VZCZCXRO0041
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
DE RUEHMK #1599/01 2430927
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 310927Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY MANAMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5548
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
RHBVAKS/COMUSNAVCENT  IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 MANAMA 001599 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/30/2016 
TAGS: PREL PGOV BA OFFICIALS REGION BILAT
SUBJECT: KING STRESSES IMPORTANCE OF U.S. ROLE IN REGIONAL 
STABILITY 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William T. Monroe.  Reason: 1.4 (b)(d) 
 
¶1. (S) Summary.  Bahrain's King Hamad, during an August 29 
discussion with the Ambassador, repeatedly stressed the value 
he placed on the U.S. relationship, and the importance of the 
U.S. role in maintaining peace and security in the region. 
He expected Bahrain to initiate discussions shortly with 
NAVCENT on possible Bahrain Navy participation with TF-150 in 
the Arabian Sea.  He said the Arab League has asked FM Shaikh 
Khalid to lead an AL delegation at the UN next month to 
develop a fresh formulation to push the Israeli-Palestinian 
peace process forward, focusing on two points: the existing 
Arab initiative and increased Arab engagement with Israel. 
On Iran, he stressed the importance of GCC unity to confront 
Iran's goal of regional hegemony.  An Iranian MFA official 
came to Bahrain this week to present/defend Iran's nuclear 
response; his main point was that Iran wants to keep talking. 
 The King described relations with Saudi Arabia as better, 
although requiring careful management and still troubled by 
lingering economic-related irritants.  While bilateral 
relations with Qatar are quite good, the King was critical of 
Qatari actions at the UN and its tilt towards Iran.  He 
engaged only briefly on domestic issues, speaking positively 
of the upcoming parliamentary elections and the benefits of 
having broader participation (leading opposition Shia society 
Al-Wifaq) this time.   The meeting received prominent and 
unusual front-page coverage, clearly reflecting the King's 
desire to signal the value he places on the U.S. relationship 
at a time of much critical local reporting and commentary 
about U.S. policies in the region.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) King Hamad invited the Ambassador for a "business 
lunch" August 29 at Safriya Palace.  Joining the King were 
Foreign Minister Shaikh Khalid bin Ahmed Al-Khalifa and 
National Security Advisor Shaikh Ahmed Al-Khalifa.  The 
Ambassador was accompanied by the DCM. 
 
¶3. (C) The King opened the meeting by stressing the value he 
placed on Bahrain's bilateral relationship with the United 
States.  He returned to this theme several times during the 
discussion.  This is a long-standing relationship, he stated. 
 Bahrain was the first country in the Gulf to welcome a U.S. 
military presence on its soil.  When Iraq invaded Kuwait and 
the U.S. built up its military forces in the region, it was 
only in Bahrain that the U.S. military already had a real 
presence.  He repeatedly emphasized the "crucial role" that 
the U.S. plays in preserving the security and stability of 
the region.  He spoke frankly of the role that the U.S. 
military presence plays in helping protect Bahrain from Iran. 
 He described the U.S. as providing a "ring of fire" 
protecting Bahrain. 
 
¶4. (C) Bahrain values the U.S. relationship, and would like 
to strengthen it, the  King stated.  In that connection, he 
said he has initiated internal discussions on the possibility 
of Bahraini participation with the navy coalition operating 
outside the Strait of Hormuz (TF-150), and the government 
will approach NAVCENT shortly to discuss this issue. The 
Ambassador noted that we were serious about developing a 
security dialogue with Bahrain and other GCC countries which 
would look at ways to expand cooperation, and that a team 
would be coming to Bahrain in the fall for a round of 
discussions.  The King welcomed this initiative. 
 
¶5. (S) On Iran, the King stressed that it was important that 
the GCC countries remain united in dealing with the Iranians, 
who clearly want hegemony over the region.  While this unity 
is strong, two countries are walking a tightrope -- Oman and 
Qatar.  The Omanis, in walking this tightrope, lean towards 
the GCC.  They have been doing this for years, and have a 
special concern because of the Strait of Hormuz.  The 
Qataris, in contrast, lean towards Iran, and this worries 
other GCC partners. 
 
¶6. (C) When Foreign Minister Mottaki visited Bahrain earlier 
this year, the King stated, he told the Bahrainis that Iran 
is friends with the Taliban, Iraq, Syria, Hamas, and 
Hizbollah, and so Bahrain should be on the side of Iran.  The 
King said his reaction was: "with friends like that, we don't 
want to be partners with you."   The Ambassador asked about 
the visit the day before of Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister 
Mahdi Mastafawi, who met with Foreign Minister Shaikh Khalid. 
 Shaikh Khalid said that he came to present/defend Iran's 
response on the nuclear issue.  Mastafawi's main point was 
that the Iranians want to keep talking. 
 
¶7. (S) Turning to the Middle East, the King stated that at 
last week's Arab League Foreign Ministers' meeting, it was 
decided to task Shaikh Khalid, as rotating chair of the Arab 
League for the next six months, to lead an Arab League 
 
MANAMA 00001599  002 OF 003 
 
 
delegation to the United Nations next month to develop and 
discuss a fresh formulation to push the Israeli-Palestinian 
peace process forward.  He said this formulation would be 
based on two points: the Arab initiative already on the 
table, and a proposal for more engagement with Israel.  On 
the latter point, he noted that the Egyptians and Jordanians 
already talk to the Israelis, the Palestinians always like to 
talk to them, the Lebanese want to, and Bahrainis and other 
GCC countries meet with them (more quietly).  Why not raise 
the confidence of the Israelis by talking with them, he asked. 
 
¶8. (C) On Syria, the King said that he told President Bashar 
Al-Asad that he should break off his ties with Hamas leader 
Khalid Mishal. Bashar's response was that he hated Khalid 
Mishal, but since this was a Palestinian issue he really had 
no choice.  The King expressed exasperation with Bashar, but 
likewise felt there was no choice.  Bashar was better than 
the alternative - the Moslem Brotherhood. 
 
¶9. (S) The King talked at length on Bahrain's relations with 
Saudi Arabia, which he described as better than in the past 
but still in need of careful management.  He stated that 
Bahrain works hard to keep the relationship peaceful, adding 
that the ties remain smooth because "we do all the work."  He 
raised long-standing irritants, including oil from the joint 
Abu Safah offshore field (300,000 b/d production divided 
equally) and exports of sand from Saudi Arabia.  On the Abu 
Safah oilfield, he did not raise the usual complaint that the 
Saudis dropped a 50,000 b/d grant, but brought up a new issue 
that the Saudis have provided no transparency on the 
production and sales from the field (the field is operated by 
Aramco), leading to accusations in Bahrain's parliament that 
the Al-Khalifa's are siphoning off some of the income from 
Bahrain's share.  He said he has written four letters and 
raised the issue personally with King Abdullah, but has 
received no answer.  He would be happy if the Saudis sent the 
information directly to the Parliament.  In the King's view, 
the issue is all the more annoying because historically the 
territorial waters belonged to Bahrain (comment: the Saudis 
may have a different view.). 
 
¶10. (C) On the sand sales, he acknowledged that a resolution 
had been reached and exports of sand to Bahrain (vital for 
the construction industry) had resumed.  Unfortunately, the 
Saudi solution was to give the rights to sell sand to Bahrain 
to one company, which has sharply raised the price. 
 
¶11. (C) When the King mentioned, as he has in the past, that 
the Saudis watch with concern the democratic reform steps 
that Bahrain has taken, the Ambassador asked if the Saudi 
leadership had complained directly to him. The King offered 
no concrete examples, but pointed to regular attacks and 
criticisms of Bahrain's democratic reform efforts in the 
Saudi daily "Al-Watan." 
 
¶12. (S) On Qatar, the King expressed strong criticism of 
Foreign Minister Hamad Bin Jassim's statement at the UN 
Security Council after the July vote on Lebanon.  He said 
that HBJ maintained that he was speaking on behalf of the 
Arabs.  If that were the case, the King said, he should have 
consulted with the Arab League, the GCC, even the OIC, before 
preparing his statement.  He also said that HBJ indicated he 
had to reflect the "Arab street."  What "Arab street is there 
in Qatar, he wondered. 
 
¶13. (C) The Ambassador asked the King how he saw the upcoming 
Parliamentary elections, expected to take place after Eid in 
late October or November. The King thought the process was 
going well.  "Let's put this in perspective," he said. 
"We've come a long way in just four years since the first 
election."  It is important to bring people into the system, 
he said, and give them a stake in the country's affairs, and 
that is happening.  He was pleased that Al-Wifaq (major Shia 
opposition political society) had decided to participate in 
this election. More hard-line oppositionists, while refusing 
to participate, have been quieter lately.  Of course, there 
are some who will always remain outside the system, such as 
Said Shehabi, who remains in London and refuses to come back 
even though he has been encouraged to do so.  People like 
him, the King said, prefer to complain from the relative 
comfort of their homes in London. 
 
¶14. (C) Comment.  The Ambassador's previous meetings with the 
King have been private affairs, not reported in the local 
newspapers.  This meeting, taking place two days after the 
King's return to Bahrain, received lead front-page coverage, 
with the press reporting that the King called for a revival 
of the Middle East peace process and stressed the crucial 
role of the U.S. in promoting peace and security in the 
region.  Coming at a time of much critical reporting and 
 
MANAMA 00001599  003 OF 003 
 
 
editorial commentary about U.S. policy in the region, this 
was clearly an effort to remind Bahrainis (and Iran) that 
Bahrain does value its relationship with the U.S.   The 
Ambassador's meeting with the Crown Prince the same day also 
received press coverage, focusing on the potential benefits 
of the FTA.  The King's interest in exploring possible 
cooperation with TF-150 could be a positive, practical result 
of the King's desire for engagement in the security area. 
 
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Visit Embassy Manama's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/manama/ 
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MONROE