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C O N F I D E N T I A L QUITO 002138 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
TREASURY FOR SGOOCH, NSC FOR DTOMLINSON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/24/2016 
TAGS: ECON EPET PINR PREL ETRD EC CN
SUBJECT: A THOUSAND CHARIOTS IN THE FIELDS: CHINESE PLAYERS 
IN ECUADOR'S OIL INDUSTRY 
 
REF: A. A) 05 QUITO 2152 
 
     ¶B. B) QUITO 1231 
     ¶C. C) INR REPORT 06/10/2005 
 
Classified By: EconOff Josh M. Cartin for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: With their $1.4 billion acquisition of 
Canadian EnCana, China's state oil companies announced their 
entrance as major players in Ecuador's and the region's 
petroleum industry.  Now with active participation in at 
least five of Ecuador's petroleum blocks, and with further 
investments in the offing, Quito is playing host to a steady 
inflow of managerial, financial and technical representatives 
of China's major and minor oil companies.  Their efforts and 
activities in Ecuador are both less coordinated and less 
harmonious than they may appear.  End summary. 
 
"The Heavy and the Swift..." 
----------- 
 
¶2. (C) The overseas arms of three major Chinese oil 
conglomerates, the China National Petroleum Company (CNPC), 
the China Petroleum Company (Sinopec) and Sinochem all are 
present and have ongoing operations in Ecuador.  (Note: the 
fourth major Chinese oil conglomerate, the China National 
Overseas Oil Company (CNOOC), has concentrated its efforts on 
offshore drilling and does not operate in Ecuador).  These 
companies own, invest in or operate individual assets in 
Ecuador, and in some cases work together through consortia. 
CNPC, for example, through its international arm, the China 
National Overseas Development Corporation (CNODC), operates 
CNPC International (Amazon), which solely possesses the 
concession to drill in Ecuador's Block 11.  CNPC and Sinopec 
also are the 60-40 joint-investors in Andes Petroleum, the 
Ecuadorian operating entity that purchased the Ecuadorian 
assets of Canadian EnCana earlier this year (reftel a) and 
which is now the majority concessionaire for Blocks 14, 17, 
Tarapoa and Shiripuno.  As part of the EnCana acquisitions, 
Andes purchased the former's 36% stake in the Oleoducto de 
Crudos Pesados (OCP) pipeline consortium and its 40% stake in 
the disputed Block 15, formerly run by Occidental Petroleum 
(Oxy).  Andes' $1.4 billion purchase agreement with EnCana 
contained an indemnity clause specifying a refund of up to 
20% of the total purchase price if the Oxy asset was seized 
by the Ecuadorian government.  EnCana's ex-General Manager in 
Ecuador told EconOff that the companies currently "are 
working toward that". 
 
¶3. (C) Sinochem, as its name implies, has its historical 
roots in chemical production, trading and sales, and, 
according to its local manager in Ecuador, is known in China 
as a fertilizer monopoly.  Its integrated petroleum arm was 
established in 2002, In Ecuador Sinochem is a 15% joint 
investor-operator, together with Taiwan's Offshore Petroleum 
Investment Corp. (OPIC), of Block 16, of which Spanish Repsol 
is the majority shareholder.  Sinochem's senior 
representative in Ecuador XXXXXXXXXXXX (protect) told EconOff 
that in Ecuador most of Sinochem's activities are in 
petroleum trading. 
 
¶4. (C) Sinopec Services, a wholly-owned subsidiary of 
Sinopec, has a relatively large operation in Ecuador and 
contracts technical services such as equipment leasing, 
seismic studies and oilfield construction to the petroleum 
exploration companies in Ecuador.  Sinopec Services has 
performed work for American companies such as Oxy. Several 
Ecuadorian engineers from state-owned Petroproduccion have 
traveled to China recently to participate in the analysis of 
seismic studies performed by Sinopec Services. 
 
¶5. (C) EconOff has also met representatives from at least 
three other Chinese petroleum companies: Changqing Petroleum 
Exploration Bureau (CPEB), nominally under the control of 
CNPC, and Zhongyuan Petroleum Exploration Bureau (ZPEB) and 
Jiangsu Oil Exploration Corporation (JOECO), both nominally 
 
under the control of Sinopec.  These companies are legacy 
upstream companies apparently still directed by Chinese 
provincial and local governments.  As China's domestic oil 
exploration opportunities have dried up, these bureaus have 
attempted to sell their expertise overseas. 
 
"Subdued Tones Point To Disaffection..." 
---------- 
 
¶6. (C) EconOff spoke with Sinochem's XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX, a 
senior manager from Sinopec Services (protect), about the 
structure of Chinese petroleum companies in Ecuador. 
Regarding the structure of the Andes consortium, XXXXXXXXXXXX said 
that the 60-40 CNPC-Sinopec ownership structure leads to 
management tension and "long, fractious board meetings." 
Andes is by far China's most productive and lucrative 
operator with an output, at EnCana's previous production 
level, of approximately 200,000 barrels per day.  Andes' 
senior executive in Ecuador, Dr. Zhang Xing (reftel b), is a 
CNPC man; the Sinopec counterpart at his level, Dr. Duan 
Zhibin, lives in China and visits Ecuador only occasionally. 
His deputy, Ding Jingjun, is thus the highest-level Sinopec 
officer resident in Ecuador but not an equal partner to 
XXXXXXXXXXXX.  Sinochem's XXXXXXXXXXXX said that "the worst thing is for 
Chinese companies to work together.  Chinese and foreign 
companies can work together without problems, but Chinese 
companies together are not good."  XXXXXXXXXXXX said that Sinochem 
originally had planned to participate in the Andes consortium 
but pulled out.  He said that "Sinochem actually cares about 
making money", while CNPC and Sinopec do not.  This apparent 
disregard for profits by China's two majors echoes the 
sentiments of other industry contacts.  Both XXXXXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXXXXXX
confirmed that CNPC Amazon's work on Block 11 has been 
unproductive: "they keep drilling, but there's no oil coming 
out." 
 
¶7. (C) According to Sinopec Service's XXXXXXXXXXXX, his company 
subcontracts with the old provincial service bureaus to 
perform technical services: "we receive money from our 
clients, and then we pay the subcontractors."  Sinopec 
Service's office in Quito thus appears mainly to be engaged 
in sales, business development and finance, with little 
in-house technical expertise permanently resident in Ecuador. 
 EconOff asked how Sinopec Services chose which provincial 
service bureaus to employ, and XXXXXXXXXXXX replied that "the 
decisions are made back in China, depending on which service 
bureaus have relationships with Sinopec executives." 
According to XXXXXXXXXXXX, the service bureaus are not supposed to 
contract their services without passing through Sinopec or 
CNPC, but because of "poor management control in CNPC", CPEB 
managed to contract a perforation deal directly with American 
company City Oriente, its first foray into the private 
sector.  City Oriente's local manager told us that CPEB 
drilled nine wells in its Block 27, and City Oriente had 
plans to expand the cooperation to twenty-one wells before it 
had to scale back plans due to the passage of the 
Hydrocarbons Law.  The City Oriente manager said that 
although CPEB first started the work with shoddy equipment 
and low standards, they were "very compliant" in working with 
City Oriente to upgrade their rigs and safety standards. 
 
"Cooking Pots Over The Campfires..." 
------------ 
 
¶8. (C) The profile of Chinese oil company staff in Ecuador is 
overwhelmingly male, on average between the ages of thirty 
and fifty years old.  Most of these workers seem to be 
married but leave their families back in China.  According to 
XXXXXXXXXXXX (protect), a XXXXXXXXXXXX manager of Sinopec 
Services, staff leave their families in China because Chinese 
educational options for their children in Ecuador are 
nonexistent.  Many of the staff live communally in 
apartments.  The companies bring their own Chinese chefs to 
Ecuador, and the staff often eat their meals together in the 
communal apartments.  In addition to raising the mean quality 
of Chinese food available in Ecuador, the influx of single, 
Chinese men into Quito has been a boon to Ecuador's nascent 
casino industry.  We are aware of one ex-finance manager from 
CPEB who embezzled several thousand dollars from the company 
to finance his gambling habit. 
 
Comment - Ecuador's "Entangling Ground" 
------------ 
 
¶9. (C) The entrance en masse of Chinese oil companies into 
Ecuador is a potent manifestation of China's national 
strategy of securing direct oil contracts around the world to 
reduce China's reliance on oil shipped from and through 
hotspots such as the Persian Gulf and the Straits of Malacca. 
 Sinochem's XXXXXXXXXXXX, echoing many industry analysts, questioned 
this strategy, recommending a greater emphasis on maximizing 
profits from sales to the world oil markets.  Nonetheless 
Chinese oil exploration activities are increasing in the 
region.  Sinopec's XXXXXXXXXXXX told EconOff that Chinese oil 
companies will soon announce a new consortium with India's 
ONGC-Videsh in Colombia. 
 
¶10. (C) Global contracts for the Chinese majors' service arms 
also offers valuable opportunities to increase their 
technical and managerial expertise, and we assume that the 
dozens of Chinese petroleum engineers coming through Quito on 
temporary projects will take these lessons home, furthering 
China's effort to create an integrated oil services company 
to rival Western companies like Schlumberger and Halliburton 
(reftel c). 
 
¶11. (C) Acquisitions of efficiently-managed and productive 
operations such as EnCana's therefore serve both strategic 
objectives at once, but Ecuador has proven a difficult and 
expensive training ground for China.  With the GOE's 
combination-punch of the Hydrocarbons Law and the Oxy 
contract caducity, the Chinese saw the value of their $1.4 
billion EnCana acquisition shaved by about seventy percent 
(reftel b).  Meanwhile CNPC reportedly faces periodic 
indigenous unrest around its heretofore unproductive Block 
¶11.  Chinese petroleum managers and diplomats, who appear to 
consult closely on all major issues, openly complain about 
the corruption and difficulty of doing business in Ecuador, 
but we see no sign of a tactical retreat.  Indeed, if XXXXXXXXXXXX's 
pronouncement of a China-India joint-exploration venture in 
Colombia materializes, then that will be more evidence that, 
profits or losses, Chinese petroleros in South America are 
here to stay. End comment. 
JEWELL