VZCZCXRO2726
RR RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHPA
DE RUEHNK #1000/01 2281804
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 161804Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5761
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0326
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0372
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 0525
RUEHBAD/AMCONSUL PERTH 0336
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0280

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NOUAKCHOTT 001000 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/15/2016 
TAGS: PINR PREL PGOV PHUM EAID ASEC KPAO MR
SUBJECT: THE GREATEST THREATS TO THE DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION 
(C-AL6-01048) 
 
REF: NOUAKCHOTT 764 
 
NOUAKCHOTT 00001000  001.6 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: Amb. Joseph LeBaron, Reasons 1.4(b)(d) 
 
-------------- 
(C) Key Points 
-------------- 
 
-- The largest threat to the democratic transition is another 
coup led by military officers dissatisfied with how the 
transition is unfolding. 
 
-- While overt/overt electoral interference by the military 
council cannot be ruled out, it seems unlikely. 
 
-- If the council were to interfere, they would likely follow 
a more subtle path through secret campaign contributions, 
backroom candidate endorsements or by adopting electoral 
procedures that favor particular parties. 
 
-- However, there is no evidence to date that the council is 
backing any candidate or party. 
 
------------ 
(C) Comments 
------------ 
 
-- While rumors abound about fissures in the CMJD, we have 
seen no concrete evidence of this.  Our best guess is that 
the transition will go to its end, resulting in elections 
that will be accepted by both Mauritanians and the 
international community, with a handover to the civilian 
government as planned. 
 
-- However, many questions remain about what comes next and 
the post-election role of Fal and the other council members. 
The military has always played a significant role here, and 
elections alone will not change that, nor will they change 
Fal or the military's influence over public affairs. 
 
-- Striking the correct civil-military relationship will 
likely be among the new government's most formidable tasks. 
 
End Key Points and Comments. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
A COUP - THE LARGEST THREAT TO SUCCESSFUL ELECTIONS 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶1. (C) The current democratic transition was set into motion 
following the coup of August 2005, and ironically, a new coup 
presents the largest threat to the ultimate success of the 
transition.  As the transition to democracy will not end with 
the presidential elections in March, but will take years to 
build up, so too will the threat of a coup remain for the 
foreseeable future. 
 
¶2. (U) On June 20 the government arrested several high 
ranking military officers and civilians for allegedly 
plotting a coup (reftel), and both government officials and 
citizens alike believe additional coup attempts are possible. 
 
 
------------------- 
WHY AND FROM WHERE? 
------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Mauritania's long history of coups (from Colonel Saleh 
in 1978 to Army Chief of Staff Taya in 1984 to Colonel Fal in 
2005) have all come from high-ranking military officers close 
to the head of state.  While it seems likely that a future 
coup would also come from an officer, it is not clear how 
close this officer might be to Fal or the council.  Some 
believe the next coup will come from officers close to former 
president Taya (such as the men recently arrested), while 
others believe the coup will stem from members of the 
military council who are disaffected by the process. 
 
¶4. (C) Other possible threats to the transition, including 
civil strife and extremist activity, grow less likely as the 
process continues.  Aggrieved minorities seem to have 
 
NOUAKCHOTT 00001000  002.3 OF 003 
 
 
accepted the process despite its flaws and the government's 
lack of responsiveness to their concerns, and the government 
has kept a good lid on extremist activity. 
 
¶5. (C) A coup prior to the elections could be led by officers 
who feel they are not getting their share of the new found 
wealth that this transitional government has amassed.  There 
are rumors that Fal is feathering his own bed (septel), and 
that other officers, who have not been at the trough so long, 
might be resentful.  Another scenario would have officers 
derailing the process because they dislike the way the 
elections are going (if an Islamist or non-White Moor became 
the presidential front runner for example). 
 
¶6. (C) Even following the elections, the possibility of 
another coup remains strong if the military leaders sense 
that their economic welfare is threatened or fear that the 
new government might represent a personal risk to the 
officer, either through a military restructuring or perhaps 
through pursuing convictions for past human rights abuses 
committed by officers in the 1980s and 90s (Taya is currently 
being pursued in a Belgian court for such abuses). 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
WILL THE COUNCIL INTERFERE IN THE TRANSITION? 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) While overt/overt electoral interference by the 
military council cannot be ruled out, it seems unlikely.  The 
council's actions to date have been consistent with the 
democratic transition plan they agreed to in negotiations 
with the US, EU, and UN, and the June 25 constitutional 
referendum to limit important powers of the president was 
deemed free and fair by all observers, including post.  In 
short, they have gone to a lot of trouble to do it right if, 
in the end, they intend to explicitly interfere and throw it 
all away. 
 
¶8. (C) If the council were to interfere, they would likely 
follow a more subtle path of influencing the election outcome 
through secret campaign contributions, backroom deals to 
endorse specific candidates or by adopting electoral 
procedures that favor particular parties (such as public 
funding for political campaigns).  They would likely work 
within the democratic system, rather than against it.  For 
many observers, it seems probable that the council will 
follow this more subtle approach (either in an organized 
fashion or with council members acting independently). 
 
--------------------------- 
WILL THE COUNCIL STEP DOWN? 
--------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Yes.  It seems likely that the council and Fal will 
step down.  He will probably retire as well, to build on his 
legacy and possibly prepare for a run at the presidency 
sometime in the future.  However, the more important question 
is what comes next?  What will they do after they hand over 
power?  What role will the military play in the civilian 
government?  The answers to these questions are much more 
difficult. 
 
¶10. (C) It seems clear that the military will remain a 
central player in the Mauritanian power balance.  They have 
always had significant power (most often through direct rule 
of the country), and elections alone will not change that. 
While some may retire, most council members will likely 
remain the most powerful military leaders in the country, and 
will therefore likely continue holding many of the strings. 
Even when some leaders leave, the seconds in command are 
ready to step up and provide continuity. 
 
¶11. (C) Thus it will be incredibly important that the new 
government form a positive relationship with the military, 
while not ceding too much power to this long-standing 
authority.  If too much power is handed back to the military, 
then the democratic transition will have only succeeded in 
electing a puppet government; while if the new government 
tries to drain too much power to quickly from the military, 
the threat of another coup will dramatically increase.  In 
either case, striking the correct civil-military relationship 
 
NOUAKCHOTT 00001000  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
is likely to be among the new governments most formidable 
tasks. 
LeBaron