VZCZCXYZ0002
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHPC #0800/01 2341822
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 221822Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY LOME
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7318
INFO RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 1975
RUEHCO/AMEMBASSY COTONOU 3882
RUEHOU/AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU 8834
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0483
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS

C O N F I D E N T I A L LOME 000800 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/W (DBANKS) 
PARIS FOR D'ELIA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/20/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM TO KDEM
SUBJECT: TOGO:  FINAL NEGOTIATIONS OF THE NATIONAL DIALOGUE 
PRODUCE AN ENCOURAGING ACCORD 
 
REF: A. LOME 798 
 
     ¶B. LOME 737 
 
Classified By: Poloff Rona Rathod for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.    (U) Summary.  This cable continues reporting from ref 
¶A.  Although talks in Ouagadougou were difficult, the 
Togolese ruling party made significant concessions, and 
Blaise Compaore proved a worthy facilitator.  Provisions of 
the comprehensive poltical agreement that emerged in 
Ouagadougou attempt to guarantee free and fair legislative 
elections, which are viewed widely as crucial for future 
progress toward ending Togo's long political crisis.  All 
constitutional reforms are left to a future government, to be 
formed after the legislative elections in late 2007.  In the 
interim, the agreement establishes a government of national 
union that will oversee reforms in a number of key areas. The 
new accord provides for a permanent body to discuss national 
issues and a follow-up committee to monitor implementation, 
chaired by Compaore, who also will serve as final arbitrator. 
 The agreement also formulates a mechanism to help repatriate 
refugees. Although the accord lacks details, most notably 
about selecting a new prime minister, it has heralded a new 
esprit in Togo.  End summary. 
 
--------------------------- 
ARDUOUS BUT FRUITFUL TALKS 
--------------------------- 
 
¶2.    (C) By all accounts, the definitive phase of 
negotiations proved as difficult as the initial stages. 
Pervasive mistrust between the opposition and ruling RPT 
(Rally of the Togolese People) resurfaced during the 
negotiations in Ouagadougou and continues to linger even 
after the signing of the accord.  Party representatives 
admitted that the decision to move the talks to Ouagadougou 
and place them under the aegis of someone without a vested 
interest in Togolese politics was one of the principal 
reasons that all parties signed the comprehensive political 
agreement (Accord Politique Global).  The fact that a 
non-Togolese oversaw the process provided enough assurances 
to each side that no party to the talks could later claim it 
did not fully grasp a certain provision and ask that it be 
amended or ignore it altogether, as has occurred in the past. 
 Despite the hesitation of some opposition leaders, notably 
from the UFC (United Forces of Change), over the appointment 
of Burkina Faso president Blaise Compaore as the facilitator, 
the respect that he commanded among the Togolese parties 
ultimately assured a fairly quick resolution to the 
negotiations. 
 
¶3.    (C) Probably at Togolese president Faure Gnassingbe's 
insistence, the RPT approached the Ouagadougou talks with a 
greater spirit of compromise than existed in the initial, 
Togolese only, negotiating round. RPT members made real 
concessions, acquiescing to the inclusion of points certain 
to disrupt the status quo and resisting pushing for their 
most controversial ideas.   At one point during the talks, 
RPT representatives became very nervous about the process as 
a result of statements made by UFC special advisor Eric 
Amerding about the UFC's power to make the RPT concede 
certain difficult points.  Regardless of Amerding's perceived 
hubris, it was, in fact, the UFC's resilient lobbying that 
ensured that opposition ideas, specifically about forming a 
government of national unity, appeared in the final text. 
(Comment. The presence of Amerding and UFC president 
Gilchrist Olympio Amerding's brother-in-law), who both reside 
in France, at the talks in Ouagadougou suggests that Olympio 
did not have complete confidence in the local leadership to 
make the right decisions. End Comment.) 
 
-------------------------- 
ANALYSIS OF THE AGREEMENT 
-------------------------- 
 
¶4.    (U) Many of the elements included in the comprehensive 
accord remain unchanged from reporting in reftels. 
Therefore, the following discusses previously controversial 
points. 
 
¶5.    (C) Elections.  One of the most beneficial provisions 
for the opposition concerns the quashing of existing 
constitutional amendments regarding eligibility to stand as a 
candidate in national elections.  These amendments, imposed 
by former president Gnassingbe Eyadema to deny certain 
 
opposition members the opportunity to run for national public 
office, required residing in Togo for a specified period of 
time and officially renouncing any claims of citizenship 
outside of Togo.  These provisions will not be applied to 
candidates in the upcoming national elections, paving the way 
for many opposition members with dual citizenship or who are 
living in self-imposed exile to throw their hats in the ring. 
 
 
¶6.    (C) A reconstituted electoral commission will be 
charged with organizing the elections with the support of the 
government.  This ostensibly independent body will be 
composed of five members of the RPT, two from each of the 
other five political parties participating in the dialogue, 
one from each of the civil society groups involved in the 
talks, and two non-voting members of the government.  Though 
this does not differ from the stipulations of the previous 
interim agreement (ref B), this new agreement requires that 
the commission make decisions by consensus rather than vote. 
Apparently, the UFC insisted on this wording, as well as the 
non-voting status of the government to counterbalance the 
superior RPT presence on the commission. 
 
¶7.    (U) The electoral commission will no longer be involved 
in resolving election disputes.  Any challenges concerning 
candidacy, voting procedures, and election results will be 
heard by the Constitutional Court, which the accord asks be 
reconstituted as a more professional, credible, and 
independent body.  This accord also accepts that national as 
well international observers may monitor each stage of the 
electoral process (the previous agreement only allowed for 
international observers).  The document also encourages 
political parties and the government to consider increasing 
the role of women in politics, but did not offer any 
numerical guidelines or quotas. 
 
¶8.    (U) Security.  Parties to the dialogue asked the 
government to take all measure to ensure that security forces 
refrain from interfering in politics and concomitantly, asked 
that political parties refrain from provoking the security 
forces. The concept of a "republican" army, i.e., ethnically 
and regionally diverse, was spelled out in the agreement as a 
necessary change, as was a separation of roles between the 
army (national defense) and the police and gendarmes 
(domestic order). 
 
¶9.    (U) Refugees.  All parties have agreed to work quickly 
to bring home refugees who fled after the contentious 
presidential election of 2005.  They will participate in an 
ad hoc committee to assist the Togolese office charged with 
repatriating refugees from Ghana and Benin by acting as 
liaisons between the refugees and the government. 
 
¶10.   (U) Constitutional Reforms.  The document leaves 
constitutional reforms, such as the nomination and 
responsibilities of the prime minister, conditions of 
eligibility to run for president, limits on presidential 
terms, the possibility of creating a Senate, and reform of 
the Constitutional Court to the government that will take 
shape after the next legislative election. 
 
¶11.   (C) Reconciliation Commission.  The accord calls for 
the creation of a reconciliation commission which could offer 
pardons to past transgressors.  The parties to the dialogue 
appear to have recoiled from calling for judicial punishment 
for prior bad acts and from specifying how far back in the 
past the punishments would apply.  Although not included in 
the accord, it seems likely that a compensation mechanism, if 
it can find donor support, will be put into effect for 
property losses from violence surrounding political events in 
recent years. 
 
¶12.   (U) Final Arrangements.  As reported in ref A, the 
parties to the dialogue have agreed to form a government of 
national union (GNU).  This GNU will conduct business 
according to a roadmap laid out in Annex Two of the accord. 
The GNU will mostly begin implementing the terms of the 
comprehensive agreement.  Accordingly, the GNU will revise 
the electoral code in conformity with provisions of the 
accord and formulate an election calendar specifying when the 
electoral commission will come into being.  It will also, 
among other things, engage refugees and ensure that security 
forces adhere to norms of a "republican and nationally 
representative military." 
 
¶13.   (C) The GNU will also specify the mandate and 
composition of a permanent dialogue body, to whom the accord 
has assigned the task of reviewing subjects of national 
interest.  A follow-up committee, to include a representative 
of each party to the dialogue, the European Union, and 
ECOWAS, and presided over by the facilitator (President 
Compaore) or his agent, will oversee the implementation of 
the accord.  Differing interpretations of the accord will be 
put to the facilitator (Compaore) for final arbitration. 
These mechanisms built into the accord to guarantee its 
proper implementation are a feature that did not exist in 
previous Togolese political agreements and were very likely 
an important driving force behind global acceptance of the 
document. 
 
------------ 
CONCLUSIONS 
------------ 
 
¶14.   (C) The main weakness in this new accord, as in the 
previous, interim version, is that it lacks details and 
leaves much to the government to undertake -- even though 
that government now will include all the opposition elements. 
 Constitutional and military reforms, arguably two of the 
most contentious topics, have been left in the hands of the 
GNU.  Considering how much time and energy was spent on 
formulating this accord within the constrained structure of 
the national dialogue, these more controversial matters could 
prove difficult to settle within a larger government, 
particularly if the spirit of consensus that characterized 
the dialogue falters. 
 
¶15.   (C) As has been the case throughout the national 
dialogue, the question of who will receive the prime 
ministership is on everyone's mind.  It is fairly certain 
that incumbent Edem Kodjo, appointed by Faure after last 
year's flawed elections, will be asked to step down.  The 
names of CAR (Action Committee for Renewal) president and 
dialogue chair Yawovi Agboyibo, UFC vice president Patrick 
Lawson, Eric Amerding, and CDPA (Democratic Convention of 
African Peoples) president Leopold Gnininvi are being 
mentioned as possible candidates.  The ultimate decision 
rests with Faure, who will will be under pressure from his 
hardline RPT backers.  Enduring suspicion of the ruling party 
has caused some opposition members to lament the hasty 
signing of the accord without specificity on who the prime 
minister will be. 
 
¶16.   (C) Despite the limitations of this accord, there is a 
sense of a new era and new spirit in Togo. The fact that the 
document, unlike similar agreements with the opposition in 
years past, was made public two days after its signing 
signals a change in mindset on the part of the authorities 
and has given Togolese hope that politicians have turned over 
a new leaf and are willing to be inclusive and transparent 
and work towards fundamental improvements. 
DUNN