VZCZCXRO8217
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHPS #0664/01 2231551
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 111551Z AUG 06
FM USOFFICE PRISTINA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6379
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0800
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RHFMISS/AFSOUTH NAPLES IT
RHMFISS/CDR TF FALCON
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEPGEA/CDR650THMIGP SHAPE BE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RUFOANA/USNIC PRISTINA SR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PRISTINA 000664 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR DRL, INL, AND EUR/SCE, NSC FOR BRAUN, USUN FOR 
DREW SCHUFLETOWSKI, USOSCE FOR STEVE STEGER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/11/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM UNMIK DPKO YI
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: COM TO UNITY TEAM MEMBERS:  TIME'S UP 
 
 
Classified By: COM TINA S. KAIDANOW FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  COM met individually with members of 
Kosovo's Unity Team (UT) August 9-11 to lay down a direct and 
unambiguous marker:  the time is now to come to closure with 
UN Special Envoy for Kosovo Marti Ahtisaari on the issues of 
decentralization and minority rights.  COM underscored USG 
disappointment in the Kosovar team's performance in the last 
round of Vienna technical talks, and emphasized that failure 
to close the gap on these issues during the upcoming visit of 
Ahtisaari and his experts to Pristina the week of August 22 
would endanger the entire settlement process.  President 
Sejdiu promised the COM intensified leadership, and to that 
end convened a special meeting of the Unity Team August 10 to 
galvanize their efforts.  COM made special interventions with 
PDK deputy leader Fatmir Limaj (party president Hashim Thaci 
remains on vacation) and ORA leader Veton Surroi, who is 
heading up the Unity Team working group on minority rights. 
With all UT members, COM cautioned against complacency 
regarding the "inevitability" of independence.  She warned 
that allowing political differences to divide the team and 
failure to reach agreement on the Ahtisaari proposals would 
make it almost impossible to achieve Contact Group consensus 
on the status process and the ultimate way forward.  End 
summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) COM met August 9-11 with key members of the Kosovar 
"Unity Team," including President Fatmir Sejdiu, Prime 
Minister Ceku, coordinator Blerim Shala, Presidential Advisor 
Skender Hyseni, PDK Deputy Leader Fatmir Limaj (substituting 
for the absent Hashim Thaci), and ORA opposition leader Veton 
Surroi.  In her meeting with Sejdiu August 9, COM stressed 
that the results of the discussions during the technical 
talks in Vienna on August 7 and 8 had been very disappointing 
to the USG.  If the Kosovars were hoping for a desultory back 
and forth with UNOSEK on the key issues of decentralization 
and minority rights, or worse yet believed that they could 
hold out on their positions because "independence was 
inevitable anyway" they were very much mistaken.  She 
underscored that there simply was no more time to close the 
remaining gaps with UNOSEK, and she warned that the risk of 
stubbornly maintaining a distance in the negotiation would be 
to undermine Ahtisaari's ability to gain Contact Group and 
Security Council consensus for his status proposals.  Sejdiu 
gravely acknowledged the risk involved, and pledged to exert 
renewed leadership to bridge the remaining gaps.  (Note: The 
President followed up by calling a meeting of the entire 
Unity Team August 10; from readouts of the meeting offered by 
various members, he exhorted them to intensify their work and 
finalize discussions with the UNOSEK team during the upcoming 
end of August visit.) 
 
¶3.  (C) COM held two separate meetings with PDK deputy party 
leader Fatmir Limaj and ORA president Veton Surroi.  COM made 
it clear to both that political differences with the 
governing LDK-AAK coalition must not get in the way of the 
status process and the unity of the Kosovar team.  Limaj 
noted the difficulty of presenting some of the proposed 
decentralization measures to his party constituency, argued 
that Kosovo must maintain "functionality," and complained 
about LDK efforts to seize credit and profile as a result of 
the Vienna negotiation process.  COM countered that "selling" 
the decentralization and minority rights provisions of the 
settlement to the Kosovar Albanian public was a matter of 
leadership; it was a very small price to pay to offer the 
Serbs guarantees of asymmetric decentralization when in all 
likelihood there would be no more than a handful of 
universities or hospitals built in Serb municipalities.  On 
the LDK's assertion of political primacy in the talks, COM 
noted that the Unity Team functioned and must continue to 
function as an integral whole -- no one individual or party 
would gain credit for a successful status outcome, but those 
who hindered the process would inevitably be singled out for 
obstructionism.  Limaj agreed that the onus rested on the 
Kosovar team to close the distance with Ahtissari and pledged 
to enlist PDK support.  Surroi, as well, claimed that he 
would work with UNOSEK over the coming week to sharpen the 
Unity Team's proposals on minority rights and address UNOSEK 
 
PRISTINA 00000664  002 OF 002 
 
 
concerns. 
 
¶4.  (C) Comment:  Speaking individually to the members of the 
Unity Team, they understand the stakes involved and appear to 
be getting their act together to make a productive showing 
during UNOSEK's late August trip to Pristina.  But clearly 
the fragility of the team and the intrusion of political 
animosity is beginning to show; it will be our job to keep 
them focused on the larger goals of the status process and 
continue to caution against allowing ambitions to outweigh 
good sense. 
 
¶5. (U) U.S. Office Pristina clears this cable for release in 
its entirety to U.N. Special Envoy for Kosovo Martti 
Ahtisaari. 
KAIDANOW