VZCZCXRO9373
PP RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHKL #1525/01 2260721
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 140721Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7340
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY 0073
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KUALA LUMPUR 001525 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/14/2026 
TAGS: PREL PINS PTER EAID RP MY
SUBJECT: MALAYSIAN VIEW OF GRP/MILF PEACE PROCESS 
 
REF: MANILA 3352 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR CHRISTOPHER J. LAFLEUR, REASON 1.4 (B AND D). 
 
¶1.  (S) Summary:  Malaysian lead facilitator for the 
Philippine Government(GRP)/Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
(MILF) peace process Othman Abdul Razak told the Ambassador 
August 9 that he anticipated that the parties would sign an 
interim agreement late this year, with conclusion of a 
"comprehensive compact" possible in the first half of 2007. 
Othman described the MILF as practical and realistic in their 
negotiating approach.  He identified key challenges as the 
delineation of Muslim-majority areas and the ability of 
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (GMA) to sell the deal in 
Manila given her weak political position.  Continued 
restraint by the Philippine armed forces, success of the 
constitutional reform process, and the commitment of local 
MILF commanders and ulamas also would be important.  Othman 
claimed the MILF had already neutralized Jemaah Islamiyah 
(JI) terrorists, with only three JI-linked persons remaining. 
 Othman called for capacity building efforts for MILF, 
including financing of a leadership school, to proceed in 
parallel with the remaining negotiations.  Othman foresaw the 
need for U.S. diplomatic pressure on GMA to seal the deal at 
the end, as well as development assistance to ensure the deal 
lasts.  End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (S) The Ambassador, accompanied by Polcouns, called on 
Othman Abdul Razak August 9 to seek his views on the GRP/MILF 
peace process.  The Ambassador emphasized the importance the 
U.S. places on seeing the conflict in Mindanao resolved and 
eliminating a safe haven for terrorists in the region, noting 
that such extremists pose a threat to Malaysia as well.  He 
lauded Malaysia's important role in the GRP/MILF 
negotiations.  Othman, who retired as Malaysia's external 
intelligence chief early this year and operates out of the 
Prime Minister's office, readily acknowledged Malaysia's 
self-interest in eliminating a breeding ground and sanctuary 
for extremists who could also threaten Malaysian territory. 
Othman reiterated that Malaysia's role was as a "facilitator, 
not a mediator," and that Malaysia remained "impartial" but 
not "neutral" as to the outcome.  Othman provided a positive 
overview of the process so far, comparing it very favorably 
to the 1996 accord, which ultimately failed.  He described 
MILF leaders as more realistic in their approach compared 
with earlier negotiations.  For example, the MILF accepted 
that they could not reclaim areas of recent non-Muslim 
settlement.  Importantly, the MILF for all practical purposes 
had given up its claims for independence. 
 
¶3.  (S) Othman acknowledged that the negotiations had 
proceeded more slowly than originally forecast.  However, he 
believed that the parties should reach a written interim 
agreement or memorandum of understanding sometime after the 
fasting month of Ramadan and before the Christmas season 
(late October to mid December).  The memorandum would pin 
down the important areas of agreement to date.  Othman stated 
that the signing of a "comprehensive compact" should be 
possible within the first half of 2007.  The process had not 
hit a lull and activities continued.  Most recently, on the 
margins of the August 3 OIC summit, Malaysia facilitated a 
meeting between a MILF delegation and a senior Organization 
of the Islamic Conference (OIC) senior official intended to 
seek OIC approval of the negotiations. 
 
¶4.  (S) Othman described the delineation of Muslim-majority 
areas and the Moro ancestral domain as the major remaining 
challenge.  The GRP and MILF thus far had agreed on some 630 
villages, but the MILF claimed an additional 1,200 villages 
as properly included in the Moro domain.  Othman stated that 
the GRP and MILF already had agreed to conduct a joint survey 
of the villages in dispute.  The need to devise a settlement 
map that resulted de facto in territorial contiguity for the 
eventual Moro-administered area constituted another issue 
that required a solution, as thus far the prospective map was 
a patchwork of Muslim and non-Muslim enclaves. 
 
¶5.  (S) The ability of President Macapagal Arroyo to sell the 
final package, including concessions to the MILF, to 
stakeholders in Manila represented another major hurdle, 
Othman commented.  He questioned whether GMA's current 
political weakness would allow her to win sufficient Senate 
backing for ratification of the accord.  Othman noted other 
factors of importance for the final agreement.  The 
Philippines armed forces should continue to exercise 
restraint and avoid a return to the aggressive and disruptive 
attacks launched under General Reyes.  A successful 
constitutional reform effort in Manila would allow the future 
Moro entity to fall neatly under an emerging federalism.  The 
MILF commanders and ulamas would need to buy into the accord 
 
KUALA LUMP 00001525  002 OF 002 
 
 
in order to avoid the emergence of a new insurgency. 
 
¶6.  (S) Othman claimed the MILF had already largely 
neutralized Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) terrorists, with only three 
JI-linked persons remaining in MILF areas.  These three had 
married into the local society.  Malaysian persuasion had 
played the key role in MILF's expulsion of JI members. 
Malaysia also had encouraged the MILF to take action against 
the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), but the MILF had been reluctant 
to open a "second front." 
 
¶7.  (S) The Malaysian peace facilitator encouraged the U.S. 
to take on a greater role in support of the negotiations. 
Specifically, he urged U.S. assistance for capacity building 
for MILF leaders so that they would be better able to govern 
and manage areas under their control.  He argued that the 
MNLF accord had failed in large part because the MNLF leaders 
had been unprepared to assume peace-time leadership roles; he 
wanted to train MILF leaders now, before the settlement, to 
prevent this from happening again.  As a starting point, he 
recommended U.S. funding for the Bangsamoro leadership and 
management center in Cotabato City.  Malaysia was considering 
a modest financial contribution.  On the diplomatic front, 
Othman foresaw a need for U.S. pressure on GMA to conclude 
and accept the "comprehensive compact" that necessarily 
included some concessions to the MILF.  While acknowledging 
the good intentions of the U.S. Institute of Peace in seeking 
to support the negotiations, he implied a preference that the 
Department take a more direct role.  More broadly, Othman 
strongly disagreed with the inclusion of any NGOs in the 
negotiations, including those who claimed to represent 
stakeholders from the 1996 process. 
 
¶8.  (S) Comment:  Othman portrayed a peace process that 
remained on track, but would require more time than initially 
envisioned.  His comments indicated that Malaysia intends to 
remain positively engaged as the facilitator for the talks 
and would welcome some further U.S. involvement, at least in 
the form of MILF capacity building and future diplomatic 
pressure on Manila.  We defer to Embassy Manila as to the 
validity of Othman's observations of the GRP/MILF talks and 
the U.S. role. 
LAFLEUR