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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0761
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHZJ/HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUCNISL/ISLAMIC COLLECTIVE
RUEHWH/WHA DIPL POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1570

2006-08-23 05:21:00	06GENEVA2030	US Mission Geneva	CONFIDENTIAL	06GENEVA1954|06STATE130904	VZCZCXRO8205\
PP RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHLH RUEHPW RUEHSR\
DE RUEHGV #2030/01 2350521\
ZNY CCCCC ZZH\
P 230521Z AUG 06\
FM USMISSION GENEVA\
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0761\
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE\
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE\
RUEHZJ/HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL COLLECTIVE\
RUCNISL/ISLAMIC COLLECTIVE\
RUEHWH/WHA DIPL POSTS COLLECTIVE\
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1570	C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 GENEVA 002030 \
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SIPDIS \
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SIPDIS \
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IO/FO,IO/RSH,DRL/FO, DRL/MLA, L/HRR \
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2016 \
TAGS: PHUM UNHRC PREL
SUBJECT: INSIDE THE HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL \
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REF: A. A. GENEVA 1954 B. STATE 130904 \
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     ¶B. C. STATE 130145 D. GENEVA 1675 \
     ¶C. E. GENEVA 1673 \
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GENEVA 00002030  001.2 OF 004 \
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Classified By: PolCouns Velia M. De Pirro. Reason: E.O. 12958 1.4 (d) \
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Introduction and Summary \
------------------------- \
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¶1. (C)  The newly established Human Rights Council (HRC) \
within the space of two months held an inaugural session \
(June 19-30) and two special sessions (July 5-6 and August \
11) both focused on condemning Israel.  As the U.S. \
Government debates whether or not to seek election to the \
Council next year, Mission Geneva hopes to share some \
insights and concerns that may aid the debate based on the \
HRC sessions to date.  This message will address the \
opportunities and challenges we see in the new Council.  It \
will also try to explain the internal dynamics of the \
regional groups from the Geneva perspective.  The mixed \
results of the HRC's inaugural session and the decidedly \
one-sided results of the two special sessions point to two \
distinct tendencies within the Council: one to seize the \
opportunity to redress the shortcomings of the Commission of \
Human Rights; the other to exploit the numerical superiority \
of G-77 and/or Islamic countries to press an agenda that \
gives precedence to economic, cultural and social rights over \
political and civil rights or to single out Israel for \
condemnation.  U.S. efforts to influence outcomes in both \
areas will on depend our ability to develop issue-by-issue \
partnerships across regional groups and our willingness to \
consider new approaches to issues on the human rights agenda. \
 End Summary. \
 \
What's Possible \
--------------- \
 \
¶2.  (C)  The HRC's first session came to a disappointing end \
after efforts to focus on establishing the organizational \
foundations for the new body were overshadowed by demands \
from the Arab Group and countries of the Organization of the \
Islamic Conference (OIC) to single out Israel and make the \
situation in the occupied territories a permanent feature on \
the Council's agenda.  Nonetheless, early agreement among a \
number of states on the importance of establishing solid \
foundations for the new body indicated that, among those who \
see the Council as an opportunity to further the promotion \
and protection of human rights, there are areas of \
commonality. Although the spoilers, e.g. Cuba and the \
Palestinian observer, sought to derail some of the efforts, \
the first session of the Council agreed to a program of work \
for the first year, the creation of two working groups to \
elaborate proposals for the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) \
and the Mandate Review, and the temporary extension of \
mandates and mechanisms, including calling for a final \
meeting of the Sub-Commission on Human Rights.  These issues \
will be discussed in consultations and informals during the \
next month, in preparation for the September 18-October 6 HRC \
session, providing various venues where the U.S. priorities \
may be advanced. \
 \
¶3. (C)  While there is general agreement among Western Human \
Rights Group (WHRG) members on the range of human rights \
issues in Geneva, key to our efforts will be establishing \
partnerships across regional groups on these issues.  On \
organizational issues, the GRULAC may prove to be a useful \
partner.  Division with the Eastern, Asian and African Groups \
will allow us to work with individual delegations on common \
approaches. It will be, however, essential to give them \
adequate support and when necessary the political cover to \
strengthen their will to oppose stronger members in their \
groups. \
 \
Dealing with Country Situations \
------------------------------- \
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¶4.  (C)  A greater challenge lies in efforts to bring \
attention to and take measures to deal with country specific \
situations.  While Western Group countries and a few others \
support the Council's ability to address country situations, \
many see that as the root of the problems that beset the \
Commission on Human Rights. A number of states are motivated \
by self-interest in their opposition to dealing with country \
specific situations, fearing that they could become the \
subject of scrutiny.  Of these, a small group, including \
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GENEVA 00002030  002.2 OF 004 \
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Cuba, Burma, Iran and North Korea, are determined to \
eliminate any mechanism that allows the Council to focus on \
individual countries.  The majority seem inclined to work \
through the Council to deal with systemic violations of human \
rights through dialogue and cooperation, meaning reaching \
agreements on receiving technical assistance from the Office \
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, other UN agencies, \
or regional mechanisms in order to avoid becoming the \
subjects of such resolutions.  In their view country specific \
resolutions, which condemn violations or practices in a given \
state, should be used as a last resort.  The opposition to \
country resolutions is in itself an indication of the value \
of maintaining this tool as the "stick" in urging nations to \
engage constructively and to request and accept technical \
assistance to address systemic problems. \
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Special Sessions \
---------------- \
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¶5.  (C)  The mechanism for holding special sessions, although \
recently abused by the OIC and Arab Group, remains a valuable \
option for addressing serious or emerging situations, \
provided the next special session is called to deal with a \
valid situation not involving Israel.  Convoking a special \
session on any country, whether it is Darfur/Sudan, Burma, or \
the deteriorating situation in Sri Lanka, will likely be \
opposed by the concerned state, its regional group and those \
who object to addressing country situations in general.  If \
the situation to be addressed is viewed, however, as a \
legitimate emerging crisis and not as a retaliation for the \
two Israel-focused sessions, interested states should be able \
to garner the necessary 16 signatures (the required \
one-third) from HRC members to convoke a session.  A \
determination would have to be made early on regarding what \
would be the desired outcome of such a session -- bring \
attention to the situation; seek the country's acceptance of \
technical cooperation or advice; or pass a resolution \
condemning the situation and the government's culpability or \
failure to remedy it.  Obviously, the latter would be the \
most difficult to attain.  Intermediate measures that \
highlight dialogue and cooperation may yield improvements on \
the ground while at the same time restoring the validity of \
the special sessions mechanism. \
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Regional Group Dynamics in Geneva \
--------------------------------- \
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¶6.  (C)  Last spring, in anticipation of the establishment of \
the HRC and its first session, a great deal of discussion \
centered on the need to foster cross regional consultations \
and coordination with the goal of reducing the \
contentiousness that impeded the work of the Commission. \
Numerous meetings were held, including by Mission Geneva, \
with counterparts in various groups.  Although welcomed by \
all, these efforts did little to overcome long-standing \
suspicions regarding Western countries' motives, particularly \
from the African Group, which insisted that its only leverage \
came from acting as a bloc.  Interestingly, in the three HRC \
sessions to date we have seen less than the usual level of \
concerted action by the regional groups.  Instead, we have \
seen the OIC, with Arab group support, take a dogmatic, \
no-holds-barred approach to pushing its one-issue agenda, \
including refusing to consult other delegations or to \
consider amendments to its resolutions.  The regional groups' \
reactions to the OIC's tactics (as outlined in paras 7-12) \
provide some insights into their internal dynamics.  It is \
important to bear in mind, however, that on certain \
fundamental issues, such as privileging economic rights over \
political rights, the unifying force is not the regional \
group but the level of economic development. \
 \
¶7. (C) OIC:  Led in Geneva by Pakistani Permanent \
Representative Masood Khan, the OIC is very aggressive in \
pursuit of its anti-Israel agenda.  It blithely ignores the \
hypocrisy of opposing the consideration of country-specific \
situations while singling out Israel for condemnation.  Khan \
tends to view both the human rights and humanitarian affairs \
arenas as stages for him to expound his views and harangue \
those who disagree.  In fact, at the conclusion of the \
conference on the new emblem for the Red Cross and Red \
Crescents Societies in June and the two HRC special sessions \
he requested the floor only to take to task the delegations \
with views contrary to those of the OIC.  Egypt is another \
leading player in OIC activities in Geneva, often taking \
responsibility for drafting resolutions or decisions. \
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GENEVA 00002030  003.2 OF 004 \
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Egyptian PermRep Sameh Shoukry prefers to work behind the \
scenes.  The Palestinian Observer is only active when Israel \
is the focus of discussion.  More moderate OIC members -- \
Morocco, Tunisia, and Jordan --, have told us privately that \
on Israel-related issues the pressure from Syria, Egypt, \
Algeria, and Pakistan to maintain group unity is \
overwhelming.  The OIC's rigid discipline multiplies its \
power because its membership crosses four regional groups -- \
Asian, African, Eastern and Western -- though Western Group \
member Turkey tends to keep a low profile. \
 \
¶8.  (C)  African Group:  This group has been the most \
outspoken in support of regional group unity and preeminence \
in the HRC's work.  On procedural and organizational matters, \
it is able to maintain a united front, though some states \
such as Ghana, Zambia, and Nigeria, complain of the "big \
country to the north" (Egypt) bullying them.  African Group \
unity has frayed, however, in dealing with the anti-Israel \
resolutions at the Council's first session and the two \
special sessions.  In each of the three votes, Cameroon and \
Nigeria abstained. Ghana abstained in two and Gabon in one. \
In discussions with poloffs, delegates from these countries \
have expressed concern about the lack of consultations within \
the group, the focus on Israel to the exclusion of all else, \
and their opposition to dealing with country specific \
situations.  We suspect that there is also worry that Sudan \
could become the subject of a resolution or special session. \
 \
¶9.  (C) Asian Group:  Its members admit that it is nearly \
impossible to coordinate or reach consensus within this \
group.  Unbridgeable gaps between Japan's, South Korea's and \
occasionally the Philippines' views and those of China and \
others tend to divide this group into two unequal blocks. \
Japan, also a member of the Western Group, routinely finds \
itself isolated in arguing for more moderate positions. It \
is, therefore, reluctant to take a leading role.  South Korea \
and the Philippines eschew any leadership role, but will \
quietly press their views.  China and India are the \
heavyweights, often taking similar views in support of NAM or \
G-77 positions, particularly in supporting economic, cultural \
and social rights over political and civil rights.  The OIC, \
often with China's support, holds great sway over this group \
with Syria and Pakistan pushing the anti-Israel agenda. \
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¶10.  (C) Western Group (U.S.):  This group is generally in \
agreement on the ultimate goal, though it frequently finds \
itself unable to agree on how to get there.  All members are \
sensitive to U.S views, but are extremely wary of being seen \
as U.S. puppets.  The EU plays a large, if not always helpful \
role, within the WHRG.  The EU's preference for arriving at \
"common" positions on all issues frequently weakens its \
ability to act forcefully.  EU positions, as reflected in \
statements during informals or plenary sessions, are too \
often weak and unfocused, revealing the EU's inability to \
bridge significant differences among its members.  The French \
took a particularly unhelpful position during the last \
special session, which was turned around after demarches in \
Paris by the United States, Germany, and UK (ref A). \
Finland, current EU president, is extremely cautious, almost \
to the point of paralysis, in its efforts to coordinate EU \
positions for the Council.  A few very close EU colleagues \
have voiced their frustration with the Finnish presidency. \
Switzerland tends to see itself as the keeper of both \
humanitarian law and human rights law, a distinction it \
regularly blurs.  During the past two months, it has become \
an increasingly unreliable partner in the WHRG.  Swiss \
Foreign Minister Calmy-Rey sees Switzerland as a mediator of \
sorts even when it is apparent that there is nothing to \
mediate.  EU colleagues complain that she is dismissive and \
contemptuous of their concerns.  Canada, particularly since \
the Harper Government took office, has been a strong partner. \
 The major cause for concern is Canada's vocal support for \
eliminating all resolutions in the Council.  Australia and \
the UK remain the strongest U.S. partners. \
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¶11.  (C) Eastern Group:  Deep divisions in the Eastern Group, \
between EU members and EU hopefuls on one side and Russia and \
a handful of former republics on the other, handicap its \
ability to act as a bloc.  EU members and EU hopefuls abide \
by EU positions, but routinely consult with the U.S. \
delegation to gauge our responses.  The Polish Mission, in \
particular, stays in close touch with us.  The Russian \
Federation jealously watches for initiatives that may make it \
vulnerable to Council scrutiny of its own human rights \
situation and exerts heavy pressure on former republics to \
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GENEVA 00002030  004.2 OF 004 \
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fall in with it. \
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¶12.  (C) Latin American and Caribbean Group (GRULAC): \
Members have openly voiced their discontent with the \
elimination of the Commission and their concern that the \
Council will be no better and possibly worse than the \
Commission.  With this in mind, they have taken a keen \
interest in development of the procedures and structures for \
the Council's work.  Most have made thoughtful proposals \
regarding the new body's organization.  Cuba, not \
surprisingly, continues to play the spoiler, looking to \
eliminate country mandates (at least the one focused on Cuba) \
and to blame the U.S. and EU for anything it opposes.  It has \
yet to make any proposals regarding the issues under debate. \
On issues related to Israel, with the exception of Guatemala, \
the GRULAC has supported OIC actions.  Argentina, Brazil, \
Uruguay in addition to Cuba co-sponsored the request for the \
special session on Lebanon.  Argentine and Brazilian \
counterparts told poloff that, while the Lebanon resolution \
was one-sided and singled out Israel, the scale of the \
destruction in Lebanon warranted such action.  During the \
June session of the Council, Brazil, Argentina, Chile and \
Ecuador invoked Mercosur unity to support the resolution \
putting Israel permanently on the Council's agenda. \
Guatemala has stood out by it willingness to take a \
principled position on these issues. Its explanation of \
position (abstention) at the last special session forcefully \
called on Council members to be even handed in their approach \
and to avoid actions that could undermine the Council's \
credibility. \
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Comment \
------- \
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¶13.  (C)  This message is based on Mission Geneva's \
observation of the conduct of delegations here and on \
exchanges with a large number of our counterparts.  Based on \
responses to refs B and C, it appears that Geneva-based \
missions have a certain liberty of action or their \
governments fail to recognize that the United States does \
take note of their actions in the Human Rights Council. \
Mission Geneva would welcome any insights that posts could \
provide on their host governments' views and expectations for \
the Council.  We would especially welcome information on \
their plans for the Sept. 18 - Oct. 6 session of the Council. \
 End Comment. \
TICHENOR \