VZCZCXRO3800
OO RUEHDBU RUEHIK RUEHYG
DE RUEHBUL #3851/01 2411017
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 291017Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2148
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHMCSUU/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2779
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2928
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 6257
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1606

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 003851 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS, SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR SCA/FO (DAS GASTRIGHT), SCA/A, S/CRS, SCA/PB, 
S/CT, EUR/RPM 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID A-AA/ANE MARK WARD, CDHA/DG, NSC 
FOR AHARRIMAN 
OSD FOR BREZINSKI 
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV EAID ETRN ELTN SNAR ASEC AF
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE REQUEST FOR JAPANESE RING ROAD 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary and Action Request: Representatives of 
Embassy Economic Section, CFC-A, USAID/Afghanistan, and U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers Afghanistan Engineering District 
(AED) have held several recent meetings with the Japanese 
Embassy to discuss the status of suspended work on their 114- 
kilometer section of the ring road.  The Japanese report 
that work is about to resume on Phase A of this stretch; due 
to security-related cost overruns, however, they are seeking 
additional funding to allow completion of Phase B.  Embassy 
requests that Washington demarche the GOJ at a high level to 
ensure adequate and timely funding to complete the project. 
The Japanese stressed that they have legal constraints 
against contracting with a foreign military to perform the 
work.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (U)    Representatives of Embassy Economic Section, CFC- 
A, USAID/Afghanistan, and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
Afghanistan Engineering District (AED) have held several 
recent meetings with the Japanese Embassy to discuss the 
status of suspended work on the 114-kilometer section of the 
ring road that Japan is funding from KH Sec 2 - KH Sec 116. 
This stretch is the only section of the ring road between 
Kabul and Herat that has experienced serious delays; the 
section funded by Saudi Arabia will be completed this year. 
[Background: the company previously contracted by Japan to 
build this road abandoned work - without having actually 
improved any part of the road - for security reasons in 
April 2005.  The road therefore remains in extremely poor 
condition, passable only with difficulty and very slow 
travel times.] 
 
¶3. (SBU) CFC-A, USAID, and AED met Sunday August 20 with the 
Japanese DCM and Economic Cooperation Officer.  The Japanese 
thanked us for clarifying a previous offer of USG support 
and requested detailed information on what AED and USAID 
could do "informally."  AED gave the Japanese DCM a sheet of 
suggested advisory technical services that AED could supply 
on a pro bono basis.  These included: 
 
a)  Advice and consultation (no cost) to the Government of 
Japan during the different stages of the project. 
 
b)  Prior to issuing a contract tender, AED could advise on 
the standard and special contract stipulations that are 
applicable to construction in the region. 
 
c)  During tendering of the contract, AED is available to 
provide advice regarding procurement methods in Afghanistan 
and specifically in the region of the Ring Road. 
 
d)  During evaluation and negotiations, AED could provide 
unit cost information regarding materials, supplies, and 
labor. 
 
e)  After contract award, AED could offer advice on the 
initial coordination that should occur with the local 
villages, local sub-contractors, local Afghan Police and 
Army, and with the regional U.S., Coalition and ISAF forces. 
 
AED is preparing a letter for signature by Commanding 
General Eikenberry to cover a white paper that contains more 
detailed information to assist the Japanese in defining 
contract terms that will expedite the process and enable 
road work to get underway soonest. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The group then discussed the status of Japan's 
effort to find a new contractor for this roadwork.  Through 
a competitive procurement, Japan has selected an Indian firm 
(one with which USAID has worked successfully) to do as much 
of the 114 kilometers as possible.  Unfortunately, security 
concerns have significantly increased the cost of this road 
from the original estimate of 62 million dollars.  For 
approximately this amount, the proposed contractor now 
 
KABUL 00003851  002 OF 002 
 
 
estimates that it can complete only half the length of the 
road.  Accordingly, the Japanese have divided their portion 
of the road into Phase A and Phase B.  Phase A covers 
approximately half the total number of kilometers and will 
include the portions of the road that are four-lane (those 
closest to Kandahar City).  They intend to proceed with 
Phase A now; indeed, they believe that bringing U.S. 
expertise to bear on the contracting for Phase A would 
actually slow them down.  Their best guess is that the 
contracting process will be complete by late September, and 
that roadwork will resume on Phase A, in October.  The 
Japanese Embassy has asked Tokyo to provide the remaining 
funds required to allow them to complete Phase B. 
 
¶5. (SBU) In a dinner hosted August 22 for the USAID Mission 
Director, Econ Counselor, and the head of USAID's 
Infrastructure Office, the Japanese DCM spoke frankly and 
colloquially about the need for U.S. support for his 
Embassy's request that Tokyo provide the additional funding 
needed to complete Phase B and to do this in a timely 
manner.  He did not provide a cost estimate, but Post 
assumes that it will be a lower cost than Phase A. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Comment: The Japanese here understand the urgency 
of completing the road.  They also know that, now that work 
has resumed on the Saudi-financed portion of the Ring Road 
(KH Sec 116 - Sec 231), they are the odd man out.  In Post's 
opinion, an appropriately high-level demarche to Tokyo might 
prove very helpful in convincing the Japanese Ministries of 
Foreign Affairs and Finance to support their Kabul Embassy's 
request for additional funding.  One point, however, emerged 
very clearly from the conversations described above: while 
the Japanese Embassy welcomes the offer of pro bono AED 
advisory assistance, they stressed that the U.S. military 
cannot be used to actually carry out the Japanese project. 
 
¶7. (U)  Action request:  Embassy recommends the suggested 
demarche to Tokyo be delivered at a high level and as soon 
as possible. 
 
NEUMANN