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C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 005848 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/31/2016 
TAGS: PREL PHUM KDEM BY FR
SUBJECT: FRANCE/BURUNDI:  AMBASSADOR MOLLER'S AUGUST 22 
CONSULTATIONS 
 
REF: A. BUJUMBURA 726 
     ¶B. STATE 139995 
 
Classified By:  Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, 1.5 (b/ 
d). 
 
¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  French MFA and MOD officials expressed 
views on Burundi and the Great Lakes region similar to those 
of the U.S. during August 22 discussions with visiting U.S. 
Ambassador to Burundi Patricia Moller.  MFA officials 
expressed concern about the recent arrests in Burundi in 
connection with alleged coup plotting and reviewed French 
assistance programs, centered on education, refugee support, 
public financing, general "capacity building," and limited 
police and military training.  These paralleled similar 
programs in other Great Lakes countries.  The MFA officials 
stressed the need to keep Burundi moving in a positive 
direction and, thereby, serving as a positive example of a 
country emerging from a long and destructive period of ethnic 
warfare.  Both sides agreed on the relative lack of 
sophistication of Burundi's leaders and its need to cultivate 
a more positive international image and build donor 
confidence.  FM Batumubwira seemed to be more perceptive than 
other leaders but her ability to get things done was 
uncertain.  The French agreed with Ambassador Moller on the 
importance of the Tripartite Plus and other regional 
approaches.  The MOD military advisor for Africa and the 
Middle East offered a terse description of France's interests 
in Burundi and the region.  He tended to minimize France's 
interests and its ability, given other demands and limited 
resources, to influence events there.  He stressed the need 
for greater involvement in the region on the part of the 
international community.  All of Ambassador Moller's 
interlocutors cited good U.S.-France cooperation on Burundi 
and the region, and stressed their commitment to continue 
working with us to achieve our common goals.  END SUMMARY. 
 
Meeting at MFA 
-------------- 
¶2.  (C)  THE "COUP":  MFA AF PDAS-equivalent Elisabeth 
Barbier (expected soon to become Ambassador to Kenya) and 
Burundi desk officer Laurent Chevallier met with Ambassador 
to Burundi Patricia Moller on August 22.  Barbier immediately 
expressed concern about the situation in Burundi following 
the recent series of arrests in connection with an alleged 
coup plot.  She was keenly interested in Ambassador Moller's 
assessment.  Ambassador Moller reviewed recent events and 
noted clear signs that those arrested had been mistreated, if 
not tortured.  Barbier confirmed reports that former 
President Ndayizeye remained in confinement.  Ambassador 
Moller said that she and other ambassadors had expressed in a 
direct manner their concerns about the arrests to FM 
Batumubwira. 
 
¶3.  (C)  LEADERSHIP ISSUES:  Ambassador Moller said that FM 
Batumubwira was one of Burundi's leaders capable of seeing 
the "big picture" and of understanding how the international 
community's perception of Burundi affected relations.  Other 
GOB leaders lacked sophistication and experience, many having 
been far from the centers of power before assuming control a 
year previously.  Barbier and Ambassador Moller discussed the 
many uncertainties about the arrests and the GOB's claims of 
having evidence of a coup plot but its failure to display 
such evidence. 
 
¶4.  (C)  RESPONSES TO THE "COUP":  Barbier and Ambassador 
Moller noted the absence of any apparent links between the 
arrestees, making a coup plot less plausible.  The Burundian 
army had not, so far, taken any action.  Barbier expressed 
disappointment in President Nkurunziza's August 17 speech 
(ref A) and his failure to take decisive measures, although 
she agreed that addressing the issue publicly was a good 
step.  Ambassador Moller described her exchange with FM 
Batumubwira and different perceptions in Burundi and the U.S. 
on presidential speeches during a crisis -- obligatory in the 
U.S. but a possible sign of weakness in Burundi. 
 
¶5.  (C)  DONORS CONFERENCE/FRENCH PROGRAMS:  Concerning the 
Burundi donors conference scheduled for the autumn, 
Ambassador Moller and Barbier discussed Burundi's often naive 
concept of international assistance and the expectation that 
simply holding a conference would generate new assistance. 
Barbier said that France was trying to orient its assistance 
programs to meet Burundi's priorities, with the education 
sector an object of French support.  France was also helping 
with police training (which Ambassador Moller welcomed). 
Other areas for assistance included refugee support, public 
financing, and "capacity building."  These were French 
 
priorities for other countries in the Great Lakes region. 
The political and security background in Burundi would be 
important for donors -- unrest and signs of instability would 
scare off donors.  Ambassador Moller reiterated Burundians' 
failure to appreciate the importance of projecting a positive 
image internationally and the sometimes differing responses 
one received from different GOB ministries. 
 
¶6.  (C)  Chevallier noted with dismay that some Burundians 
viewed foreign assistance as a form of reparations from the 
colonial era and not a resource to be carefully invested for 
Burundi's future.  He stressed the importance of making clear 
to the GOB that donors would expect improvement in such areas 
as human rights and good governance.  The question of 
demobilized FNL members after the signing of an accord was 
also complex and potentially costly, and determining the 
FNL's intentions was always difficult. 
 
¶7.  (C)  POLITICS:  Barbier said that FM Batumubwira seemed 
aware of Burundi's image problems and asked whether the FM 
could do anything about them.  Ambassador Moller said that 
that was a key question that remained to be determined. 
Deskoff Chevallier noted that the present coalition led to a 
lack of cohesion within the GOB.  Ambassador Moller pointed 
out President Nkurunziza's high popularity in contrast with 
his relatively weak leadership.  Barbier was concerned about 
postponement of the GOB-FNL summit, which would be an 
opportunity to bring key actors together and to push 
President Nkurunziza in the right direction.  She hoped the 
summit would take place.  Ambassador Moller lauded South 
Africa's and Tanzania's policies towards Burundi.  Barbier 
and Ambassador Moller agreed that France, the U.S., and 
like-minded countries were sending similar signals concerning 
Burundi. 
 
¶8.  (C)  ONUB:  Both Ambassador Moller and Barbier expressed 
uncertainty about ONUB's fate following the UNSYG's 
recommendation that it be downsized (ref B), and to what 
extent it might continue playing a positive role politically 
and economically should its mandate continue.  Ambassador 
Moller noted that the downsizing was in part a result of a 
Burundian request.  It was not clear whether Burundi had 
taken into account the strong contribution to the local 
economy ONUB's personnel had been making.  Another 
uncertainty centered on how Burundi would handle 
truth-and-reconciliation issues.  On the positive side, 
Ambassador noted that the Burundian press was much freer than 
its counterpart in Rwanda and had done a good job covering 
the recent arrests.  Chevallier cited another positive -- the 
recent "coup" arrests remained a political issue only and had 
fortunately not acquired an ethnic dimension. 
 
¶9.  (C)  A GOOD EXAMPLE:  Barbier said that Burundi so far 
represented a good example of a country lifting itself out of 
prolonged ethnic turmoil, with all its complications.  France 
wanted it to continue moving in a positive direction and to 
serve as an example, particularly to the DRC.  Rwanda was not 
serving as such a model politically, she said.  She agreed 
that Rwanda was enjoying relative economic success.  The 
international community needed to keep steering Burundi in 
the right direction.  Barbier hoped that donors had not been 
negatively affected by the arrests and subsequent 
controversy.  She agreed with Ambassador Moller that 
Burundi's ambitious social programs (health care, education) 
would be expensive, and a failure in these areas could 
produce serious problems.  The issue of the sale of the 
presidential aircraft was not helping. 
 
¶10.  (C)  TRIPARTITE PLUS:  Barbier and Ambassador Moller 
agreed on the value of the Tripartite Plus process, which had 
been useful for all parties involved to address common 
problems such as insurgencies.  Chevallier commented on the 
importance France placed on stability in the DRC and how 
French regional efforts always took into account the DRC. 
Ambassador Moller reported good cooperation among Tripartite 
Plus ambassadors in Bujumbura and her good working 
relationship with France's ambassador.  She described USG 
assistance programs following the lifting of 508 sanctions in 
December 2005.  Various IMET programs were in train and the 
U.S. had helped organize a civil-military seminar and similar 
meeting that had been well received. 
 
¶11.  (C)  The meeting closed with a commitment by both sides 
to continue existing U.S.-France cooperation in Burundi in an 
effort to achieve the many goals the U.S. and France shared. 
 
Meeting at MOD 
-------------- 
 
¶12.  (C)  Colonel Eric Bonnemaison, the MOD's military 
advisor for Africa and the Middle East, met with Ambassador 
Moller prior to her meeting at the MFA.  (COMMENT: 
Bonnemaison tended to view Burundi from a narrow military 
perspective and he did not address many of the concerns 
Barbier raised.  END COMMENT.)  He said that one of the 
biggest security challenges in the region was the difficulty 
in controlling borders, which insurgent groups exploited.  He 
suggested the need for a regional approach because individual 
countries could not solve border control issues individually. 
 
¶13.  (C)  MODEST INTERESTS:  In Bonnemaison's view, France's 
interests in Burundi were relatively few.  Economic interests 
were limited and the Francophonie movement, while important, 
did not, in his view, warrant major French involvement.  Most 
interventions in the region were for humanitarian purposes. 
He noted France's involvement in Rwanda during the 1990s and 
continuing problems stemming from France's performance during 
the 1994 Rwandan genocide and questions surrounding Operation 
Turquoise.  This difficult era and continuing judicial and 
public inquiries concerning France and the genocide, he 
suggested, were inhibiting France-Rwanda military cooperation. 
 
¶14.  (C)  DRC:  When asked, Bonnemaison said that the DRC 
posed many challenges.  It was a large country and difficult 
to govern.  One objective was simply to avoid having it 
collapse.  He believed it necessary to involve a range of 
other countries, suggesting that France's ability to shoulder 
the costs of supporting stability in the DRC were beyond its 
means.  However, aside from the U.S., UK, and France, there 
was not much interest among others in the DRC, especially 
with other crises in Africa demanding attention.  Migration 
(legal and illegal) from Africa was one concern of Europe's 
Mediterranean states. 
 
¶15.  (C)  CHINA:  Concerning China's increased influence in 
Africa, Bonnemaison said that China could play a helpful 
role, but had chosen not to do so.  The Chinese did not share 
our concerns regarding democracy, transparency, and the rule 
of law.  Ambassador Moller noted China's activism in Burundi 
and PRC programs to build roads, schools, and water-related 
facilities.  Bonnemaison said that the MOD estimated 
500,000-750,000 Chinese in Africa; he expected China to 
continue its "invasion" of Africa.  He said that Chad's 
dropping of Taiwan and establishing relations did not 
surprise him. 
 
¶16.  (C)  FRENCH MILITARY IN AFRICA:  Asked about the 
restructuring of French military headquarters in Africa, 
Bonnemaison said that the purpose was to give a more regional 
focus to them, and to align them in ways that would parallel 
Africa's several sub-regional multilateral organizations. 
This would not come, he said, at the expense of France's 
existing bilateral military relations.  Bonnemaison explained 
military training programs offered to Rwanda and Burundi, 
including the "maison metier" program, which he described as 
a program to offer broad-based basic skills training to the 
military in Burundi.  (COMMENT:  Barbier suggested that the 
"maison metier" program had recently ended but similar forms 
of cooperation were either in progress or under 
consideration.  END COMMENT.)  Ambassador Moller described 
the ending of the 508 sanctions in December 2005 and U.S. 
programs initiated since then.  Bonnemaison encouraged 
cooperation between the French and U.S. embassies in Burundi, 
and with France's defense attache, resident in Rwanda. 
 
¶17.  (U)  Ambassador Moller authorized transmission of this 
message. 
 
 
 
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm 
 
STAPLETON