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DE RUEHTL #0768/01 2360830
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O 240830Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY TALLINN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8943
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 1126

C O N F I D E N T I A L TALLINN 000768 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/24/2016 
TAGS: MARR MOPS NATO PGOV PREL EN
SUBJECT: ESTONIA LEADS THE WAY: MILITARY TRANSFORMATION 
 
REF: A. TALLINN 00091 
 
     ¶B. TALLINN 00311 
     ¶C. TALLINN 00740 
     ¶D. TALLINN 00767 
 
Classified By: CDA Jeff Goldstein for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  Over the last several years, Estonia has 
made significant strides towards modernizing its military 
and meeting its NATO requirements.  Since 2001, Estonia 
has increased its defense spending 13 percent annually. 
The GOE has contributed forces to priority international 
operations abroad, including Iraq and Afghanistan.  The 
Estonian Defense Forces (EDF) has also leveraged 
participation in these missions to provide its troops 
with valuable operational and combat experience 
unavailable at home, and identify and address 
shortcomings in military operations and training. 
However, there is growing resentment within the GOE and 
EDF that these efforts do not receiving the recognition 
they deserve.  Although they do not scream and shout 
about it, this resentment does increase when the 
Estonians see their Baltic neighbors receiving more FMF 
and Coalition Support Funds than they do.  End Summary. 
 
Putting their money where their mouth is 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (U) In the 15 years since re-independence, Estonia has 
transformed its military into a capable and experienced, 
if small-scale, contributor to NATO and the global war on 
terror (GWOT).  This has been achieved, in part, because 
of the GOE's willingness to direct some of the proceeds 
from Estonia's economic success into the defense budget. 
Since 2001, the GOE has increased its defense spending 
annually by 13 percent.  This year defense spending will 
increase from 1.61 to 1.84 percent of GDP ($309 million). 
"(We) have promised NATO to spend two percent of GDP on 
defense and we must reach this goal by 2010," explained 
Prime Minister Ansip in May, "(and) no concessions 
whatsoever can be made on this, because the most 
important thing a small country can offer to NATO is 
reliability" (ref A). 
 
¶3. (SBU) The Ministry of Defense (MOD) is making the most 
of this extra funding by enacting root-and-branch 
military transformation for greater efficiency and 
interoperability within NATO.  The MOD and Estonian 
Defense Forces (EDF) have focused on a few key areas to 
get the most bang for their buck. 
 
- NATO obligations: The Ministry of Defense's (MOD) two 
biggest projects are the upgrade of Amari airbase and 
procurement of a short range air defense (SHORAD) system 
in order to meet their NATO obligations.  The GOE has 
pledged $40 million for Amari with a completion date of 
¶2010.  Additionally, the GOE will spend $52 million to 
procure its new SHORAD system, the largest military 
tender in Estonia's history. 
 
- Hardware Upgrades: The GOE is upgrading its Mine 
Counter Measure (MCM) capability with purchases of MCM 
vessels from the UK.  The EDF has also purchased an 
artillery battalion (AN) set of 155 MM guns and 65 modern 
armored personal carriers (APC).  Finally, the Estonians 
continue to purchase, via Foreign Military Financing 
(FMF) and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS), night vision 
devices (NVD), thermal weapons sights, and modern secure 
communications. 
 
- Training: Estonia has completely revised its joint 
command and general staff with NATO standard doctrine. 
The EDF also continues to send 45 to 50 officers and non- 
commissioned officers (NCO) to U.S. military courses each 
year. 
 
-Specialization: Understanding that Estonia's security 
ultimately depends on NATO, the EDF has reoriented its 
focus from territorial protection to niche capabilities 
to fill NATO needs.  The EDF has focused on developing a 
rapid reaction infantry unit, a Human Intelligence 
(HUMINT) team, and an Explosives Ordinance Disposal (EOD) 
team. 
 
Learning by doing 
----------------- 
 
¶4. (U) Estonia's military transformation has involved 
more than just acquiring new equipment or training.  From 
the top down, the philosophy within the MOD and EDF is 
one of learning by doing.  Nothing exemplifies this 
better than Estonia's participation in international 
peace support operations (PSO).  In just a short period 
of time, Estonia has gone from an aid recipient to a 
country that contributes financially and materially far 
more than is expected for its size.  Since 1995, over 
1500 EDF troops have participated in international PSOs 
around the world.  Currently, Estonia participates in 
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the International 
Stabilization and Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, 
and peacekeeping in Kosovo and Bosnia. 
 
¶5. (SBU) The GOE has used these missions to give its 
military first hand operational and combat experience 
that is otherwise unavailable at home.  This has created 
a virtuous circle where Estonia invests in upgrading its 
military, deploys that investment abroad, and in turn 
gives the EDF an invaluable opportunity to assess areas 
for improvement in order to set higher goals and 
objectives.  Estonia's current participation in the UK- 
led PRT in Afghanistan would not have been possible 
without the experience gleaned from its earlier mission 
in Iraq.  Currently 228 EDF personal are deployed abroad. 
The MOD's 2010 usability target (for force deployment) is 
350 troops.  This represents nine percent of Estonia's 
total armed forces and almost five percent of its total 
defense budget. 
 
Diving in the deep end 
---------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Rather than play it safe and assume low risk PSOs, 
Estonia has chosen to participate in some of the toughest 
and most dangerous foreign missions.  The GOE has 
designated Afghanistan as Estonia's main foreign military 
mission priority for the next two years (with a 
parliamentary mandate through the end of 2007).  Estonia 
is part of a UK-led PRT in Helmand province, 
Afghanistan's main opium poppy cultivation region, where 
Taliban activity has been increasing.  The Helmand PRT 
represents a huge commitment for this small country -- 
the largest it has ever undertaken (ref B).  Since May, 
Estonia has gradually increased its contributions to just 
over 80 soldiers.  This will increase to 120 by the end 
of the year (comparable in size to the Lithuanian-led 
PRT).  The GOE is under no illusions regarding the 
challenges and dangers the mission entails: In August, 
the Estonians suffered three casualties from a Taliban 
attack near the Pakistan border (ref C). 
 
¶7. (C) An EDF platoon has also been serving in Iraq since 
2003 as part of OIF (with its current parliamentary 
mandate expiring at the end of 2006) under the command of 
the First Brigade of the U.S. Fourth Infantry Division. 
The EDF has suffered 18 casualties, including two deaths. 
The Estonians have consistently received high praise from 
U.S. soldiers for their professionalism and willingness 
to serve shoulder-to-shoulder on dangerous missions like 
foot and motorized patrols, searches, escorting convoys, 
and counter-insurgency activities. 
 
¶8. (U) Estonia is also carving out a role within the NATO 
Response Force (NRF).  The flagship of the Estonian Navy, 
the Admiral Pitka, recently finished a tour as a command 
ship for the NATO rapid reaction mine force.  Currently, 
an Estonian EOD team is part of the NRF till the end of 
2006, after which an Estonian military police unit will 
participate in the NRF.  The MOD is preparing to commit 
an additional unit of up to 40 personnel to be a part of 
the NRF sometime in 2006 and perhaps as many as 250-300 
troops as part of a Baltic Battalion for NRF 14 in 2010. 
On the European front, the Estonians are participating in 
the Nordic EU Battle group, to which the MOD has 
committed 40 to 45 troops on standby. 
 
Remaining challenges and hurdles 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Estonia's participation in PSOs (especially in 
Iraq and Afghanistan) have revealed to the EDF key areas 
for further improvement: 
 
- Language: While EDF troops are able to communicate 
fluently in English, there remains a lack of interpreters 
in the local languages in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kosovo. 
 
- Night Vision Devices (NVD) and encrypted communications 
(crypto-comm): Estonia needs more and better NVDs and 
crypto-comm equipment for its deployed troops.  This 
equipment is also needed for modeling and simulating 
counter terrorism training. 
 
- Interoperability of frequency (communications) 
management: Last May, APC-carrying EDF troops suffered an 
attack from an improvised explosive device (IED) while on 
patrol with U.S. troops outside of Baghdad.  Both the 
U.S. and EDF troops use their own jamming devices to 
prevent insurgents from remotely detonating IEDs; in this 
case, however, they interfered with each other leading to 
the IED exploding underneath the Estonian APC. 
Unfortunately, this is also a problem in Afghanistan with 
UK and EDF troops (ref D). 
 
- Professionalizing the EDF: Due to mandatory 
conscription, the EDF lacks a consistently high quality 
of non-commissioned officers (NCO).  NCOs who wish to 
become professional soldiers generally join the officer 
corps in lieu of remaining on duty as a low-paid NCO. 
Additionally, the EDF lacks training and performance 
standards for its NCOs.  While progress has been made 
with the career officers and NCOs in the Scout Battalion, 
there is unfortunately no political will to fully 
professionalize the army. 
 
¶10. (C) Comment.  Estonia's success in transforming its 
military into an effective and experienced contributor to 
NATO and other international military operations is 
exceptional.  The Estonians tend not to be very good at 
blowing their own horn.  However, there is a growing 
perception within the GOE and EDF that these efforts have 
not received the recognition they deserve.  There is also 
some frustration over the disparity of attention given to 
other allies whose contributions are proportionally 
smaller than Estonia's.  This unhappiness only increases 
when the Estonians see their Baltic neighbors receiving 
more FMF and Coalition Support Funds than they do. 
GOLDSTEIN