VZCZCXRO8526
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL
DE RUEHKUK #0136/01 2141727
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 021727Z AUG 06
FM REO KIRKUK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0702
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0664
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHKUK/REO KIRKUK 0730

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KIRKUK 000136 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
BAGHDAD FOR POL, POLMIL, NCT, IRMO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  8/2/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR PINS PNAT PREF PREL PTER KDEM IZ
TU 
SUBJECT: (C) KDP KIRKUK ASAYISH HEAD ON SECURITY, MERGER WITH PUK, 
KRG ACTION AGAINST PKK 
 
REF: KIRKUK 00000135 
 
KIRKUK 00000136  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Jim Bigus, PRT Leader, POL, Department of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
¶1.      (C) INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY:  KDP Kirkuk Asayish head, 
Hallo Najat Hamza, told IPAOs on July 25 that the terrorists 
were getting stronger and were targeting security forces in 
Kirkuk.  Hamza said the open borders of Kirkuk and guards 
cooperating with the terrorists at checkpoints were primarily to 
blame.  Hamza said the current police chief and poor quality of 
Iraqi Police (IP) training were also responsible for the 
deteriorating security situation.  He said there were more 
foreign fighters among the terrorists than previously.  Hamza 
offered suggestions for improving security, including 
privatization of the security forces in Kirkuk.  He was not 
optimistic about merging PUK and KDP Asayish within the coming 
year.  KDP Asayish were present in all of the liberated, mixed 
Kurdish areas currently outside the Kurdistan Regional 
Government (KRG) borders from Kirkuk to Iran, he claimed.  Hamza 
said Kurdish public reaction to KRG taking action against the 
PKK would be negative.  END INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY. 
 
(C) TERRORISTS GETTING STRONGER, TARGETING SECURITY FORCES 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
¶2. (C) KDP Kirkuk Asayish head, Hallo Najat Hamza, told IPAOs on 
July 25, that terrorist operations in Kirkuk had increased in 
the last two months.  He said the terrorists were targeting 
security forces successfully, which indicated the terrorists 
were getting stronger.  One of the main problems, according to 
Hamza, was the open borders surrounding Kirkuk, particularly in 
the southern areas, which provided ideal conditions for multiple 
smuggling routes.    He said Hewija had become a stronghold of 
terrorists because it shared its borders with Mosul and Tikrit. 
Terrorists placed bombs in cars outside Kirkuk in one of the 
many villages from which they operated; the cars were then 
brought into the city through checkpoints around Kirkuk where, 
Hamza claimed, the guards did not cooperate with the Asayish 
security forces.  He said the Asayish had recently captured a 
person from Tunisia who was leading a cell in Hewija and 
confessed to having extensive financial support and cell 
branches throughout the area.  Hamza said requests for increased 
Coalition presence in the Hewija area to hinder terrorist 
movement have been successful but sometimes had an adverse 
impact on Asayish operations.  For example, he said the 
Coalition Forces recently used a helicopter to monitor area 
roads, alerting the terrorists into taking a different route and 
thus avoiding the roadblock traps the Asayish had set to capture 
them and get more information. 
 
(C) POLICE CHIEF'S PERFORMACE RATED "UNDER ZERO" 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
¶3.  (C) Hamza said that he rated the performance of current 
Chief of Police in Kirkuk, General Sherko, as "under zero" and 
that some called him "grandfather Sherko," a reference to his 
age and prevailing sentiment that it was time for him to retire. 
 He said Sherko was first and foremost responsible for the poor 
security situation in Kirkuk.  Hamza claimed the regular police 
do not respect Sherko's orders and that he did not enjoy good 
formal, public relations with high profile leaders or important 
ethnic communities.  He said Sherko had good "informal" 
relations with important groups and their leaders, but this was 
not enough to command wide respect.  Hamza said it was not 
important who replaced Sherko, as long as he was qualified and 
could work effectively to improve security.  (Note:  PUK Asayish 
head, Halkawt Abdullah Aziz, informed post on July 24 that KDP 
representatives said they would support any PUK choice for 
Sherko's replacement.  (Ref. Kirkuk 000135.)  End note.)  Hamza 
said in connection with this statement that currently he enjoys 
good relations with Samir Nazib and Brigadier Zurhan. 
 
(C) MORE FOREIGN FIGHTERS 
------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (C) Hamza said the number of foreign fighters responsible 
for terrorist attacks in Kirkuk had been increasing this year 
and blamed this on neighboring countries working to hinder the 
implementation of Article 140 and normalization of Kirkuk.  He 
claimed there was local support for the terrorists and that an 
Arab Asayish employee in the IA had been approached and told to 
join the terrorists or be killed.  Hamza added that terrorists 
recently had rented a very expensive house in Kirkuk, a sign 
they have affluent and influential connections in the city. 
Hamza dismissed the fact that apparently none of the 
approximately 150 suspects rounded up during recent raids in 
Hewija were foreigners; he said they knew how to hide themselves 
 
KIRKUK 00000136  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
to evade capture.  (Note:  At the request of local Sunni tribal 
shaykhs, Coalition Forces on July 24 conducted a series of raids 
against suspected terrorist cells in Hewija.  End note.) 
 
(C) POOR IP TRAINING AND DISCIPLINE 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Hamza said inadequate training and discipline were 
having an impact on IP capabilities to improve security.  He 
said a review of video from a recent IP police raid on the 
residence where a group of terrorists were killed demonstrated 
it was a random operation with no clear plan and that the police 
attack was clearly uncoordinated.  Hamza added IP were often 
seen sleeping by the side of the road or not wearing their vests 
and that there was a clear lack of discipline to the force in 
general.  The IP has asserted they were conducting night patrols 
all over Kirkuk city, but Hamza claimed he had evidence the IP 
stayed away from the city center and only patrolled the northern 
- and safer - part of the city. 
 
(C) IMPROVING SECURITY - DIG A TRENCH, INCREASE COURT STAFF 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) Hamza suggested Kirkuk follow Erbil's model, where the 
security services had dug a trench around the city's perimeter 
and posted guards every 1-1.5 kilometers.  He said this was very 
effective in Erbil and could be replicated in Kirkuk.  Also, 
restructuring the IP was necessary to strengthen security, 
especially some battalions in the Arab areas where the police 
often fought along side the terrorists against Asayish.  Hamza 
said the courts were ineffective: lack of evidence and trial 
judges not adhering to the full legal process were the two main 
reasons terrorist suspects were released, according to Hamza. 
In addition, those terrorists who did make it through the court 
system and were convicted went free because staff shortages and 
overcrowding in the only prison facility meant the court was 
unable to hold terrorists for even 24 hours.  He said he favored 
the creation of a special office to investigate and try 
terrorists. 
 
(C) LIAISON RELATIONS WITH ISF AND COALITION 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶7.      (C) The Asayish in Kirkuk were not involved at checkpoints 
and did not arrest or participate in arrests, Hamza claimed.  He 
said on occasion they participated in joint operations with the 
Iraqi Army (IA) or IP when asked.  Hamza said that 60 percent of 
KDP Asayish officers assisted the Coalition by collecting 
information and compiling files on suspects, while the other 40 
percent worked with the IA and IP at the municipal and 
provincial level.  (Note:  These claims are questionable as he 
also often referred to arrests and questioning that had been 
conducted independently. End note.) 
 
(C) KDP-PUK ASAYISH MERGER - "THERE'S ALWAYS 2007" 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶8.      (C) Hamza claimed there was no rush locally to merge the 
KDP and PUK Asayish organizations and that there was no specific 
timeline for the merger from the KRG Ministry of Interior.  He 
said he was about to meet with PUK counterparts to discuss this 
issue for the first time and that most of the pressure to merge 
the two security services came from Erbil.  Hamza added that, 
although the two Asayish services shared information, their 
efforts had been uncoordinated and relations with the PUK had 
not been "on a high level" to this point.  Hamza claimed there 
were plans to coordinate with PUK Asayish formally in the 
future, and said that he did not anticipate a problem if the 
referendum and annexation of Kirkuk occurred before the merger 
of the security services was complete.  He noted that the KRG 
administration required that the two groups merge by the end of 
¶2006.  When questioned if this was realistic he sounded 
doubtful, stating that the separate KDP and PUK Asayish leaders 
would simply continue to have "meetings and more meetings" to 
discuss the merger.  If it wasn't completed by the end of the 
year, he shrugged, there was always 2007. 
 
(U) KDP ASAYISH COMPOSITION, PRESENCE BELOW 'GREEN LINE' 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶9.      (C) All of the Asayish officers in the "liberated Kurdish 
areas" reported to him in Kirkuk, Hamza said.  Around 2,000 
Asayish officers came under his authority, he said, and were 
located in the "mixed" Kurdish districts and sub-districts from 
Kirkuk to Iran; 700 were based in Kirkuk, and of these 10 were 
Arabs.  He said dividing the Asayish into branches headed by 
lieutenants helped to manage such an expansive organization, but 
effective monitoring was sometimes difficult. 
 
KIRKUK 00000136  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
 
(C) BAGHDAD'S SECTARIAN PROBLEMS THREATEN KIRKUK 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶10.     (C) Hamza claimed the Sunni-Shia strife in Baghdad was 
about to affect Kirkuk.  Although the Shia numbers were small in 
and around Kirkuk, Hamza said they were able to cause increasing 
problems since they belonged to militias who did not have 
uniforms.  Without uniforms these militants were difficult to 
capture because, as soon as they disarmed themselves, they could 
blend into a civilian crowd.  He claimed the Kirkuk 
sub-districts of Daquq and Taza already had Shia militias. 
 
(C) KURDISH PUBLIC REACTION TO KRG ACTION AGAINST THE PKK 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
¶11.     (C) Hamza said that, according to his information, the 
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) had no plans to take action 
against the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK, formerly Kongra 
Gel/KGK) but that the Asayish were part of the KRG and would 
honor its decision if the KRG were to call for such action.  He 
claimed that the Kurdish public response to KRG action against 
the PKK would be negative. Hamza said a media campaign would be 
necessary first if the KRG planned to expel the PKK from 
Kurdistan in order to prepare the Kurdish public.  He claimed 
Turkey did not want to solve the PKK issue on the grounds that 
it served as justification for the Turkish military to meddle in 
Kurdistan's internal affairs. 
 
(C) BIOGRAPHIC NOTES 
-------------------- 
 
¶12.     (C) Hallo Najat Hamza:  Current head of Kirkuk KDP 
Asayish; born in 1974 in a mountain area after the Iraqi regime 
expelled his family from their village; his father was a strong 
supporter of Mustafa Barzani and Hamza's family fled to Iran 
after the 1975 Algiers agreement between Tehran and Baghdad that 
ended Iranian military support for the Iraqi Kurds; his family 
returned from Iran in 1976 after the KDP reorganized its forces; 
he studied for a period of time in Iran; received a diploma in 
Military Science from Zhako Military Academy; liaison officer 
between KDP Peshmerga and Coalition forces during Operation 
Iraqi Freedom (OIF); speaks some English, which he learned while 
working with the Central Intelligence Agency prior to OIF; 
source told post he believed his age, young by Kurdish 
leadership standards, was not a detriment because it enabled him 
to relate to the concerns of Kurdish youth. 
 
(U) COMMENT 
----------- 
 
¶13.  (C) IPAOs noted that Hamza and the PUK Asayish head (Ref. 
Kirkuk 000135) cited cases in which Kurdish security forces 
arrested, detained, and questioned suspects where no other Iraqi 
security services apparently were involved, indicating that 
Asayish in some cases were operating extra legally.  The 
indifference of the two Asayish heads to merging their services 
forebodes conflict at the lower tiers of KDP and PUK security 
forces where local leaders from each party have much at stake, 
especially in Kirkuk and the disputed territories outside the 
official KRG boundaries.  Current levels of cooperation between 
the two services would indicate any real Asayish merger is 
unlikely prior to the referendum on Kirkuk's final status, set 
to occur no later than the end of December, 2007. 
JBIGUS