia's decision on the rotation is a 
very important one for his government.  Foreign Minister 
Enkhbold responded that Mongolia's National Security Council 
would make the final decision at an as yet unscheduled 
meeting, and that the U.S. and Polish views would be taken 
into account.  He commented that the Cabinet had felt that 
the 7th rotation could be decided at its level, but that it 
would "have to listen to the NSC."  Comment:  Enkhbold's 
acknowledgement that the NSC will make the final call is a 
change from his demeanor on July 20 (ref c), which gave no 
suggestion that the Cabinet decision to make the significant 
reduction was other than final.  While the outcome remains 
unknown, two of the three members of the NSC (the President 
and Speaker) have been strong supporters of Mongolia's 
presence in Iraq, and President Enkhbayar is known to be 
unhappy both with the reduction and the way that the decision 
was made. End summary and comment. 
 
¶2.  (C) Ambassador, accompanied by Polish Ambassador Zbigniew 
Kulak, met with Foreign Minister Enkhbold on August 9. 
Ambassador stated that Washington had asked her to meet with 
the Foreign Minister to urge Mongolia to send a 7th rotation 
which could carry on with the same mission.  She drew on ref 
a points to state that, while the U.S. welcomes Mongolia's 
decision to send a 7th rotation to Iraq, there is 
disappointment with the late notice.  She noted there would 
be a significant negative impact on security at Camp Echo, 
since it is impossible to find replacements for the Mongolia 
soldiers, who had performed very well in previous rotations. 
 
¶3.  (C) Polish Ambassador Kulak noted that he had briefly 
talked with the Foreign Minister several days ago on the 
margins of another event.  Since then, his government had 
suggested that he call on the Foreign Minister with the U.S. 
ambassador.  Kulak stated that the Mongolian contingent is 
very important for the security of the 2,000 Polish soldiers 
in Iraq.  There had been excellent cooperation between the 
Polish and Mongolian contingents.  A reduction in Mongolia's 
contingent at Camp Echo, or its end, is a very important 
issue for the Polish government.  He urged the Mongolian 
government to understand Poland's viewpoint.  Ambassador 
Slutz noted that the Polish forces are more directly affected 
by the intended Mongolian reduction, but that it also has 
bearing on Coalition relations as a whole. 
 
¶4.  (C) FM Enkhbold responded that both ambassadors knew 
about the Cabinet decision which had been made, and which had 
been based on consultations between MFA and the Ministry of 
Defense.  The Cabinet had supported the suggestion to reduce 
the number of soldiers, but to still have a few staff 
officers there.  A final decision had yet to be made 
concerning the details of this decision, such as how many 
staff would be sent. 
 
¶5.  (C) The Foreign Minister continued that, prior to those 
details being worked out, the issue would be submitted to 
Mongolia's National Security Council (note: the President, 
Speaker, and Prime Minister).  Enkhbold expressed uncertainty 
as to when the NSC would meet, but opined it likely would be 
in the near future, before the planned vacations of 
officials.  The Foreign Minister reiterated that it is within 
the authority and power of the Cabinet to make decisions on 
the details of each rotation but, in this case, the issue 
would be discussed and a decision made at the NSC level.  He 
assured that Mongolia would not be withdrawing from Iraq. 
Foreign Minister Enkhbold acknowledged that he had seen the 
Ambassador's letter of the previous day, and passed it to the 
President and Speaker.  (Note: On August 8, citing MFA 
 
reports that the NSC would meet to discuss the 7th rotation, 
the Ambassador wrote to the President, Speaker, and Prime 
Minister, with a copy to the Foreign Minister, attaching a 
copy of the ref a talking points.)  Enkhbold stated that the 
Cabinet and the NSC would consider the U.S. and Polish points 
in making the final decision on the 7th rotation. 
SLUTZ