VZCZCXRO2064
OO RUEHCN RUEHGH
DE RUEHIN #3013/01 2432209
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 312209Z AUG 06
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1898
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 5603
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 8059
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 7985
RUEHCN/AMCONSUL CHENGDU 1381
RUEHGZ/AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU 9520
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 6809
RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 0342
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG 5347
RHHMUNA/USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 003013 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/31/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR TW
SUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENT LIU SEES ANTI-CHEN MOVEMENT 
FAILING, "THIRD FORCE" RISING 
 
REF: TAIPEI 01544 
 
Classified By:  AIT Director Stephen M. Young. Reason(s): 
1.4 (B/D) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary.  Vice President Annette Lu told the Director 
that she believes the "Depose Chen" movement will blow over 
in the next few weeks, but expressed concern about the 
potential for violence by anti-Chen demonstrators.  She 
steadfastly defended President Chen Shui-bian and gave no 
outward indication she expects to move up before the end of 
Chen's term in May 2008.  Lu blamed the pan-Blue camp for two 
years of legislative gridlock, and urged AIT to put more 
pressure on the Blues, especially KMT Chairman Ma Ying-jeou, 
to pass the defense budget and other gridlocked legislation 
in the Legislative Yuan (LY) this fall.  Finally, she 
downplayed the significance of her interview this week with 
Reuters, where she seemed to be extending an olive branch to 
Beijing, arguing, rather, that opening up to the PRC could 
hurt Taiwan and that Beijing has not reciprocated thus far. 
Lu has become a major focus of attention in Taiwan because of 
the possibility that she could succeed to the presidency, 
even though the "Depose Chen" movement itself faces an uphill 
struggle.  End Summary. 
 
President Likely to Survive "Depose Chen" Movement 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶2.  (C) In a meeting on August 31, Vice President Annette Lu 
told the Director and Deputy Director that the current threat 
against President Chen Shui-bian would probably blow over by 
the beginning of the fall LY session on September 19.  She 
was pleased, she said, that Shih Ming-te's forces had been 
denied permission to demonstrate 24/7, noting that she had 
strongly opposed this from the beginning.  Lu did, however, 
express concern about the potential for violence on the part 
of the anti-Chen demonstrators and intimated the possibility 
that underground gangs or mainland interference could incite 
violence.  In contrast, she noted her own effort to build a 
"Blue Sky, Green Earth" coalition to reduce tensions and 
enhance cooperation across party lines.  Throughout the 
hour-long meeting, Lu steadfastly defended President Chen and 
gave no outward indication she is hoping to move up before 
the end of his administration on May 20, 2008. 
 
¶3.  (C) The Director responded that the U.S. position was one 
of strict neutrality toward this internal Taiwan domestic 
political issue, though the U.S. does hope the demonstrations 
will remain peaceful.  This was not, he noted, a "colored 
revolution" of the Former-Soviet Union variety, where 
demonstrators did not have any legal or constitutional 
mechanisms to express their views, as they have in democratic 
Taiwan. 
 
¶4.  (C) Lu then turned to Shih Ming-te, noting that she and 
Shih had both participated in the December 1979 "Kaohsiung 
Incident" and had been members of the "Kaohsiung Eight" 
imprisoned after the incident.  She had been the first of the 
"Kaohsiung Eight" arrested, she explained, while Shih had 
been the last, and then only after one month in hiding.  She 
commented cryptically that Shih had been in negotiations with 
the police during the Kaohsiung demonstrations. 
 
Intimations of a "Third Force" 
------------------------------ 
 
¶5.  (C) Vice President Lu suggested that a "Third Force" 
could emerge on the Taiwan political scene.  There appeared 
to be divisions within the KMT, she said, with tensions 
apparent between KMT Chairman Ma Ying-jeou and KMT LY Speaker 
Wang Jin-pyng, which reflected the basic Mainlander-Taiwanese 
split in the party.  Noting that Wang represented the 
Taiwanese wing of the KMT, and that she herself had close 
ties to a number of NGOs focused on social welfare and 
livelihood issues, she surmised that a "Third Force" focused 
on these and anti-corruption issues might emerge in 
counterpoint to the resurgent mainland-dominated KMT and the 
scandal-ridden DPP. 
 
Defense Deadlock:  KMT Did It 
 
TAIPEI 00003013  002 OF 002 
 
 
----------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) VP Lu insisted to the Director that the two-year 
stalemate on defense procurement was the fault of the 
pan-Blue camp, especially KMT Chairman Ma -- "not Chairman 
Mao but Chairman Ma."  Blue legislators voted against the 
defense budget week after week, she said, then rushed off to 
Beijing for meetings.  Some in the KMT did not care about 
national defense, she charged, urging AIT to put more 
pressure on the Blues, especially Chairman Ma, to pass the 
defense spending budget and other gridlocked legislation in 
the LY this fall. 
 
Mixed Views on Cross-Strait Prospects 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Lu downplayed the significance of her interview this 
week with Reuters, where she seemed to be extending an olive 
branch to Beijing, as nothing new.  Rather, she insisted that 
further cross-Strait opening would damage Taiwan. 
 
Mum's the Word 
-------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) As the Director stood to leave, VP Lu apologized for 
the press "leak" following their last meeting in May, just 
after the CSB transit brouhaha.  She stressed that only she 
and her two note-taking assistants were present at this 
meeting, and pledged they would not inform the press about 
the meeting.  MOFA representatives who attended the last 
meeting, she said, pointing to the empty chairs next to her, 
had not been invited this time. 
 
Comment:  Lower Key, But Loquacious 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) VP Lu was loquacious but slightly lower key than 
usual.  She sought to demur comment on sensitive issues ("I 
really don't know much about opposition politics"), but then 
proceeded under the Director's prodding to offer extensive 
commentary.  Lu was higly critical of political adversaries 
-- her innuendo that Shih Ming-te colluded with the police at 
the time of the Kaohsiung Incident, and her references to 
"Chairman Ma, not Chairman Mao, but Chairman Ma." 
¶10.  (C) DPP interlocutors uniformly agree that Lu remains as 
ambitious as ever, her eyes squarely on the presidential 
prize despite her low poll ratings within the DPP and island 
wide.  She has, moreover, demonstrated that she will seize 
any chance and run with it.  She moved quickly in December 
2005 when appointed DPP Acting Chairman to stamp her ideas on 
the party.  She summoned the Director to an "urgent" meeting 
in early May, when serving as Acting President during Chen's 
Central America trip.  While Shih Ming-te's "Depose Chen" 
movement does not appear likely to obtain its objective at 
this point, Lu has become a major focus of attention in 
Taiwan because of the possibility that she could succeed to 
the presidency. 
 
¶11.  (C) Our visit this time was intended to show respect for 
her position and pave the way for cooperation should the 
rough and tumble politics of democratic Taiwan elevate her to 
the Presidency.  That said, we continue to believe a Lu 
Presidency would be contentious at home and cause real 
problems for both Beijing and Washington. 
YOUNG