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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 016962 
 
SIPDIS 
 
C O R R E C T E D  C O P Y (PARA MARKINGS) 
 
SIPDIS 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/2015 
TAGS: PK PREL PGOV KTER PINR
SUBJECT: BALOCHISTAN (2): THE GRIEVANCES 
 
REF: A. ISLAMABAD 14349 
     ¶B. ISLAMABAD 16269 
     ¶C. ISLAMABAD 16944 
 
ISLAMABAD 00016962  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Peter W. Bodde, 
 Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary. While the Government of Pakistan (GOP) 
undertakes projects to develop Balochistan, in part to turn 
the province into a transit point linking Pakistan to western 
Afghanistan and the Central Asian states, it faces a 
distrustful and resentful provincial population. This 
wariness and antipathy extends beyond the handful of Baloch 
tribal leaders prone to insurrection. The province welcomes 
development, but is skeptical about who it will benefit. 
There is a widespread feeling that GOP action in Balochistan 
is geared toward benefiting Punjab and Sindh provinces, not 
Balochistan. This cable on the politics of Balochistan is the 
second in a series on the province--septel will look at the 
tribal uprising led by Nawab Bugti in the Dera Bugti and 
Kohlu districts. (Note: This cable was drafted prior to the 
reported death of Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti on August 26 (Ref 
C). End note.) End summary. 
 
¶2. (U) GOP-planned "mega projects"--such as the expansion of 
the port at Gwadar (Ref B)--have re-ignited Baloch 
nationalist anger toward Islamabad. Even provincial members 
of the Pakistan Muslim League (PML), which is the leading 
coalition partner in governments at both the national and 
provincial levels, are wary of the proposed development 
schemes. According to PML member Rahila Durrani, "We should 
get our share of the (natural) gas so that we don't need to 
ask the federal government for anything." Similarly, Maulvi 
Rehmatullah of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam, Fazlur Rehman 
Faction (JUI-F) said that locals should receive priority in 
hiring at these projects and receive an education that 
prepares them for those jobs. 
 
¶3. (U) According to nationalist leader and former provincial 
chief minister Akhtar Mengal, the Baloch are very skeptical 
that they will get anything out of oil and gas projects--such 
as the proposed Iran-Pakistan-India natural gas pipeline. He 
warned that such pipelines and other projects would not be 
secure until local people reaped the benefits of development. 
Nationalist Shahid Hassan Bugti of the Jamhoori Watan Party 
(JWP), said, the Baloch have "a lot of bitter experience" 
from the government's exploitation of the Sui gas fields, 
leading to the conclusion that there is "strong 
centralization and not much consulting" in government 
decisionmaking. 
 
------------------------ 
What do the Baloch Want? 
------------------------ 
 
¶4. (U) Quite simply, the Baloch want greater autonomy within 
Pakistan. Shahid Bugti, a son-in-law of insurgent leader 
Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti (Ref C), said the current struggle is 
for "our economic and political rights," not independence. 
Baloch nationalists accuse Punjab Province of treating 
Balochistan like a colony. Dr. Hayee Baloch, a nationalist 
political leader from the Makran Coast, told poloff that the 
Baloch feel like "third rate" citizens in their own province 
and have "zero" influence in the policymaking. 
 
¶5. (U)  The people of the province want "a fair share" of 
revenues generated by the mines and gas fields in the 
province. Shahid Bugti claimed that, in 1990, the GOP owed 
Balochistan 600 million rupees (USD 10 million at today's 
exchange rate) in back royalties from the Sui gas fields 
alone; today the figure stands at 1 billion rupees (USD 16.7 
million). 
 
¶6. (U) Balochistan residents criticize the federal government 
for the lack of educational institutions in the province that 
 
ISLAMABAD 00016962  002 OF 002 
 
 
could prepare people for the skilled jobs available in the 
current development projects. In August 2006, local political 
officials in Gwadar told the Ambassador (Ref B) that their 
district needs better schools, including a new technical high 
school or college, so that their children could compete for 
jobs in the port. 
 
¶7. (U) Residents hope that development benefits them, but 
there is a common fear among the people of 
Balochistan--Baloch and Pashtun alike--that the development 
projects will act as magnets for settlers from Punjab and 
Sindh, tipping the province's demographic balance. Baloch 
nationalists argue that settlers should not be allowed to 
vote until they had lived in the province for 15 years, and 
that there should be restrictions on outsiders buying land in 
Balochistan. Nationalists cite the experience of the Dera 
Bugti district which experienced an influx of outsiders who 
took jobs away from locals after natural gas was discovered 
in Sui in the 1950s. 
 
------------------------- 
Extra-judicial Detentions 
------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) A growing source of anger among the Baloch is the 
GOP's extra-judicial detention of political opponents. Many 
in the province suspect GOP security agencies such as 
Military Intelligence (MI), which overseas security 
operations in the province, and the Inter-Services 
Intelligence (ISI), of spiriting away political activists. In 
early August 2006, these disappearances became a focal point 
during a national parliamentary debate, with a rush of 
editorials entitled "Those Who Vanished" and "These 
Mysterious 'Disappearances.'" Shahzada Zulfiqar, 
correspondent for The Nation newspaper in Quetta, described 
these "extra-judicial abductions (as) multiplying hatred 
against the state and the army." 
 
----------------------------------------- 
India's Suspected Meddling in Balochistan 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (U) Islamabad has become increasingly agitated at India's 
growing influence in Afghanistan, and has hinted that New 
Delhi has a hand in Baloch unrest. Senior military officers 
are convinced that India has nine-to-twelve consulates along 
the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. (Note: In fact, India has an 
embassy and four consulates in Afghanistan. End note.) In a 
speech to the nation on July 20, President Musharraf said the 
Baloch were receiving weapons from "external sources." And on 
July 26, the State Minister for Information said publicly 
that the GOP has was evidence of foreign involvement in 
subversive activity in Balochistan, noting the proximity of 
Indian consulates in Zahedan, Iran, and Qandahar, Afghanistan. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶10. (C) The issue for Balochistan today is increased 
provincial autonomy to ensure that the province is the main 
beneficiary of development projects. For the GOP, which wants 
to develop the province as an anchor for regional trade, 
extending central government control and suppressing 
rebellious tribal militants is the first order of business. 
Fueling the calls for autonomy and control over Balochistan's 
mineral wealth, is a belief that the province would take in 
more than enough revenues from its gold and copper mines, its 
coal and natural gas fields to develop the province and 
provide for the native population. End comment. 
BODDE