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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MADRID 001966 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
YAOUNDE FOR MALABO 
AF/FO FOR DAS DONALD YAMAMOTO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/18/2016 
TAGS: PREL EAID SMIG SOCI SP XY
SUBJECT: PLAN AFRICA: SPAIN INTRODUCES SELF TO NEIGHBORS 
 
REF: STATE 112788 
 
MADRID 00001966  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
Classified By: A/DCM Whitney Baird; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C)   SUMMARY: On July 26, Vice President Fernandez de la 
Vega officially rolled out Plan Africa, an ambitious project 
developed by the Zapatero government to address what it 
perceives to be a glaring hole in Spanish foreign policy. 
Prompted both by fears of international terrorism and by more 
recent and somewhat alarmist public clamor over illegal 
immigration, the Zapatero government has committed Spain to a 
three year initiative that will significantly expand Spanish 
diplomatic and assistance programs in Sub-Saharan Africa and 
also strengthen immigration controls.  Spain's projected 
assistance budget for Africa in 2008 (120 million euros) will 
quadruple its 2003 expenditures.  GOS contacts have 
repeatedly expressed interest in working with the United 
States in Africa; Post has indicated some possible avenues 
for cooperation (PARA. 8).  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (U)   Emboffs met with MFA Subdirector General for Africa 
Antonio Sanchez-Benedito Gaspar on July 18 to deliver a 
letter from former Deputy Secretary Zoellick to Deputy 
Foreign Minister Bernardino Leon (reftel) regarding bilateral 
cooperation in Africa and specifically in Equatorial Guinea. 
Sanchez-Benedito thanked Emboffs and said that Plan Africa 
was now complete and would be officially rolled out by Vice 
President Maria Teresa Fernandez de la Vega at a July 26 
ceremony.  He described the plan as "ambitious but directed, 
with concrete targets, clear objectives and a finite scope." 
 
---------- 
Background: Benign Neglect 
---------- 
 
¶3. (U)   Sanchez-Benedito said that Sub-Saharan Africa 
represents a "final frontier" of sorts for Spanish diplomacy 
- an area which Spain has neglected for centuries but is now 
looking to engage on a wide variety of issues.  The Spanish 
feel that they are uniquely positioned to serve as an honest 
broker on behalf of the EU in Africa, both because of their 
geographic proximity and cultural links to the region and 
because Spain has much less of a negative imperialist legacy 
in Africa than other Western European nations. 
Sanchez-Benedito pointed to West Africa as a region that has 
received very little attention of late yet has important 
historical connections dating from the time of the Muslim 
occupation of Spain.  While Spain has had relationships with 
nations in Southern Africa since the 1970s, he noted that 
these relationships were mostly centered on fishing rights 
and other economic concerns.  Sanchez-Benedito singled out 
Mali, Mauritania, and Equatorial Guinea, the only former 
Spanish colony in Sub-Saharan Africa, as three nations of 
particular importance. 
 
---------- 
Motivation: "New African Reality", Self-Interest 
---------- 
 
¶4. (U)   The "new African reality" of notable democratic 
advances coexisting with continuing widespread misery and 
conflict, coupled with concern that certain regions of Africa 
represent ideal growth opportunities for international 
terrorist organizations, has prompted Spain to undertake this 
initiative.  The plan notes that Spanish society feels a 
"calling to solidarity" with Africa, as well as a renewed 
 
MADRID 00001966  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
spirit favoring multilateral endeavors and a more relevant 
global role for Spain.  In one highly visible recent episode, 
Spanish tourists became voluntary aid workers when a boat 
carrying nearly 100 dehydrated and starving West Africans 
pulled ashore at a popular beach in the Canary Islands. 
 
¶5. (U)   On the other hand, critics accuse the Zapatero 
government of producing this plan solely to provide cover for 
their main goal of discouraging illegal immigration from 
Sub-Saharan Africa.  The GOS replies that although it is a 
highly visible and easily sensationalized phenomenon, the 
"African exodus" represents only a tiny fraction of total 
Spanish immigration.  (COMMENT: This is true, but this 
illegal immigration is the most damaging to the government's 
image. END COMMENT.)  Furthermore, immigration, with its 
coresponding supply of cheap labor, is one of the factors 
propping up the Spanish economy. 
 
¶6. (U)   Counter-migration strategies represent an important 
part of the plan, according to Deputy Foreign Minister 
Bernardino Leon, but they are merely a part, not the key 
objective.  In a May 21 interview with Spanish daily El Pais, 
Leon noted that Sub-Saharan migrants represent a meager three 
percent of total immigrants to Spain.  He called alarmist 
claims of an African exodus "pure demagoguery."  When asked 
if the GOS really thinks it can fix Africa, Leon stated the 
issue plainly: "What should we do?  Stand with our arms 
crossed while Africa empties itself of its youth, either 
through emigration or AIDS?"  He said Spain's plan would 
complement other existing initiatives such as those of the 
European Union, the G-8, the United Kingdom and China. 
 
---------- 
The Plan 
---------- 
 
¶7. (U)   The GOS has identified seven main objectives for 
Plan Africa: 
 
A.--Financing Democracy, Human Rights, Peace & Security-- 
Included under this objective are existing contributions to 
elections in Ivory Coast and Democratic Republic of Congo, a 
commitment to contribute to future election operations, 
bilateral efforts on human rights, engagement with the 
African Union and a commitment to increase contributions to 
peacekeeping operations in Africa.  Additional goals include 
the enactment of Cooperation Protocols on Security and 
Defense with Angola, Namibia, Mozambique and South Africa, 
and the ratification by African nations of international 
conventions on terrorism and justice, as agreed to at a May 
2006 Ministerial Round Table on Terrorism, hosted by Spain. 
 
B.--Fight Poverty, Develop Sub-Saharan Africa-- 
This objective includes programs for food assistance, 
education, water/sanitation, urban housing, gender equity and 
public health.  Further, Spain will provide technical 
assistance and advice to African fishing and agricultural 
industries, as well as tourist sectors.  Spain also intends 
to remain a leader in debt forgiveness, with an eventual 
total cancellation of 800 million euros through the 
Gleneagles initiative, as well as bilateral cancellation of 
200 million dollars. 
 
C.--Cooperation with African Nations on Migration-- 
This objective puts in place domestic border controls and 
resources for immigrant integration.  It also seeks to 
 
MADRID 00001966  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
establish bilateral agreements on migration and repatriation 
with Senegal, Mali, Ghana, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Cape Verde, 
Guinea, and the Gambia.  Additionally, Spain cosponsored and 
co-organized with Morocco the first Ministerial Conference on 
Migration and Development among European and African nations. 
 Spain considers the summit, which took place in Rabat on 
July 10-11, a success and proof of their emerging leadership 
role in the EU on African concerns. 
 
D.--Active Participation in the EU-Africa Strategy-- 
Spain intends to actively involve itself in EU policies on 
Africa, especially in peace and security matters, as well as 
supporting the second EU-Africa summit in Lisbon. 
 
E.--Commercial Investment, Fishing, Energy Security-- 
Spain runs a modest trade deficit with Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Spanish exports to Sub-Saharan Africa amount to only 4 
percent of total European exports to the region, compared to 
21 percent each for France and Germany.  Spain intends to 
counter this trade imbalance by capitalizing on geographical 
proximity, Spain's squeaky clean image in Africa (as compared 
to France and Germany), and Spanish industry's recent 
experiences in successfully globalizing their operations via 
Latin America.  The plan identifies South Africa, Nigeria, 
Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Namibia, Uganda and Cameroon as 
nations of immediate interest.  Spain will use development 
assistance funds both to stimulate growth and to promote 
Spanish businesses in the region.  It will also seek to 
earmark funds from the World Bank for infrastructure and 
employment projects in its areas of interest. 
 
On fishing, Spain will maintain or renegotiate its 1970s-era 
fishing agreements with most coastal African nations and will 
seek to establish respect for sustainability in African 
fisheries, as well as targeting EU funds to modernize African 
fishing industries. 
 
Spain will press for the inclusion of Spanish energy firms in 
exploratory operations in Africa, as well as taking measures 
to support the democratic and financial rights of citizens in 
hydrocarbon producing countries.  Target areas are the Gulf 
of Guinea, Nigeria, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, San Tome and 
Principe, and Angola. 
 
F.--Cultural and Scientific Cooperation-- 
Spain will increase by 20% their cultural budgets in African 
embassies, as well as increasing their cultural staff. 
Additionally, Spain will create Spanish language classrooms 
and Cervantes Institutes in several African countries. 
Scientific cooperation will be in the form of technical 
advice and exchanges.  Lastly, Spain will inaugurate Casa 
Africa, a regional center focused on Spanish-African 
relations, in Las Palmas, Canary Islands. 
 
G.--Expansion of Political and Institutional Presence -- 
Spain's diplomatic presence in Africa has remained basically 
unchanged since the 1970s, with 17 embassies.  Spain will 
open embassies in Mali, Sudan and Cape Verde, cooperation 
offices in Cape Verde, Ethiopia and Mali, and Defense Attache 
offices in Cape Verde, Senegal and Gabon.  Additionally, 
Spain will be creating new positions in almost all of its 
African embassies to expand their diplomatic presence in the 
region.  The Spanish Foreign Ministry will also create an 
Africa working group with civil society leaders. 
 
---------- 
 
MADRID 00001966  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
Requests for USG Cooperation 
---------- 
 
¶8. (C)   Spanish officials including VP de la Vega, FM 
Moratinos, Deputy FM Leon, and Director General for the 
Mediterranean, Middle East and Africa Alvaro Iranzo have 
expressed interest in working with the USG on Africa 
development issues.  We look forward to working with the 
Africa Bureau to review possible areas for joint 
collaboration.  Countries of mutual interest include but are 
not limited to Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria, Sudan, and Congo. 
Possible areas for cooperation include justice and democracy 
building, development assistance coordination, 
counter-terrorism, human rights, organized crime, 
narco-trafficking and global health. 
 
---------- 
Comment 
---------- 
 
¶9. (C)   While Plan Africa says all the right things with 
respect to development, it is certainly as preoccupied with 
abating the perceived hordes of Sub-Saharan African migrants 
heading to Spain as it is with improving conditions in 
Africa.  Deputy FM Leon practically said as much at a June 23 
press conference in Bamako when he noted that "Spain does not 
have the capacity to accept more workers."  Nevertheless, the 
fact that Spain has repeatedly sought U.S. input and 
cooperation in this area is an indication of their sincerity 
and presents an opportunity to direct Spanish diplomacy and 
funds toward key U.S. policy goals, simultaneously improving 
visuals on bilateral relations. 
AGUIRRE