VZCZCXRO0535
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHVJ #1751/01 2161142
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 041142Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4092
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0230
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY 0095
RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB PRIORITY 0216
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHDC PRIORITY
RUFOAOA/USNIC SARAJEVO PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 SARAJEVO 001751 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR (DICARLO), EUR/SCE (FOOKS, MITCHELL), L/EUR 
(K. JOHNSON), D (SMITH), P (BAME), S/WCI (WILLIAMSON, 
BERG), INR (BRAUM), USUN (WILLSON), THE HAGUE (SCHLIDGE, C. 
JOHNSON), ZAGREB (SELINGER), BELGRADE (CAMPBELL), NSC FOR 
BRAUN, USNIC FOR BOALS, OSD FOR FLORY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/02/2016 
TAGS: KWAC PHUM PGOV PREL BK
SUBJECT: RS OFFICIALS PLEDGE ICTY COOPERATION TO SWCI 
AMBASSADOR WILLIAMSON 
 
REF: A. BELGRADE 1149 B. SARAJEVO 1329 
 
Classified By: Amb. Douglas McElhaney.  Reason 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (U) Summary and Comment: On July 28 and from August 1-2 
Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues Clint Williamson 
met with GBiH and Republika Serpska (RS) officials in 
Sarajevo and Banja Luka.  Both GBiH and RS officials affirmed 
their commitment to ICTY cooperation, and all agreed with 
Ambassador Williamson's suggestion that their efforts would 
benefit from regional coordination.  Nonetheless, Bosniak and 
Serb politicians, as well as the executive and judicial 
officials, stressed different issues in their meetings with 
Ambassador Williamson.  President Tihic said that BiH police 
reform was critical to inter-entity and inter-state efforts 
to apprehend war criminals, and was skeptical that Kostunica 
was truly committed to implementing Serbia's plan to capture 
Mladic.  RS Premier Dodik saw ICTY cooperation as an avenue 
for improving his relations with the international community. 
 He characterized the PIFWC support networks in the RS as 
decimated by recent arrests.  RS President Cavic portrayed 
himself as a martyr, claiming that if he lost in the October 
election it would be largely due to his support for ICTY 
cooperation.  RS Interior Minister Cadjo said it was unfair 
place all responsibility for apprehensions on the RS, and 
that State-level agencies also must pull their weight in the 
hunt for PIFWCs.  State Intelligence Agency Head Dzuvo said 
apprehending PIFWCs was a political issue, suggesting that 
Serbian authorities could deliver Mladic and Karadzic 
whenever they wished.  BiH State Court officials said that 
sentencing inequities and lack of resources were the main 
challenges facing the War Crimes Chamber. 
 
¶2. (C) Comment:  When it comes to PIFWC issues, BiH officials 
know exactly what the international community wants to hear. 
Therefore, it is no surprise that RS officials responded to 
Ambassador Williamson's message about cooperation and 
commitment with the same enthusiasm as the GBiH officials. 
However, GBiH officials are clearly skeptical that the RS 
government is genuinely prepared to commit operational 
resources and political capital to this effort, when it has 
not done so in the past.  They are equally doubtful about 
Serbia's sincerity.  RS officials' criticisms of State-level 
law enforcement institutions have some merit.  They must also 
pull their weight if in the effort to apprehend PIFWCs and 
shut down their support networks is to succeed.  Continued 
U.S. engagement will be necessary to ensure that all the 
players within BiH translate their words into deeds.  End 
Summary and Comment. 
 
¶3. (U) During his first visit to Bosnia in his role as 
Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, Clint Williamson 
met in Banja Luka on July 28 with: RS Premier Milorad Dodik; 
RS President Dragan Cavic and his Political and Security 
Advisor Darko Matijasevic; and RS Minister of Interior 
Stanislav Cadjo. In Sarajevo on August 1-2 he met with:  GBiH 
Tri-Presidency Chairman Sulejman Tihic; BiH State Court 
President Meddzida Kreso and Chief Prosecutor Marinko 
Jurcevic; and State Intelligence Service Head Almir Dzuvo. 
 
¶4. (U) Ambassador Williamson emphasized that resolving 
outstanding Balkan war crimes cases was a USG priority, and 
underlined the USG's desire to see Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Serbia put this issue behind them and advance their 
integration into European and Euro-Atlantic institutions. 
Stressing the Secretary's commitment to sustaining the 
momentum generated by her positive meeting with Serbian 
Premier Vojislav Kostunica in Washington, and the release of 
Serbia's action plan for apprehending Ratko Mladic and other 
fugitive indictees (ref. A).  Williamson said the USG was 
prepared to commit resources to enhance Bosnia's ICTY 
cooperation.  New USG initiatives included organizing a 
regional war crimes prosecutors' conference, and creating a 
regional S/WCI liaison FSN position to help embassies and the 
Department identify avenues to facilitate internal and 
cross-boarder progress on PIFWCs. 
 
SARAJEVO 00001751  002 OF 004 
 
 
 
TIHIC: POLICE REFORM CRITICAL TO WAR CRIMES EFFORTS 
 
¶5. (U) BiH Tri-Presidency Chairman Sulejman Tihic thanked 
Ambassador Williamson for the USG's strong and sustained 
support to The Hague Tribunal and the BiH War Crimes Chamber. 
 He expressed appreciation that Ambassador Williamson 
recognized the importance of also apprehending Radovan 
Karadzic.  He said war criminals like Mladic and Karadzic 
must not go down in history as heroes, adding that it was 
unfortunate Milosevic died before receiving a verdict. 
 
¶6. (U) Tihic said BiH police reform was critical to the hunt 
for war criminals, because at present the confusing 
relationship between State, entity and cantonal authorities 
was a major impediment to effective law enforcement.  While 
agreeing that the RS was not doing enough, Tihic also 
criticized State-level institutions, specifically SIPA and 
OSA, for failing to produce any concrete results. 
 
¶7. (C) Tihic said he would wait and see how committed 
Kostunica was to implementing Serbia's plan to capture 
Mladic.  He added that if the RS and Serbia would make a full 
and honest commitment to the task, it would be easy to 
capture the remaining PIFWCs.  He cautioned the USG not to 
"settle for half" by indicating, as he thought the Europeans 
were, that capturing Mladic would enable Serbia to "check 
that box" and move forward with the NATO and EU integration 
process. 
 
¶8. (C) Tihic speculated that the Orthodox Church was 
supporting Karadzic, and thanked the USG for urging the 
Church to speak out against him.  Tihic also asked Ambassador 
Williamson to press RS and Serbian authorities to divulge the 
location of all mass graves, explaining that it was difficult 
for Bosnia to look towards a better future when each time a 
new grave was found it dragged people back to the painful 
past. 
 
DODIK: RS (AND KOSTUNICA) FULLY COMMITTED TO ICTY COOPERATION 
 
¶9. (U) RS Prime Minister Milorad Dodik, fresh from a meeting 
with Serbian Premier Vojislav Kostunica on July 28, assured 
Ambassador Williamson that Kostunica was committed to 
fulfilling completely Serbia's ICTY responsibilities that 
Serbian police were close to locating Mladic and the people 
around him.  Dodik expressed his wish to improve his 
relations with the international community, particularly the 
Europeans, by seeing all fugitives within the RS transferred 
to the ICTY while he was in office.  Dodik added that he was 
also prepared to take action against Karadzic and Mladic, 
even "the day before BiH elections." 
¶10. (U) Dodik expressed concern that once Mladic was 
transferred to The Hague, the full burden for apprehending 
Karadzic would fall unfairly on the RS.  To avoid this 
scenario, Dodik proposed the formation of a joint undercover 
police unit with members from all of the countries of the 
region.  Dodik said he was willing to spearhead the effort, 
which he also discussed with Kostunica.  He assured 
Ambassador Williamson that the international community would 
have strong oversight over the unit. 
 
¶11. (C) Dodik described his efforts to enlist assistance from 
the Serbian Orthodox Church, articularly Bishop Grigorije of 
Trebinje and Bishp Vadilije (Kacavenda) of Bijeljina, on 
PIFWCs. Dodik said that during their visit to Bijeljina,Kacavenda had promised 
Dodik and Kostunica that hewould 
appeal to the fugitives to surrender.  Howver, Dodik was 
skeptical that such an appeal would work, given that Karadzic 
had remained at large even after his own wife called for his 
surrender.  As an aside, Dodik said Karadzic's daughter asked 
him to allow the RS government to resume paying her father's 
pension and providing health care to the family.  Dodik said 
he would like to help her, but worried that such a gesture 
might be problematic. 
 
 
SARAJEVO 00001751  003 OF 004 
 
 
¶12. (U) Dodik believed that much of Karadzic's support 
network in the RS had been shut down.  Network kingpin 
Momcilo Mandic was on trial in the BiH War Crimes Chamber, 
and two key members of the support network with RS ties were 
now in Serbia -- Ljuban Ecim, former Banja Luka police chief, 
and Karadzic's Police Minister Dragan Kijac.  Dodik added 
that Serbia had shown its willingness to hit the support 
network by its recent arrest of former RS Premier Gojko 
Klickovic.  Klickovic was currently in Serbian custody, but 
would soon be extradited to the BiH War Crimes Chamber for 
trial. 
 
CAVIC: PIFWC ISSUES RIPE FOR POLITICAL MANIPULATION 
 
¶13. (C) RS President Dragan Cavic told Ambassador Williamson 
there was full political consensus in the RS for fulfilling 
its responsibilities under the 2004 RS National Assembly 
(RSNA) resolution supporting ICTY cooperation, but that the 
key would be operational work.  Cavic said that RS officials 
had located Zupljanin on three separate occasions, only to 
see him escape "by millimeters." 
 
¶14. (U) Cavic recounted the RS efforts to date on ICTY 
cooperation, including its role in the recent transfer of 
Dragan Zelenovic from Russia to The Hague (ref. B).  Cavic 
dismissed assertions from RS Auditor in Chief Bosko Ceko that 
the government had failed to account for one million BAM in 
funds dedicated to ICTY cooperation.  He agreed that shutting 
down PIFWC support networks was an important issue, but 
cautioned that the scope of the networks should not be 
overestimated. 
 
¶15. (C) Cavic noted that the issue of Serbia-RS cooperation 
on PIFWCs was ripe for political manipulation.  Some 
politicians in Sarajevo would be happy to see Belgrade's 
efforts fail, as it would result in addition pressure being 
placed on the RS.  Cavic said he could lose in the October 
elections, in large measure because of his positions on ICTY 
cooperation, defense reform and admission of the crimes at 
Srebrenica, but he was prepared for such an outcome.  He 
concluded by saying that the USG could be certain that he and 
his Security Advisor Matijasevic were prepared to offer the 
U.S., and newly-appointed RS Interior Minister Cadjo, 
whatever support was necessary to strengthen ICTY cooperation. 
 
CADJO: STATE INSTITUTIONS HAVE TO PULL THEIR WEIGHT ON PIFWCs 
 
¶16. (U) During the meeting with RS Minister of Interior 
Stanislav Cadjo, Cadjo assured Ambassador Williamson that 
apprehending fugitive ICTY indictees was one of the RS 
Government's top four priorities, along with fighting 
organized crime, combating terrorism and eliminating 
corruption.  The RS Interior Ministry had formed an elite 
special police unit, dedicated to locating and apprehending 
ICTY fugitives.  This unit, according to Cadjo, was prepared 
to work closely with foreign law enforcement services.  He 
described his current relations with Serbia's Security 
Information Agency (BIA) as "correct," and noted also the 
importance of establishing cooperative ties with new 
Montenegrin institutions. 
 
¶17. (U) Cadjo pointed out, however, that it was unfair to 
place all responsibility in BiH for locating fugitives on RS 
authorities.  State-level agencies, particularly the State 
Information and Protection Agency (SIPA), State Intelligence 
Agency (OSA), and the State Border Police (SBP) needed to 
pull their weight in the effort to find PIFWCs.  Cadjo added 
that he had no indication that his units were failing in 
their PIFWC responsibilities, and asserted that he would 
sanction such failure should it come to his attention. 
 
DZUVO: PIFWCs ARE A POLITICAL, NOT A LAW ENFORCEMENT ISSUE 
 
¶18. (C) Head of the State Intelligence Agency (OSA) Almir 
Dzuvo likened PIFWCs to a cancer that must be removed. 
However, he thought ultimately that this was a political, 
 
SARAJEVO 00001751  004 OF 004 
 
 
rather than a law enforcement issue.  He suggested that 
Serbian authorities knew exactly where Karadzic was hiding, 
and could deliver him any time they wished.  Dzuvo told 
Ambassador Williamson that, according to OSA sources, 
Karadzic's support network had been significantly disrupted, 
and that Karadzic was "practically alone." 
 
¶19. (C) Dzuvo identified several challenges within BiH.  In 
the RS, Matijasevic was all talk and no action, and Dzuvo did 
not expect Cadjo to be any better.  Consequently, OSA had to 
operate on its own in the RS, without local assistance.  OSA 
had good relations with the State Border Service (SBS), but 
the SBS did not control large portions of the RS-Serbia 
border, and fugitives could move between the territories 
easily.  Dzuvo also complained that information received from 
The Hague was often not reliable.  On the positive side, the 
nascent Montenegrin security services appeared receptive to 
developing good working relations with OSA. 
 
STATE COURT: SENTENCING INEQUITIES, INADEQUATE RESOURCES ARE 
MAIN CHALLENGES 
 
¶20. (U) BiH State Court President Meddzida Kreso and Chief 
Prosecutor Marinko Jurcevic told Ambassador Williamson the 
non-extradition provisions in the Croatian and the Serbian 
constitutions were a major obstacle to trying cases in BiH. 
Kreso said that making the minimum and maximum sentence for 
war crimes the same within Bosnia, as well as identical to 
those in Serbia and Croatia, would somewhat ameliorate the 
problems of forum shopping.  (Note: The maximum penalty for 
war crimes at the BiH State level is 45 years in prison, as 
opposed to 20 years in the RS and 15 years in the Federation. 
 The maximum penalty in both Serbia and Croatia is 20 years. 
End note.) 
 
¶21. (C) Jurcevic said his office cooperated well with the 
ICTY Prosecutor's Office.  He supported the creation of a 
regional S/WCI liaison, who could identify ways to improve 
the State Prosecutor's existing cooperative agreements with 
Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia and Macedonia on evidence 
sharing.  However, Jurcevic told Ambassador Williamson, his 
greatest difficulties were internal.  In particular, the 
resources made available by the GBiH were insufficient, given 
the enormity of the task.  Because of this, he questioned the 
GBiH's commitment to seeing war criminals brought to justice. 
MCELHANEY