VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTI #0846/01 2231010
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 111010Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY TIRANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4673
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEASWA/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 3302
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY

UNCLAS TIRANA 000846 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR H, EUR/SCE (DAVIS, SAINZ), ISN/NDF (PAULSON) 
OSD FOR CTR POLICY (REID, WEBER) 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OREP PARM MASS NATO PGOV ECON PREL AL
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR CODEL LUGAR'S VISIT TO ALBANIA 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Mr. Chairman, the Albanian Chemical Weapons 
Elimination Program (ACWEP) is proceeding apace.  Although 
delays in testing the destruction equipment in Germany mean 
that destruction will not have begun by the time of your 
visit, the program is nevertheless on track to complete 
destruction in time to meet the April 2007 deadline imposed 
by the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).  You will see a 
facility with substantially upgraded security as well as 
destruction equipment in place. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Politically, your visit could not come at a better 
time.  Euro-Atlantic integration is a goal shared by 
virtually the entire political spectrum and enjoying broad 
support from the public.  However, the deterioration of the 
political atmosphere in the past several months has virtually 
precluded work on the tough reforms and the 
institution-building that are crucial to Albania's 
Euro-Atlantic aspirations.  Your visit is an outstanding 
opportunity to send the message -- to both the government and 
the opposition -- that this difficult job will require them 
to reach across the aisle and work together, as you did in 
creating the Nunn-Lugar program that made possible the 
destruction of Albania's CW stockpile.  Visits at your level 
are exceedingly rare (we will have had only two official 
Congressional Delegations, and none composed of Senators, 
since your visit here in 2004), and we hope you will use this 
chance to tell Albania that, while the U.S. supports its 
aspirations and wants it to succeed, ultimately it is up to 
Albania itself to achieve the necessary progress.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
CW ELIMINATION PROGRAM 
 
¶3. (SBU) Through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction 
(CTR) program, the U.S. is assisting Albania with the 
destruction of approximately 16 metric tons of blister agent, 
the existence of which was first disclosed in June 2002.  In 
December 2004, the U.S. Department of Defense and the 
Albanian Ministry of Defense (MOD) concluded an Implementing 
Agreement for the safe, secure, and environmentally sound 
destruction of the stockpile in compliance with Albania's 
obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention. 
Authorized funding is currently at $34.4 million, and the 
project is managed by DOD and implemented by the Defense 
Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA).  In 2005, the contract for 
the destruction was awarded to Washington Group 
International; Eisenmann AG of Germany is providing the 
destruction technology.  Raytheon Technical Services Company 
improved the road leading to the site and constructed the 
concrete pad on which the destruction equipment has been 
placed. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Due to damage sustained during testing of the 
destruction equipment in Germany and required modifications 
to the system, the start of destruction operations has been 
postponed from July to October 2006.  Final testing should 
take place between mid-August and the beginning of October, 
but no operations will take place during the time of your 
visit.  Despite the delay, we still expect destruction to be 
complete before the CWC deadline of April 29, 2007. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Embassy Tirana and DTRA have worked closely with the 
MOD to improve security practices at the site, and the 
Department of State's Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund 
(NDF) provided extensive physical upgrades and new security 
equipment.  The site is now much better secured than when you 
visited in 2004; however, there is always room for 
improvement, and your visit is a good opportunity to remind 
the MOD that it must not let its guard down during this 
crucial final phase. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Since the appearance of a January 2005 Washington 
Post article on the project, which Albanian press picked up, 
we have worked with the MOD to ensure an appropriate public 
affairs posture that takes into account the sensitivity of 
the project.  Since then, there has been virtually no 
reporting on the project in the local media.  While neither 
the existence of the stockpile itself nor of the ACWEP is a 
secret, we believe that extensive media coverage of the issue 
 
SIPDIS 
is undesirable before the completion of destruction activity. 
 We are therefore avoiding comment on this aspect of your 
visit and concentrating on your interest in Albania's 
progress toward Euro-Atlantic integration. 
 
NATO INTEGRATION AND MILITARY OUTLOOK 
¶7. (SBU) Albania was among the first countries to answer our 
calls for support in the GWOT, and its support has been 
unwavering.  It has a contingent of 120 combat troops in 
Mosul, Iraq; and 22 Special Operation Forces in ISAF in 
Afghanistan.  In addition, it deployed nine personnel as part 
of a Southeastern European Brigade (SEEBRIG) headquarters 
element and has three in the A-3 Joint Medical Unit.  There 
are 71 troops in the EUFOR mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Overall, including troops in training and preparation for 
overseas deployments, Albania has about a third of its elite 
troops committed to the GWOT.  We suggest that you express 
appreciation for Albania's contributions and emphasize the 
importance of "exporting security" to NATO membership. 
 
¶8. (SBU) The desire to join NATO (and the Euro-Atlantic 
community in general, including the EU) is very strong in 
Albania, enjoying broad support across the political spectrum 
and among the public, although popular understanding of the 
obligations associated with NATO membership is limited. 
Albania had hoped to be invited to join NATO in 2006.  Though 
President Moisiu expressed sharp disappointment with the 
"two-summit strategy," the reaction was more muted than in 
Croatia or Macedonia.  We have stressed that the door is 
open, but it is Albania's achievement of necessary political 
and military standards that will determine the timing of 
accession.  The Prime Minister and Defense Minister have, we 
think, digested this message, but others in the government 
and opposition to a lesser extent. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Led by the energetic, politically savvy Fatmir 
Mediu, the MOD is committed to modernizing the Albanian Armed 
Forces (AAF) to make it deployable and NATO-interoperable. 
However, while there is no doubt about the political 
commitment, several constraints remain.  Albania has failed 
to keep to its own schedule for bringing defense spending up 
to two percent of GDP by 2010.  Real spending on defense 
(excluding retirement) is about $120 million, with only about 
eight percent of that amount available for modernization. 
You should urge Albania (particularly the President and PM) 
to empower younger leadership who "think and understand" NATO 
and encourage the MOD to focus its modest resources on 
creating a "niche capability" that shows Albania brings 
something to the table.  The Rapid Reaction Brigade (RRB), 
which is the one highly touted unit the MOD says would be 
ready for NATO duty if called, still lacks sufficient 
equipment and personnel.  The MOD is now working to equip, 
train, and modernize this NATO-designated unit. 
 
¶10. (SBU) U.S. Security Assistance programs include FMF (FY06 
$3.5 million), IMET (FY06 $900,000), Global Peacekeeping 
Operations Initiative (FY06 $3.5 million), DOD Humanitarian 
Assistance, and a number of smaller programs.  Resources are 
focused on deployed and deployable units in GWOT (Commandos 
and RRB), US/NATO/Coalition-interoperable equipment and 
communications, and NATO integration through U.S. defense 
reform advisors.  The Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) 
initiated a Defense Reform Assessment this year to help MOD 
define requirements and accelerate progress in defense reform 
in resource-constrained circumstances. 
 
¶11. (SBU) In addition to the ACWEP, the Department of State 
has provided assistance with destruction of Albania's huge 
stockpile of excess conventional munitions, including small 
arms/light weapons (including MANPADS) through the Office of 
Weapons Removal and Abatement in the Bureau of 
Political-Military Affairs (PM/WRA), and heavy munitions 
through NDF.  The northeastern region of Albania (bordering 
Kosovo) suffers from mines and unexploded ordnance left from 
the Kosovo conflict, though most of the mines have now been 
cleared.  The USG has been the largest donor to mine action 
in Albania, having contributed over $8 million since 2000. 
 
POLITICAL OUTLOOK 
 
¶12. (SBU) There have been significant changes in Albania's 
political leadership since your last visit.  Parliamentary 
elections in July 2005 elections ended eight years of 
Socialist Party (SP) rule and brought former President Sali 
Berisha back to power as Prime Minister, leading a 
center-right coalition dominated by his Democratic Party 
(DP).  Former PM Fatos Nano has (for now) exited the 
political stage, with the opposition led by the charismatic 
mayor of Tirana, Edi Rama (SP).  The elections, though not 
fully meeting international standards, were nevertheless 
judged to be a step forward.  Now Albania must implement a 
rigorous program of broad-based reforms to strengthen 
institutions and reduce corruption while respecting 
democratic norms.  The lack of strong, effective 
institutions, a professional civil service, and respect for 
the rule of law impedes progress in all areas, including 
attracting the investment needed for economic development. 
Institutions crucial to Albania's democratic development, 
including NGOs, the media, religious organizations, and 
business coalitions, are still relatively immature, and it 
will take years of patient work to build them up to create a 
strong, sustainable democracy. 
 
¶13. (SBU) The new government has made combating organized 
crime and corruption a top priority, a laudable goal given 
that these are two of the biggest impediments to Albania's 
Euro-Atlantic aspirations.  It has made some good progress in 
making several high-profile arrests of organized crime 
figures in Albania and securing the extraditions of others 
abroad.  However, some of its methods have also generated 
intense controversy, with the opposition charging the Prime 
Minister with seeking to usurp Albania's constitutionally 
independent institutions.  Disagreements between the 
government and the opposition have become increasingly 
acrimonious in the last several months.  Controversy centers 
on a highly public government-led effort to remove the 
independent Prosecutor General; political machinations by 
both government and opposition to control the Central 
Election Commission in the run-up to local elections; a 
related battle over voters' registration lists; and the 
selection of members of judicial and media oversight bodies. 
Last month, tensions that had been largely contained within 
democratic parameters erupted during a heated session in 
Parliament, during which an opposition leader rushed the 
speaker's podium.  The session adjourned for the summer amid 
fisticuffs. 
 
¶14. (SBU) The opposition, blocked by the government's stable 
majority in Parliament, faces limited options.  Increasingly, 
it appears that some in the opposition are prepared to 
precipitate a political crisis that would lead to new 
elections.  The result is a political environment that, 
contrary to focusing on the tough reforms necessary for 
Albania to receive an invitation to NATO in 2008, has 
disintegrated into partisan self-interest and virtual 
stagnation.  You should remind both the government and the 
opposition that Albania's aspirations for NATO and EU 
integration, which are supported broadly by its citizens, 
must be the basis for all parties to work constructively on 
needed reforms and that there is not much time.  Particularly 
as NATO takes on a role of a forum for dialogue on security 
issues in the Euro-Atlantic community, it is crucial that 
Albania demonstrate to Allies the political maturity required 
to sit as an equal member on the North Atlantic Council. 
 
ECONOMIC ISSUES 
 
¶15. (SBU) Albania has enjoyed excellent macroeconomic 
stability in recent years, with low inflation, solid growth, 
and a stable currency.  The main economic challenges include 
an inadequate infrastructure (especially roads and energy), a 
relatively low level of foreign direct investment, and the 
lack of a competitive export sector.  Albania's economy is to 
a large extent dependent on remittances from Albanians 
working abroad, especially in Greece and Italy.  At about 
$2.5 billion annually, imports are more than three times the 
level of exports.  The Millennium Challenge Corporation 
recently approved $14 million of Threshold Program funding to 
assist with urgently needed public procurement and tax 
administration reform and to help create a National Business 
Center. 
 
REGIONAL ISSUES / KOSOVO 
 
¶16. (SBU) Your interlocutors are likely to raise Kosovo and 
regional issues.  Albania has been a stabilizing influence in 
the Balkans, particularly on Kosovo, by discouraging 
extremism and supporting the efforts of the international 
community.  The new DP-led government has been somewhat more 
vocal in support of Kosovar independence but says that its 
basic policy has not changed.  You should express 
appreciation for Albania's constructive role in the region 
and urge continued moderation. 
 
¶17. (U) Mr. Chairman, it will be our honor to welcome you to 
Tirana. 
CRISTINA