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RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 0529
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RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0760

C O N F I D E N T I A L LONDON 005746 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/UBI, EAP/MLS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/06/16 
TAGS: PREL PHUM PGOV UN BM UK
SUBJECT: (C)UK ON BURMA:  NO THAI REMORSE FOR VISIT; FINNS 
NOT BREAKING NEW GROUND 
 
REF: (A) STATE 124139 (B) STATE 127496 (C) STATE 127498 
 
Classified By: Acting Pol Couns Richard Bell for reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
 ¶1.  (C) We met August 4 with British Foreign Office 
officials responsible for Burmese affairs.  Head of section 
Nick Alexander had seen our demarche (ref a) over concern 
that the Finns have invited the Burmese Foreign Minister to 
ASEM, as it had been shared by a representative of an 
unspecified EU member state.  Alexander said the UK, Dutch, 
Danes and Australia sought to coordinate their approaches to 
Burma.  He said HMG represented the "harder end" of EU member 
states' thinking on Burma and that the invitation to the 
Burmese Foreign Minister was the product of convoluted 
negotiations within the EU which took place in Rotterdam this 
past January.  These allowed for an invitation to a Burmese 
Minister with the specific understanding that human rights 
issues would be put on the agenda of any such meeting. 
Alexander noted that Burma was represented by a Minister at 
the 2004 ASEM summit, but the Labor (not Foreign) Minister. 
Poloff said that an invitation to a Foreign Minister could be 
viewed as an elevation in participation.  Alexander agreed 
but said HMG's redline was the top echelon of Burmese 
government, which did not include the Foreign Minister. 
 
¶2.  (C) The British Ambassador to Thailand had seen the Prime 
Minister's deputy coincidentally when news of Thaksin's visit 
to Burma broke.  The Ambassador had asked the purpose of the 
visit; the reply had been that Thaksin was traveling in his 
ASEAN capacity and had delivered a message consistent with 
it.  Alexander said he understood that the Thai Ambassador to 
Burma had not been aware of the visit prior to its 
occurrence.  There had been a meeting of security service 
officials from across Asia, and it was there that Burmese 
security service officials had issued the invitation which 
was quickly accepted.  Alexander was of the view that the 
Thais were "developing lines" (something close to talking 
points) to explain the visit after the fact.  We asked if the 
British Ambassador had asked whether Thaksin had delivered a 
stern message about ASSK.  Alexander suggested that the Thai 
lines would make this point; he was less than definitive as 
to whether the British Ambassador, however, had made a direct 
inquiry.  Alexander surmised that Thaksin would show no 
remorse for the visit and would build more around it to make 
it appear as "ASEAN work" to deflect speculation that he went 
to make or maintain business links. 
 
¶3.  (C) We mentioned reporting from the like-minded meeting 
(ref b). Alexander clarified that there were no plans for 
mil-to-mil training emanating from HMG.  He and desk officer 
Penelope Curtis were interested in how many votes the USG 
thinks are now lined up in support of a Security Council 
resolution.  HMG continues to support a UNSCR on Burma. 
 
Visit London's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/london/index. cfm 
Caulfield