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C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMA 003259 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
ISN FOR JOAN CORBETT 
L/PM FOR THERESA K. MITCHELL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2016 
TAGS: PGOV KICC PHUM PREL KTIA MARR MOPS PINR PE
SUBJECT: NEW PERU DEFENSE MINISTER ON ARTICLE 98, SOFA, 
BORDER SECURITY 
 
Classified By: A/POL David C. Brooks, for Reasons 1.4 (c,d) 
 
-------- 
Summary: 
-------- 
 
¶1.  (C) Ambassador discussed Peruvian border and internal 
control issues, Article 98, a Status of Forces Agreement 
(SOFA), the U.S.-donated C-26 counternarcotics (CN) aircraft, 
the U.S. Customs P-3 CN flights from Piura, the Cooperating 
Nations Information Exchange System (CNIES), and a possible 
Intelligence Sharing Agreement with Minister of Defense (MOD) 
Alan Wagner Tizon on 8/8.  Wagner asked both Peru and the 
U.S. to "be pragmatic" on Article 98.  He also expressed 
interest in: using the military to fight poverty through 
U.S.-style New Horizons exercises, strengthening the Center 
for High Level National Studies (CAEN), and continuing the 
riverine program.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) Ambassador, DCM, DATT, MAAG Chief and POL-MIL Officer 
met with Peru's Minister of Defense (MOD) Alan Wagner Tizon, 
MOD Political Advisor Ambassador Bellina, Admiral Zegarra, 
Admiral Nieto, and Colonel Garcia on 8/8. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Air/Sea Space Control and Article 98 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶3.  (C) MOD Wagner led off by stressing Peru's need for 
greater surveillance to assure control over its sovereign 
spaces.  This is not just a border issue, but also affects 
Peru internally.  Describing the Amazon region, the MOD said 
that Peru "cannot let this region become the wild West." 
Ambassador noted the successful June 2006 demonstration by 
the U.S. Customs P-3 surveillance aircraft, and said that the 
U.S. sought to use Piura as a temporary location for P-3 CN 
flights once or twice a month for a week at a time.  In this 
connection, the Peruvians expressed interest in S-3 Viking 
aircraft. 
 
¶4.  (C) Ambassador explained that Peru does not have access 
to S-3 Viking aircraft and similar equipment through the 
Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program because Peru and the 
U.S. have yet to reach agreement on Article 98.  The MOD 
replied: "How can we be pragmatic?"  Ambassador suggested 
that both sides review the 1952 Military Cooperation 
Agreement and seek ways to interpret it to this end.  MOD 
stated that he would talk to Foreign Minister Jose Garcia 
Belaunde about this, adding that Peru and the U.S. "have to 
cooperate" on maritime interdiction.  (Comment: MOD Wagner 
has been known as an uncompromising critic of Article 98 and 
surprised us with his apparent flexibility.  End Comment). 
 
¶5.  (C) Admiral Zegarra added that the Joint Command and the 
MOD are preparing a proposal on Article 98.  He explained 
that the Peruvians are developing a plan for maritime 
interdiction, but that, to bring it off, they need certain 
major end items as well as strategic input from the U.S. 
(resources to which they would presumably have access after 
signing an Article 98 agreement). 
 
---- 
SOFA 
---- 
 
¶6.  (C) Ambassador brought up the need for/possibility of a 
Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) to reduce the bureaucratic 
procedures required for bringing U.S. military personnel into 
Peru for training missions, etc.  MOD Wagner suggested that 
we re-examine the 1952 Military Cooperation Agreement and 
determine how that might point the way toward a SOFA.  His 
Political Advisor, Ambassador Bellina, commented that the 
Peruvians have the Embassy's proposed text for a SOFA, but 
that it "presents difficulties" for Peru's legal framework 
and that they would like to see it re-framed in "more 
symmetrical terms." 
 
-------------------------- 
The CAEN, Riverine Program 
-------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Wagner stated that he intends to improve training in 
 
the Peruvian Armed Forces.  Related to this, he hopes to 
further develop the Center for High Level National Studies 
(CAEN) into a more robust institution, and to use it as a 
"communication vehicle to promote connections between the 
military and civilian society.  (Comment: The CAEN is the 
Peruvian equivalent of the National Defense University.  It 
is poorly funded, employs part and full-time professors who 
come from the middle and lower ranks of Peru's academic world 
and teaches some fairly mechanical interpretations of 
strategy.  It would be a great candidate for renovation.  End 
Comment.)  Wagner mentioned Dr. Richard Downey, Director of 
the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (CHDS), as a 
Washington contact who had agreed to help the CAEN develop a 
stronger program of military education emphasizing executive 
planning and management. 
 
¶8.  (C) Wagner praised previous U.S. assistance in setting up 
a Riverine Program in Peru.  He identified riverine 
capabilities as essential to the Peruvian Armed Forces' plans 
to reassert GOP control in areas of the Amazon now dominated 
by narcotics and arms traffickers.  Ambassador noted the 
Embassy's assistance along the northern border with Colombia 
in the areas of logistics, equipment, training, and 
intelligence.  (Comment: The Embassy discontinued its 
assistance to Peru's riverine program two years ago because 
it consistently failed to meet its goals.  End Comment.) 
 
------------------ 
The War on Poverty 
------------------ 
 
¶9.  (C) Wagner stated that in zones like the Ene and Apurimac 
River Valley (VRAE) and the Upper Huallaga, the Armed Forces 
had not only to fight terrorists and narco-traffickers, but 
also had to be seen as assaulting "the fundamental problems 
that feed terrorism."  This means attacking poverty.  In this 
connection, the MOD was eager to travel with the Ambassador 
to the New Horizons (NH) Exercise in Lambayeque in September. 
 Wagner expressed interest in developing similar capabilities 
within the Peruvian Armed Forces, so that they, too, could 
provide "direct attention" to citizens' needs in areas like 
health care and school construction.   Such activities, he 
said, "bring the Armed Forces and society together." 
 
¶10.  (C) Wagner particularly admired the NH Program's 
capacity for digging wells, which, he noted, could help make 
good on President Garcia's promise to bring potable water to 
millions of Peruvians.  Admiral Zegarra chimed in that there 
was nothing like seeing the grateful faces of recipients of 
NH help and that such training was essential to hone military 
responses to natural disasters.  Both the MOD and the 
Ambassador noted how programs like NH have to be based upon 
buy-in from local political leaders.  The Ambassador stated 
that Lambayeque Regional President Yehude Simon's support for 
NH had proved critical in laying the groundwork for the 
exercise's present success. 
 
------------------------------ 
Intelligence Sharing Agreement 
------------------------------ 
 
¶11.  (C) Ambassador mentioned that the U.S. had prepared a 
proposal for an Intelligence Sharing Agreement with Peru, 
which would guarantee the protection of shared sensitive 
knowledge.  We had not presented this to the Toledo 
Government, he noted, because it was finished too late in 
their term.   MOD Wagner replied that good intelligence was 
essential for the Peruvian Armed Forces to carry out their 
various missions.  COL Fargo added that such an accord would 
also complement the CNIES facilities that the U.S. is 
establishing in Iquitos, Pucallpa and Lima.  Both sides noted 
that the Liaison Officer Position in Key West -- whose job is 
to assist with CNIES and maritime interdiction -- remained 
unfilled because the Peruvian candidate had been blocked by 
involvement in an ongoing human rights court case.  MOD 
Wagner said that the candidate had to be changed, and 
directed that he be replaced by a Naval Officer. 
 
¶12.  (C) Comment: The new MOD's interest in securing U.S. 
military assistance appears to trump his past virulent 
opposition to Article 98, which offers a glimmer of hope for 
progress on an agreement.  This, and Wagner's willingness to 
 
replace an officer candidate tainted by possible human rights 
violations, indicated a promising pragmatism and flexibility 
on his part. 
STRUBLE