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RUFOAOA/USNIC SARAJEVO PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 SARAJEVO 001826 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
EUR (DICARLO), D (SMITH), P (BAME), EUR/SCE (HOH, SAINZ, 
FOOKS), NSC FOR BRAUN, USNIC FOR WEBER, GREGORIAN, OSD FOR 
FLORY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/10/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV BK
SUBJECT: BOSNIA:  A ROUGH SEMESTER AHEAD AS NATIONAL 
ELECTIONS, INTERNATIONAL DRAWDOWNS, KOSOVO NEGOTIATIONS LOOM 
 
Classified by Ambassador Douglas L. McElhaney, reasons 1.4 
(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary:  Our tranformational diplomacy in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina will confront a number of challenges over the 
next months: 
 
-- The Kosovo final status talks, as did the Montenegro 
referendum, will provide Bosniaks and Serbs, in particular, 
additional means to radicalize the political campaign in 
advance of parliamentary and presidential elections October 1; 
 
-- The final and complete withdrawal of U.S. military forces, 
coupled with the fading influence of the High Rep,s office, 
should segue into an enhanced role for the Europeans, 
although we see little evidence that they are ready to assume 
greater responsiblity; 
 
-- The Bosnians are looking for signs that they can win EU 
approval of a Stabilization and Association Agreement by the 
end of 2006, even though we see no traction on ICTY and 
police reform issues; 
 
-- The High Rep currently is planning his post-election moves 
to assume a leadership role in the constitutional reform 
discussion, which could transform this U.S.-initiated process 
into a &soft power8, committee-run exercise. 
 
¶2.  (C)  Ironically, the Bosnians have little trust in the 
Europeans (the UNPROFOR, pre-NATO period during the conflict 
being something that no one forgets) even though their major 
objective today is to move into the European Union.  The 
United States for years has been seen as the guarantor of 
peace and stability, which argues for our continued, intense 
involvement here, and a hard push to Brussels institutions to 
focus our European friends on their responsibility here.  In 
that vein, we need to ensure that they give the Bosnians a 
fair look ) despite "enlargement fatigue8 ) in finalizing 
the current stabilization discussions.  Too, we will need to 
keep a close eye to the political dialogue getting out of 
hand here as the political temperature rises in the electoral 
season. What we haveproduced in constitutional reform 
discussions neds to be protected by handling High Rep 
Schwarz Schilling,s aspirations with care. End Summary. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
Nationlists Take the Lead in Divisive Talk 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C)  The political debate in Bosnia has become more 
focused, and divided along ethnic (Croat, Bosniak (Muslim) 
and Serb) lines as we move to national elections October 1. 
For some time, Embassy has been reporting on the effects of 
the (albeit) peaceful transition to independence in 
Montenegro.  As expected, that debate has been taken up by 
Haris Siladzjic, once a stalwart of Izetbegovic,s Party of 
Democratic Action (SDA) (Bosniak nationalist Muslim) 
political party.  Siladzjic, from his long-time residence in 
Istanbul, has come back with his smaller Party for BiH (SBiH) 
to challenge SDA standard-bearer Suleiman Tihic for the 
Bosniak presidency slot.  A smart and canny politican, 
Siladzjic despises Tihic, particularly because Izetbegovic, 
on his deathbed, gave the nod to Tihic in the last 
presidential election, spelling defeat for the former Prime 
Minister.  Siladzjic,s party backed out early from the 
U.S.-sponsored constitutional reform discussions, using the 
argument that without complete abolition of the entities 
(read Republika Srspka), there should be no agreement. 
Siladzjic and his party, who actively worked to scuttle the 
agreement in the parliament, have campaigned ever since 
against more moderate Bosniaks, arguing that they &sold 
out8 to the Serbs. 
 
¶4.  (C)  Silajdzic,s rhetoric, including charges that the 
U.S. supports the entities because they were not fully 
eliminated in the negotiations, has been taken up by the 
Serbs in Banja Luka, and particularly Milorad Dodik and his 
ruling left of center, increasingly nationalist, Alliance of 
Independent Serb National Social Democrats (SNSD).  With the 
constant salvos from Siladzjic, Dodik increasingly has 
resorted to nationalist rhetoric for short-term political 
gain, almost forsaking the U.S.-backed reforms that he had 
privately agreed to support after the elections.  He too has 
gone on the defensive in responding to Siladjic. Taking his 
 
SARAJEVO 00001826  002 OF 004 
 
 
cue from the Montenegro referendum, he has beat the drum for 
a referendum among Bosnian Serbs to indicate whether they 
should remain in BiH, an approach similar to what happened in 
1992 when Bosniaks voted for a unified BiH and the Serbs 
voted to NOT be part of it.  This verbal "war of the 
entitites8, joined by other Bosnian Serb parties, has played 
out for two months, further poisoning the political 
atmosphere. 
 
¶5.  (C)  While the Europeans and High Rep Schwarz-Schilling 
have been content to issue press releases condemning divisive 
talk, we have worked hard with Dodik directly to get him to 
temper his approach.  Dodik, though, feels that he must 
engage in nationalist rhetoric to garner votes that would 
otherwise go to wartime leaders in Karadzjic,s SDS.  Dodik 
tells us despite his own, divisive rhetoric about referenda 
that Siladzjic,s election would be a disaster for BiH and 
for further progress in building a coherent state.  Dodik 
pays lip service to constitutional reform, but his statements 
put moderate Bosniaks like Tihic and left-center social 
democrat Lagumdzjia on the defensive.  Meanwhile, elements 
within Tihic,s party (particularly those with fundamentalist 
sympathies) are attracted by Siladzjic,s radical rhetoric, 
making it difficult for moderate elements in the SDA to 
respond.  The Muslim religious community, particularly its 
leader Reisu-l-Ulema Mustafa ef. Ceric, intensely dislikes 
Tihic and quietly has sought to undermine him.  For our part, 
we have an interest in ensuring that Muslim radical elements 
are held at bay within Tihic,s SDA, as they are the major 
opponents of his pro-U.S. support for Bosnian deployments to 
Iraq, for anti-terrorist measures, and critically, for a 
moderate, negotiated approach to constitutional reform. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
&If  Kosovars Can Have Independence, Then So Can Bosnian 
Serbs8 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶6.  (C)  Hovering above the pre-election campaign is the 
specter of the Kosovo final status talks, and what, if any, 
forces a final settlement might unleash among Bosnian Serbs. 
If the Montenegro referendum is any indicator, Kosovo will be 
an irresistible pretext for Bosnian Serbs to argue that 
Republika Srpska too, should have more autonomy.  Dodik has 
told the Ambassador privately that he "doesn,t give a damn 
about Kosovo,8 and explicitly provided assurances that he 
has no intention of trying to engineer a referendum in the 
RS.  Nonetheless, the political damage has been done. 
Bosniak politicians already are convinced that independence 
for Kosovo will spark demands from Banja Luka.  Although the 
Kosovo-effect may come after elections in October, it will 
provide ample opportunity for Serbs to continue their musings 
about secession.  In the meantime, moderate Bosniaks like 
Tihic and Ladumdzjia have refrained from responding to Dodik, 
realizing that without a Serb partner in government, any 
progress in continued institution building will be set back 
for years. 
 
¶7.  (C)  Ambassador has met with Siladzjic to discuss the 
constitutional reforms on several occasions.  Siladzjic, who 
is extremely self-absorbed and appears unstable, sees the 
world, as he told us, at a much more strategic level than any 
other Bosnian politician.  He may well be thinking that 
Bosnian Serbs could be working with Belgrade to be part of a 
sweetener when Kosovo independence becomes a reality.  For 
our part, we have distanced ourselves from Siladzjic, and 
have refused to respond to some of the more ridiculous things 
he says.  We have heard through several sources that 
Siladzjic will continue to play on Bosniak Muslim fears that, 
with the departure of U.S. troops, and the planned shutdown 
of the High rep,s office in 2007, Croats and Serbs in BiH 
will gain the upper hand. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
The International Drawdown Makes Many Nervous 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C)  Reductions in the presence of the &international 
community8 here are palpable.  Because of the critical U.S. 
role in the security sector, announcements of the pullout of 
residual U.S. forces here has met with considerable 
consternation from Bosniak Muslims, and, expectedly, 
understanding from the Serbs and Croats.  The EU force here 
(EUFOR), too, will be reduced by the end of the year, it is 
 
SARAJEVO 00001826  003 OF 004 
 
 
planned, to about 2500 troops.  Meanwhile, the Office of the 
High Rep, once a major force in directing the fractured 
ethnic politics of BiH, has already undergone large 
reductions.  The selection of new High Rep Schwarz-Schilling 
) following activist Paddy Ashdown ) has meant, already, 
that the &let Bosnians be Bosnians8 approach pervades the 
much less visible and effective High Rep hand in overseeing 
Bosnian attempts to move toward a more coherent state. 
Schwarz-Schilling believes strongly that his role should be 
one of mediator and facilitator.  If the High Rep morphs into 
the EU Special Representative (EUSR), as projected in June 
2007, we are likely to see a further diffusion of European 
influence here.  The EUSR will simply join an EU family of 
institutions, including the European Commission (EC), EUFOR, 
and the EU Police Mission (EUPM), which will continue to 
respond to Brussels through each,s one discrete reporting 
chain.  Signs of the change are reflected in the increasing 
absence of substance in meetings with the High Rep and the 
growing differences among different EU agencies. 
 
¶9.  (C)  Increasingly, the Europeans are providing little 
guidance to the Bosnians as to how to finish up their 
Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA), an 
all-important step in moving Bosnia into European structures. 
 While just about everything has been done on the NATO track 
to finish up the creation of a state defense ministry and one 
military ) the defense law was approved recently by the 
Presidency ) the Europeans have a number of issues 
unresolved that could halt progress on their agreement with 
the Bosnians.  Many of the Europeans ) particularly the 
French and the Germans ) seem to have taken anti-enlargement 
sentiment at home seriously, and their role in pushing things 
forward here, as a result, has diminished.  The High Rep 
being a German doesn,t help in this sense.  Too, the 
Bosnians are looking around for some help in fulfilling the 
requirements for completing and signing the SAA, particularly 
pushing toward agreements on a number of conditions in the 
agreement that must be reached, one being police reform, 
where process has been mistaken for progress. 
 
¶10.  (C)  On the departure of Ashdown, who was a prime 
proponent of advancing the EU-required reorganization of 
Bosnian police structures (essentially taking the entity 
Interior Ministries) &MUPs8 out of the hands of the Serbs 
on the one hand, and the Croats and Bosniaks on the other), 
progress has slowed as the Europeans have run up against 
local opposition.  The Serbs want continued control over the 
RS &MUP8, to keep a tight lid on the political situation in 
favor of the current parties, and to ensure that power in 
Srpska remains with Banja Luka, and is not transferred to 
Sarajevo.  There is little enthusiasm in the Federation, 
either, to meld 10 different cantonal police structures into 
a nationwide one.  In that context, the Europeans have taken 
a less than detailed set of three principles, negotiated by 
Ashdown and the U.S. last year, and begun turning it into a 
full-fledged plan ) on which they have no buy-in from the 
Serbs, who have used every tactic to discredit and undercut 
the EU police commission in charge of the discussions. 
 
¶11.  (C)  Our interventions with the Serbs ) particularly 
Serb PM Dodik ) have been numerous and strident.  Telling 
him nt to give the Europeans a pretext for walking awayfrom 
an EU SAA stabilization and association agrement, the 
Ambassador has proposed to him that hebegins to see what, in 
the European police plan,he can accept, and what will need 
further discusion.  At the same time, and with some 
justification, Dodik claims that the Europeans have not 
really negotiated, preferring to elaborate a detailed, 
technical plan based on the scant detail of three principles. 
 We have been careful to avoid Dodik,s divide and conquer 
tactics, while at the same time urging the EU to lift the 
discussions above working level EU Police Monitors and local 
police chiefs.  Both the High Rep, the EU police officials ) 
on the basis of some general instruction from Brussels ) are 
content to continue the discussion and bring to a head a 
negotiation in which the Serbs have only participated, of 
late, as observers.  We do not believe ) with the 
preponderance of go-slow adherents among EU members ) that 
the Bosnians will get past conditions on police reform and be 
in a position to sign an SAA stabilization agreement this 
year. 
 
----------------------------------- 
The High Rep Wants in on the Action 
 
SARAJEVO 00001826  004 OF 004 
 
 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (C)  Finally, High Rep Schwarz-Schilling continues to 
push his own role in reforming Bosnia,s fractured Dayton-era 
constitution.  Schwarz-Schilling, whom we doubt will ever 
really spearhead a true negotiation to change Dayton, insists 
that EU foreign policy chief Solana and enlargement 
commissioner Rehn have told him that he must "take a lead8 
in this area.  He told us that he fully respects that the 
U.S. should have the opportunity to get the initial phase of 
amendments passed in the Bosnian parliament post October 1 
elections, but he has given us only the sketchiest idea of 
how he would suggest to proceed after that.  In his brief 
time here, he has been unwilling to do more than use his 
office for hortatory statements.  It is doubtful that he will 
ever "take off the gloves8 with the Bosnians, which is 
necessary here to effect change.  Although he claims to the 
Ambassador that he respects the U.S. work on reform, he seems 
to be responding to an instinctive European reaction that 
when the U.S. takes the lead, they must be more involved. 
With the ramping down of the OHR presence and the transition 
to an EU Special Rep summer 2007, we doubt that 
Schwarz-Schillng will be in a position to pressure Bosnian 
politicians to make necessary changes.  We have told him 
clearly that the U.S.-sponsored package is on the table and 
that we are keeping it alive so that if the votes are 
available post-elections, we will move quickly to get it 
approved. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶13.  (C)  As the election period gets into full swing, we 
hear more and more in the press about inter-ethnic violence 
) graveyard desecration, shots fired at an imam, etc.  With 
the tapes of a wartime Bosniak general showing him ordering 
soldiers to burn Serb homes in the Krajina, Serbs now are 
raising cries of mass slaughter.  They are taking full 
advantage to equate their suffering during the war with that 
of Bosniaks and Croats.  As a result, the ensuing political 
dialogue is more the venting of frustrations of the different 
ethnic groups than actually discussing voters, bread and 
butter issues.  We are girding ourselves for a bumpy ride in 
the coming days as the confluence of election rhetoric and 
jitters over regional developments gather steam. 
 
¶14.  (C)  We have continued to encourage consultations among 
major political parties begun in the U.S.-sponsored 
constitutional reform negotiations.  The glow from that 
exercise in building a consensus (still a dirty word for 
radicals in each camp) has spilled over into the political 
arena.  For the first time in post-conflict Bosnia, Bosniak 
Tihic calls Serb Dodik to complain about Dodik,s rhetoric on 
a referendum for the RS to leave Bosnia.  Serb Cavic talks 
with Croat Covic.  The only outsiders continue to be 
Siladzjic - who dearly wants U.S. recognition but continues 
to attack Bosniaks for capitulating to the Serbs in 
constitutional discussions ) and Croat and Bosniak 
ultra-nationalists.  If the Serbs in particular start lobbing 
intimations about separation, using the parallel of Kosovo 
moving toward independence, we will need to come down hard on 
them.  It would not be surprising to us that some in the 
Bosnian Serb capital would attempt to stir trouble regionally 
through talk about a break-away Republika Srpska. 
 
¶15.  (C)  Against this background, near-term progress on 
police reform and other issues needed to sign the EU 
Stabilization and Association Agreement will be minimal.  We 
are pushing the Serbs to negotiate seriously rather than 
attacking the EU-sponsored process.  Although it is not clear 
from here, many of the Europeans tell us that ICTY head Carla 
del Ponte will likely certify that BiH is cooperating with 
the ICTY ) so that this condition for the SAA might be 
satisfied. 
MCELHANEY