VZCZCXRO7182
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL
DE RUEHKUK #0148/01 2340909
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 220909Z AUG 06
FM REO KIRKUK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0729
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0691
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHKUK/REO KIRKUK 0757

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KIRKUK 000148 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
BAGHDAD FOR POL, POLMIL, NCT, IRMO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  8/22/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR PINS PNAT PREF PREL PTER IZ TU
IR, KDEM 
SUBJECT: (C) KRG INTERIOR MINISTER ON SECURITY CONCERNS, RELATIONS 
WITH BAGHDAD 
 
REF: BAGHDAD 00000358; KIRKUK 00000134, 135, 136, 143, 144, 147 
 
KIRKUK 00000148  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Jim Bigus, PRT Leader, POL, Department of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
¶1.      (C) INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY:  Minister of Interior (MOI) 
for the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), Karim Sinjari, said 
on August 10 that nearly non-existent liaison relations with the 
MOI in Baghdad would have an impact on security in the Kurdistan 
region and throughout Iraq.  He said a meeting with all the 
heads of security from the KRG, the federal MOI, and Coalition 
Forces was necessary to discuss urgently needed security 
reforms.  The merger of the two KRG security forces was a 
complicated procedure and would not occur for more than a year; 
the merger of the separate KRG Asayish and intelligence services 
would take even longer.  The KRG leadership was under great 
pressure from the Kurdish public to implement Article 140 on 
time, making a delay of the referendum on Kirkuk impossible.  At 
stake was Kurdish confidence in the central government and 
federal constitution.  KRG security forces continued to monitor 
Islamic parties in the Kurdistan region because they provided 
the breeding ground for future terrorists.  Taking action 
against the PKK was difficult since they were hiding in the 
mountains; only a general amnesty would solve the PKK problem. 
END INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY. 
 
(C) NEED FOR COORDINATION BETWEEN FEDERAL, KRG MOI 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶2. (C) KRG Minister of Interior, Karim Sinjari, told IPAO on 
August 10, 2006, that there was almost no coordination between 
the KRG and Baghdad MOIs, and that this relationship must be 
improved to prevent security from deteriorating in the Kurdistan 
region and throughout Iraq.  He said that each of the five or 
six past ministers had visited his office, but that adequate 
relations were not established on a continuing basis.  He said 
that the KRG had very good cooperation with the last MOI on 
passport and immigration issues but that the new MOI had not yet 
visited the KRG office and had re-imposed "Saddam-style" 
regulations.  As an example, Sinjari said the new MOI had 
limited passport issuance locations to Baghdad, Mosul, and 
Basrah.  Sinjari successfully argued for an extension of 
passport services to Erbil on the grounds that the security 
situation made travel to the other locations difficult. 
However, Sinjari wanted to expand passport offices to all of the 
provinces and sent liaison representatives to Baghdad on three 
separate occasions to discuss this proposal without success. 
 
(C) CALL FOR REFORMS AND A MEETING OF SECURITY HEADS 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶3.  (C) Sinjari said he was trying to organize a conference with 
federal MOI and Coalition security experts to discuss a 
three-year plan to address urgently needed security issues.  The 
top priority he claimed was creating a national database for ID 
cards, vehicle plates, and drivers' licenses, a system that had 
been delayed now for three years and must be started 
immediately.  Sinjari added the Kurdistan region had a database 
to conduct a required security background check for those who 
entered on a visa and wanted to remain in Kurdistan; this was 
not the case for the rest of Iraq.  He would like to establish a 
national identification card or assign social security numbers, 
and to authorize each of the governorates to issue passports to 
assist in setting up this national database. 
 
(C) KRG MOI MERGERS DELAYED FOR YEAR OR MORE 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) Sinjari claimed that while simpler ministries, such as 
Agriculture, had encountered few problems and had merged 
successfully, the KDP and PUK Interior Ministries were far more 
complex and the two separate KRG security forces likely would 
have to wait for a year or more to merge completely (See para. 
10).  He said the MOI was "working its way up" and had started 
by merging the local police forces, but that even this first 
step could take up to a year.  Merging the Asayish and 
intelligence services, he added, would take even more time. 
Movement of personnel between stations and fluctuating security 
requirements presented the greatest challenges.  He said the MOI 
had established committees to move the merger forward and that 
these were due to meet again on August 20, 2006, to discuss the 
next steps in the process. 
 
(C) SECURITY PROBLEMS LIMITED TO MIXED AREAS ON KRG BORDER 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
¶5.   (C) Only those areas in the Kurdistan region with mixed 
 
KIRKUK 00000148  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
ethnic groups along the KRG borders experienced security 
problems, according to Sinjari.  He said those Iraqi Police (IP) 
forces that were predominately Kurdish, such as in Dibis in 
northern Kirkuk Province, had few security incidents.  He said 
IP forces with a large Arab presence had been infiltrated with 
insurgents and former Ba'thists.  Sinjari claimed that all IP in 
these border areas, which would include those regions to be 
covered in the upcoming referendum, were hired and paid by the 
central government, not the KRG. 
 
(C) KRG LEADERS UNDER PRESSURE, NO DELAY FOR ARTICLE 140 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶6. (C) Sinjari said the KNA would not agree to postponement of 
the referendum on Kirkuk's final status because Kurdish leaders 
were under pressure from the Kurdish public to push Article 140 
forward according to the timeline in the constitution.  Citing a 
public survey from last December in which a majority of the 
Kurdish people voted for independence, Sinjari said the leaders 
were consumed with convincing the general public that 
participation in a federal Iraq was in the Kurds' best interest. 
 (Note:  An ad hoc survey was held to coincide with the general 
and provincial elections in December, 2005, in which about 98 
percent of the Kurdish voting public allegedly chose 
"independence" from two options, the other being to remain part 
of Iraq.  Anecdotal reporting would indicate the KDP and PUK had 
a role in sponsoring the survey and have since cited the poll at 
various points to gain political leverage during negotiations. 
End note.) Sinjari claimed that KRG leaders had no problem with 
Kirkuk having a "special status" but that the people of Kirkuk 
alone, not the entire nation, must decide this for themselves 
and only after normalization was complete.  He asserted that 
normalization would take care of the security situation in 
Kirkuk, since those who came to the area under Saddam's 
"Arabization" program were supporting the insurgents and would 
leave as part of the normalization procedure. 
 
(C) ISLAMIC PARTIES "BREEDING GROUND" FOR TERRORISTS 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶7. (C) The KRG MOI continued to monitor Islamic parties closely, 
Sinjari claimed, in particular the Kurdistan Islamic Union, the 
Kurdistan Islamic Gathering, and the Kurdistan Islamic Movement. 
 He said these political groups previously received funding from 
foreign donors in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere and had used these 
funds to educate and indoctrinate youths, but that the KRG 
gradually had halted these funds (Reftel. Kirkuk 00000143, 144). 
 According to Sinjari, most of the terrorist suspects in the 
Kurdistan region confessed to having been former members of 
these political parties but had since joined terrorist groups, 
such as Ansar al-Islam (AI).  Sinjari claimed 150 members of 
these Islamic political groups had been expelled from the 
Kurdistan region and currently worked with AI in Mosul.  He said 
these political parties were very active in mosques and 
universities, where they promised help for unemployed Kurds and 
students worried about their future.  The Islamic political 
groups targeted students in universities by distributing free 
school supplies and headscarves, while the KRG bore the bulk of 
educational expenses with no appreciation from the students or 
general public.  He said although Islamic parties had been more 
successful than expected in the last provincial elections and 
were growing in popularity, they were not large enough to 
present a political challenge at this time. 
 
(C) ONLY GENERAL AMNESTY WILL SOLVE PKK PROBLEM 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶8. (C)  The KRG had no plans to remove the Kurdistan Workers' 
Party (PKK, formerly KGK/Kongra Gel) members from the Iraqi 
Kurdistan region, Sinjari claimed, since it was difficult to 
remove them from their mountain locations.  He claimed the Erbil 
office of the Kurdistan Democratic Solution Party, a PKK front 
party, was closed a month ago and did not present any problems 
currently (Reftel. Kirkuk 00000134).  He said that a political 
solution was necessary to solve the PKK problem and that only 
with a general amnesty from Turkey would the approximately 
12,000 Kurdish Internally Displaced Persons residing in Makhmour 
refugee camps return to Turkey.  (Note:  The Makhmour camps 
reportedly have been recruiting grounds for the PKK. (Reftel. 
Baghdad 00000358.)  End note.)  He claimed 70 to 80 percent of 
PKK members would come down from the mountains and return to 
Turkey, if a general amnesty were offered. 
 
(C) BIOGRAPHHIC NOTES 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C)  Karim Sinjari:  Born in Sinjar, 1950; MOI in the unified 
cabinet since May 7, 2006; previous MOI for KRG-Erbil 
 
KIRKUK 00000148  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
administration from 2001 to 2006; received degree in Law from 
Baghdad University in 1971; was a practicing lawyer before 
becoming a senior KDP Politburo member. 
 
(U) COMMENT 
----------- 
 
¶10. (C) Sinjari's claims about the extended merger timeline for 
KRG security forces contradicts reports from a separate meeting 
with the KRG Minster of Peshmerga, who estimated Peshmerga would 
be merged within six months (Reftel. Kirkuk 00000147).    From 
separate meetings with the heads of KDP and PUK  Asayish in 
Kirkuk, post believes Sinjari's estimates to be more accurate, 
since there are many obstacles that will need to be overcome 
before any real merger can be accomplished, perhaps most 
important being the building of mutual trust between the 
leadership of the two security forces.  It is worth noting that 
post was not able to meet the Asayish heads simultaneously and 
had to schedule separate meetings due to "political 
sensitivities" between the two leaders.  (Reftel. Kirkuk 
00000135, 136.) 
JBIGUS