VZCZCXRO4339
RR RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHPA
DE RUEHNK #1004/01 2301205
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 181205Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5768
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0331
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0377
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 0531
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 0557
RUEHBAD/AMCONSUL PERTH 0341
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0285

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NOUAKCHOTT 001004 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPAO EAID EFIN PINR MR
SUBJECT: JUNTA LEADER FAL WELCOMES ELECTION OBSERVER 
MISSIONS 
 
REF: NOUAKCHOTT 1003 
 
Classified By: AMB JLEBARON, REASONS 1.4 (b),(d) 
 
-------------- 
(C) Key Points 
-------------- 
 
-- In a farewell call August 17th, Ambassador strongly 
encouraged Fal to allow international groups to observe 
Mauritania's parliamentary elections in November and 
presidential election next March. 
 
-- Fal welcomed all observer missions.  He added that 
Mauritania was close to concluding an MOU with the European 
Union on an observer mission. 
 
-- In a later meeting with the Foreign Minister, Ambassador 
stressed again the importance of not restricting observer 
missions in any way. 
 
-- Ambassador left a non-paper listing seven steps Mauritania 
should take to ensure free and fair elections.  Fal was 
receptive to them all, and said actions on some of them 
already were underway. 
 
------------ 
(C) Comments 
------------ 
 
-- Ambassador detects no slippage in Fal's intention to see 
Mauritania's ambitious election cycle through.  But the wild 
card of another coup, an assassination, or some other shock 
to the political system is ever present. 
 
-- Mauritania's strategic orientation towards the United 
States also appears to remain intact, even though the USG has 
(correctly) limited several areas of engagement with 
Mauritania during this transitional period. 
 
-- In a brief private conversation between Fal and Ambassador 
at the end of the meeting, Fal stressed that he would 
continue to orient Mauritania strategically toward the West, 
and the United States, specifically. 
 
-- If and when Mauritania gets a democratically elected 
government next March, Ambassador believes the USG will have 
a major opportunity to help democratic institutions take root 
in this Islamic Republic. 
 
End Key Points and Comments. 
 
¶1. (U) On August 17, Ambassador paid a farewell call on Col. 
Fal, at which the two discussed the democratic transition and 
Mauritanian policy on the situation in Lebanon (reftel). 
Also present were FM Ahmed Ould Sid'Ahmed and DCM (notetaker). 
 
¶2. (C) Ambassador stressed the importance to the USG that the 
November municipal and legislative elections and the March 
2007 presidential elections be seen as free and fair by both 
Mauritanians and the International Community alike.  He left 
behind a non-paper listing seven measures that the Embassy 
believed would enhance future elections (see para. 9). 
 
¶3. (C) Fal began by noting that it was his concern that went 
beyond having credible elections to creating a "true spirit 
of democracy" in Mauritania.  Political parties and civil 
society must abandon their "culture of contradiction and 
confrontation" to a democratic system where "everyone accepts 
results through consultation." 
 
¶4. (C) Ambassador noted that of immediate importance was that 
the Mauritanians accept a proposed EU observer mission for 
the elections as sending a clear signal of Fal's seriousness 
in having free and fair elections. 
 
¶5. (C) Fal replied that the Mauritanians had no objection "in 
principle" to any international observer mission coming to 
Mauritania.  He said that the EU and Mauritania were in 
negotiations on an MOU and he fully expected the MOU to be 
 
NOUAKCHOTT 00001004  002 OF 002 
 
 
signed upon the return of the EU Ambassador from vacation. 
 
¶6. (C) FM Sid'Ahmed raised the issue again during the 
Ambassador's farewell call on him later that day.  Sid'Ahmed 
asked whether the USG would have an objection to the EU 
mission given that NDI was seeking to bring in an observer 
mission of its own.  Ambassador noted there was talk that the 
Carter Center was interested in sending a mission here, but 
funding was a problem.  He promised to raise the issue of a 
U.S. observer mission during his consultations in Washington. 
 That said, the USG would certainly welcome the EU mission. 
 
¶7. (C) FM Sid'Ahmed repeated Fal's point that Mauritania did 
not object to the mission, but added that they were 
disappointed that the EU had chosen the model they used for 
the elections in the Congo.  The circumstances there were 
entirely different.  The government wanted to "safeguard 
Mauritanian sovereignty and ensure that the institutions 
entrusted to elections are respected." He noted that he was 
to meet with Fal after this meeting to discuss the draft MOU. 
 
¶8. (C) Ambassador replied that while he understood the 
Mauritanian position, he warned not to quibble too much on 
the details as any effort to limit the mission would be taken 
that the Mauritanians had something to hide.  Repeating what 
he said to Fal, Ambassador concluded, "perception is 
critical." 
 
¶9. (C) BEGIN NON-PAPER POINTS: 
 
-- Reopen the voter lists before November's municipal and 
legislative elections to allow additional Mauritanians to 
register and vote.  This is a most important issue. 
 
-- Provide more intensive training to poll workers and 
electoral commission representatives to ensure that electoral 
procedures are consistently followed throughout the country. 
This was a significant problem in the referendum. 
 
-- Provide more guidance and training to security forces 
posted at polling stations to ensure that voters do not feel 
intimidated.  This was also a problem in the referendum. 
 
-- Allow international and domestic observers (including 
political party and civil society organizations) to 
participate in election observations. 
 
-- Enhance the role of political parties and civil society in 
the electoral process, to ensure their support for the 
democratic transition. 
 
-- Improve the legal framework for resolving electoral 
disputes and for educating political parties and civil 
society about these procedures. 
 
-- Ensure the neutrality of the government in the coming 
elections. 
 
END POINTS 
LeBaron