VZCZCXRO6779
PP RUEHDE
DE RUEHKU #3071/01 2131029
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 011029Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6031
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0936
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0581
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1280
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KUWAIT 003071 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR S/CT, EB/ESC/IEC, INR/EC, DS/ITA, NEA/ARP FOR 
JACKSON 
LONDON FOR TSOU 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2016 
TAGS: PREL KCIP KU PTER EPET
SUBJECT: KUWAIT'S CRITICAL ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY 
STRATEGY 
 
REF: A. STATE 110159 
 
     ¶B. KUWAIT 4400 
 
Classified By: CDA Matt Tueller for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
 ¶1. (S/NF) Summary: On July 10, 19, and 23, EconOff met with 
lead security officials from Kuwait National Petroleum 
Company (KNPC), Kuwait Oil Company (KOC), and Oil Sector 
Services Company (OSSC).  EconOff conveyed the USG desire to 
help Kuwait to secure its critical energy infrastructure and 
requested an overview of security conditions and activities 
at key sites in accordance with Ref A.  All three officials 
expressed their appreciation for the USG offer to assist, but 
said that further security assessments were not their most 
pressing need. The GOK and Kuwait Petroleum Company (KPC) 
have received numerous assessments and recommendations from 
private-sector security contractors.  Kuwaiti security 
officials emphasized that security at critical sites had 
become a clear priority receiving close attention from the 
highest levels of KPC, the Ministry of Energy, and the 
Ministry of Interior.  They cited significant enhancements 
that had been implemented in recent months, especially at the 
critical Mina Al-Ahmadi facilities.  These included improved 
access control systems, installation of additional 
surveillance equipment, and extension and reinforcement of 
perimeter fencing.  All three officials said the problems of 
greatest concern are now vulnerability to attack from the sea 
and poor dissemination of relevant, actionable intelligence 
from the ministerial level down to the working level.  The 
officials from KOC and OSSC specifically asked if the USG 
could use its influence with the GOK to facilitate 
improvements in these areas.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (S/NF) Comment: The rejection by these KPC officials of 
USG offers of assessments and recommendations did not seem to 
indicate intransigence or a fear of scrutiny.  All three 
officials seemed open in their responses and eager to 
cooperate in moving forward.  They showed an excellent 
command of the key issues of concern and although EconOff met 
with each official separately, their comments were remarkably 
consistent.  Maritime security and information sharing 
clearly represent their areas of greatest concern and 
frustration.  End Comment. 
 
GOK Acting on Recommendations from Previous Assessments 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶3. (S/NF) EconOff met separately with KNPC Security Manager 
Fahad Al-Dihani, KOC Security Manager Mohammed Al-Fodari, and 
OSSC Deputy Chairman Ali Ahmed Al-Obaid on July 10, 19, and 
23 respectively to discuss the points provided in ref A. 
(Note: All three of these companies are subsidiaries of 
Kuwait Petroleum Corporation (KPC).  KNPC is responsible for 
refining and marketing in Kuwait and manages the Mina 
Al-Ahmadi facilities; KOC is responsible for exploration and 
production; OSSC has overall responsibility for security 
across Kuwait's oil sector.  End note.)  All three security 
chiefs expressed thanks for the offer of assistance and said 
that in recent months significant progress has been made in 
enhancing physical security of key infrastructure, especially 
the Mina Al-Ahmadi location identified in Refs A and B as a 
critical energy facility.  Recent enhancements directly 
respond to gaps identified in independent security 
assessments conducted by British, American, and Australian 
private-sector security contractors, including Global Village 
Strategies and AustroConsult.  Enhancements include 
construction of triple-layered perimeter fencing, extension 
of perimeter fencing 100 meters into the sea, expanded buffer 
zones between installations and adjacent private and/or 
public property, installation of CCTV cameras and motion 
detectors, a much-improved badging and access system, 
establishment of detailed emergency response plans, creation 
of a centralized security control center, increased 
patrolling, and an improved training and qualifications 
system for oil sector security personnel.  EconOff toured the 
Al-Ahmadi perimeter and saw firsthand that a number of 
previous deficiencies identified in ref B had been corrected. 
 
KUWAIT 00003071  002 OF 003 
 
 
 Overall, security officials said that coordination among all 
the relevant parties was still insufficient but improving 
significantly. 
 
Stronger Progress and Coordination Driven from the Top 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶4. (S/NF) All three KPC security officials expressed 
appreciation for the USG offer to assist with security 
assessments but said that recent assessments conducted by 
private-sector security contractors already provided a clear 
and comprehensive picture of security deficiencies as well as 
prioritized recommendations to address these deficiencies. 
All were confident that KPC was making progress in 
implementing the necessary solutions but said the gradual 
reassignment of overarching oil sector security 
responsibilities to OSSC was proceeding slowly. (Note: OSSC 
was only established in August 2005 to assume overall 
security responsibility for all of the KPC subsidiaries.  End 
note.)  During the transition to full OSSC control, security 
improvements are principally being driven by the Vital Oil 
Installations Group (VOIG), headed by the Director General of 
Kuwait State Security and comprised of representatives from 
various GOK ministries and KPC.  The VOIG reports to the 
Council of Ministers on the security of oil infrastructure. 
The KPC security officials said the VOIG had been highly 
effective in forcing cooperation among government entities 
and overcoming political obstacles to the implementation of 
security enhancements.  However, they emphasized that the 
Kuwait Coast Guard was the one key stakeholder that had not 
been adequately brought into the process. 
 
¶5. (S/NF) Security officials recognized that there is still 
much room for improvement in physical security, but said that 
they now had much greater confidence than they did a year ago 
that efforts to enhance security had been rationalized and 
that the momentum for improvement was being driven from the 
top down.  They cited high-level involvement of the 
Ministries of Interior and Energy in addition to the senior 
leadership of KPC.  KPC's training institute is now 
graduating 100-150 security personnel every three months with 
specific training in oil sector security.  KPC security 
recognized that large portions of the Kuwaiti oil sector 
remain relatively vulnerable including pipelines, gathering 
centers, tank farms, terminals, and offshore facilities. 
However, they noted that critical, non-redundant facilities, 
for which terrorist attacks could cause the greatest supply 
disruption, were properly being addressed first. 
 
Greatest Weaknesses: Maritime Interdiction, Intel Sharing 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
¶6. (S/NF) According to these security officials, the most 
significant gaps in security are now vulnerability to attack 
from the sea and inadequate dissemination of relevant 
intelligence and threat information.  They suggested that the 
USG could be most helpful by sharing intelligence and threat 
information with KPC directly or by using its influence with 
the GOK to improve the flow of relevant intelligence from the 
Ministerial level to the working level.  All three also said 
the problem with maritime security was not surveillance and 
detection, but enforcement and interdiction.  They said the 
installation of radar and sonar systems and the establishment 
of a maritime exclusion zone allow security personnel to 
recognize potential seaborne threats but the Coast Guard 
fails to provide a ready and robust capability to intercept 
and/or neutralize these threats once they are identified. 
Deputy Director Al-Obaid of OSSC suggested this could be 
remedied by having the MOI establish a corps of Oil Sector 
Marine Security personnel who would be seconded to KPC for 
training, management, and operational control.  (Note: The 
Deputy Director has not yet forwarded this proposal through 
official channels. End note.)   Maritime security 
responsibilities currently rest with the Kuwait Coast Guard 
which, according to KPC, lacks the resources, the capability, 
and the will to play an effective role. 
 
 
KUWAIT 00003071  003 OF 003 
 
 
******************************************** 
For more Embassy Kuwait reporting, see: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/?cable s 
 
Or Visit Embassy Kuwait's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/ 
******************************************** 
TUELLER