VZCZCXRO7163
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL
DE RUEHKUK #0147/01 2340900
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 220900Z AUG 06
FM REO KIRKUK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0727
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0689
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHKUK/REO KIRKUK 0755

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KIRKUK 000147 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
BAGHDAD FOR POL, POLMIL, NCT, IRMO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  8/22/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR PINS PNAT PREF PTER IZ TU KDEM
IR 
SUBJECT: (C) KRG MINISTER FOR PESHMERGA AFFAIRS ON MERGER, SECURITY, 
FOREIGN INFLUENCES 
 
REF: KIRKUK 00000134; KIRKUK 00000136 
 
KIRKUK 00000147  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Jim Bigus, PRT Leader, POL, Department of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
¶1.      (C) INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY:  Kurdistan Regional 
Government (KRG) Minister for Peshmerga Affairs, Omar Osman 
Ibrahim, said on August 7 the KDP and PUK were ready to merge 
their Peshmerga forces within six months (Septel.).  Ibrahim 
said Peshmerga were located below the 'Green Line' anywhere KDP 
or PUK offices were based.  No independent Peshmerga action 
would be taken against the PKK unless they directly attacked 
Peshmerga or Baghdad commanded such action.  Ibrahim suggested 
dividing Kirkuk into territories with each falling under the 
control of police embedded with intelligence officers.  Iraqi 
Army (IA) protected the KRG border areas so any cross-border 
attack from Turkey or Iran would encounter federal forces first. 
However, local Kurds, probably former Peshmerga, supplied the 
bulk of these forces.  END INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY. 
 
(C) KDP, PUK READY TO MERGE PESHMERGA 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) KRG Minister for Peshmerga Affairs, Omar Osman Ibrahim, 
told IPAO on August 7 that both of the two main Kurdish parties 
were ready to merger their Peshmerga forces and that these would 
be unified within six months (Septel.).  He said that the merger 
of the two KRG Erbil and Sulaymaniyah administrations last March 
had changed the agenda of Peshmerga leaders, with defense of the 
Kurdistan region, as well as Kurdish and Iraqi unity, being the 
driving factors.  Ibrahim said the sectarian divisions in the 
rest of Iraq were only making the two Peshmerga forces more 
determined not to repeat the mistakes of the past.  (Note: 
Between 1994 and 1996, a civil war broke out between KDP and PUK 
Peshmerga forces.  End note.)  Ibrahim claimed formal 
commissions had been formed to merge the two forces but had not 
met to date, and declined to supply specific statistics on 
Peshmerga numbers because he "had not revealed these to the PUK 
leaders yet" (Ref. Para. 10). He said the goal of the Peshmerga 
Ministry was to match the pay scales, ranking system, and order 
of the federal government security forces. 
 
(C) PESHMERGA PRESENT BELOW THE 'GREEN LINE' 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶3.  (C) Ibrahim said Peshmerga forces were protecting oil 
pipelines and roads into Mosul and Kirkuk.  In some cases, he 
claimed, such as in Tel Afar, Peshmerga have been merged with IA 
but remain partially controlled by the KRG.  He said that, in 
the mixed Kurdish areas currently outside KRG administrative 
boundaries, "any place with a KDP or PUK office received 
Peshmerga protection" (Ref. Para. 8-10).  (Note:  Ibrahim kept 
referring to the IA as "New Iraqi Army" which had formerly been 
"Iraqi National Guard" forces.  Post is working to obtain the 
exact number and locations of all KDP and PUK offices in areas 
outside the KRG boundaries.  End note.) 
 
(C) NO PESHMERGA ACTION AGAINST PKK WITHOUT BAGHDAD ORDER 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
¶4.  (C) Ibrahim claimed the KRG considered the Peshmerga an 
integral part of Iraq's security forces and would only take 
action against the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK, formerly 
Kongra Gel/KGK) independently if the PKK attacked Kurdish forces 
directly or if Baghdad ordered the Peshmerga to take action 
against the PKK.  Ibrahim said normal Kurds did not like the PKK 
and would support action against this group within the Iraqi 
Kurdish region.  He cautioned, however, that the PKK also had 
bases and offices in Iran, and that simply chasing PKK members 
currently located in Iraq out of KRG areas would only multiply 
the threat by creating new camps and branch organizations.  He 
claimed Turkey and Iran were coordinating their attacks against 
alleged PKK camps in the KRG areas in an attempt to intimidate 
the Kurds of Iraq, and added the courts had already closed a 
PKK-affiliated office in Erbil and that this was under 
investigation.  (Note:  The office operated under the control of 
the Kurdistan Democratic Solution Party, an alleged PKK front 
party (Ref. Kirkuk 00000134). Turkish government officials in 
Baghdad and Ankara, however, claim that none of the PKK front 
party offices in Iraq have been closed.  Post is still trying to 
clarify this matter.  End note.) 
 
(C) SOLVING THE "KIRKUK PROBLEM" 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶5.   (C) Ibrahim proposed three solutions to the deteriorating 
security in Kirkuk.  He said Kirkuk should follow the Erbil 
 
KIRKUK 00000147  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
model by building a security trench around the city.  (Note: 
The KDP Asayish head also recommended this solution to Post on 
July 25, 2006. (Ref. Kirkuk 00000136.)  End note.)  Second, he 
claimed Kirkuk should be divided into territories with each part 
falling under the control of police with embedded intelligence 
officers.  These forces should be posted along all access roads 
into the city to stop and interrogate people routinely. 
Currently, he said, security forces only performed random spot 
checks.  Ibrahim said Peshmerga security check-points along 
Mosul, Kirkuk, and Salah ad-Din roads had been very successful 
in using this method.  Finally, he claimed imposing curfews was 
critical to improving security. 
 
(C) CURRENT ROLE OF FEDERAL FORCES IN KRG AREAS 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶6. (C) Ibrahim said currently IA patrolled border areas and 
gates in the Kurdistan region, and received regular supplies 
from the central government.  He claimed Peshmerga leaders 
supported the presence of federal forces in the border areas, 
since a cross-border attack from Turkey or Iran would be 
interpreted by the international community and Coalition forces 
as a violation of Iraq's sovereignty.  Ibrahim said that, as 
with the Shia in Basra or Sunnis in other regions of Iraq, the 
local population, in this case Kurds mostly, supplied the bulk 
of IA staffing in these border areas and "coordinated with the 
Peshmerga if requested." 
 
(C) BIOGRAPHIC NOTES 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Omar Osman Ibrahim (aka Kak Zaim Ali):  Current KRG 
Minister of Peshmerga Affairs; from Erbil; joined the Peshmerga 
in 1979 and went on to become a Kurdish war hero; elected to the 
KDP Central Committee and Politburo in 1989; currently serves as 
the Politburo's Chief of Military Affairs. 
 
(C) NOTES ON SPECIFIC PESHMERGA LOCATIONS BEYOND KRG BORDER 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Based on Ibrahim's comment regarding Peshmerga protection 
for KDP and PUK offices, post estimates Peshmerga would be 
located in several office centers for each party currently 
located outside KRG boundaries.  Post is working to obtain 
specific information on current locations for PUK offices 
outside the KRG. 
 
¶9.  (C) Post received information that the KDP had central 
offices ("Branches") in the following locations outside current 
KRG boundaries:  Mosul, 14th Branch, Office Head: Khasru 
Abdullah Goran; Khanaqin-Diyala, 15th Branch, Office Head: 
Salahaddin Ibrahim; Shaykhan-Mosul, 20th Branch, Office Head: 
Fariq Fayaq; Kirkuk, 3rd Branch, Office Head:  Najat Hassan; 
Baghdad, 5th Branch, Office Head: Mohmammed Amin Dalo. 
 
(U) COMMENT 
----------- 
 
¶10. (C) Ibrahim's reticence to supply any specifics on Peshmerga 
numbers or logistics because his office had not yet told the PUK 
indicates communication between the parties and real desire to 
merge the two Peshmerga administrations is still not what KDP 
and PUK ministry leaders claim, most notably on security issues, 
and that distrust still remains between the two parties which 
needs to be overcome before any real progress on the merger can 
be made.  Ibrahim's thinly disguised reference to IA 
coordinating "if requested" with the Peshmerga probably 
indicates who really controls the mostly Kurdish forces along 
the KRG's borders, namely the Peshmerga leaders. 
JBIGUS