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RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 9796

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DUSHANBE 001597 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  8/22/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON SNARC AF TI
SUBJECT: TAJIKISTAN: DEMONSTRATIONS IN AUTONOMOUS REGION A SIGN OF 
UNREST 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: THUSHEK, CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, STATE, STATE. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  SUMMARY:  Two demonstrations in front of the 
Gorno-Badakshan Autonomous Oblast governor's office August 18-19 
illustrate increasing unrest in the economically downtrodden 
remote area also known as the Pamirs.  The several hundred 
strong crowd protested against the central government and the 
arrest of a retired colonel --  a popular drug lord who provided 
generous assistance to the local community.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (C) During an August 18 visit to Khorog, capital of 
Gorno-Badakshan Autonomous Oblast (GBAO), PolOff and Regional 
Environment officer paid a courtesy call to GBAO Governor, 
Almamad Niezmamadov.  At the beginning of the meeting, 
Niezmamadov's direct government line began ringing off the hook. 
 He excused himself and left the room for twenty minutes.  While 
EmbOffs curiously waited, their driver burst into the room and 
urged them to leave immediately, explaining there was a 
"conflict" at the front of the building.  One minute later, the 
governor returned and apologized for his absence by saying "some 
people wanted to talk to him."  Alarmed by the driver's warning, 
EmbOffs politely ended the meeting.  As it turns out, the "some 
people" who "wanted to talk" to the governor amounted to an 
angry crowd loudly demanding to see him.  As officials escorted 
EmbOffs past the front entrance and out the building's back 
door, EmbOffs could hear and see the large crowd.  A small 
number of government officials stood by the entrance nervously. 
 
¶3.  (C)  EmbOffs were escorted out the back door and around to 
the front of the building where their vehicle was parked behind 
the large crowd.  Government officials and the local driver 
urged EmbOffs to leave.  One American traveling with EmbOffs 
remained in the vehicle during the meetings and witnessed the 
entire demonstration. 
 
EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  According to different witnesses, around 3:45 pm, a 
group of young men emerged from the local police station 
directly across the street from the governor's office.  Two 
appeared to be heavily intoxicated and the group looked like 
they were ready to break into a fight.  The young men then 
departed the scene.  Several minutes later they came back and 
may have been brandishing small firearms and brought additional 
people to the scene.  A crowd of 500-600 people, mainly young 
men, quickly gathered in front of the governor's office.  They 
began yelling and chanting, demanding to speak to the governor. 
Government officials later reported that some in the crowd had 
firearms and were firing them in the air.  Several women also 
joined the crowd, and some started wailing.  Fearing violence, 
the women cried for the men to stop the demonstrations and 
return home. 
 
¶5.  (C)  At approximately 5:10 pm, two white jeeps pulled up 
next to EmbOffs' vehicles and several men jumped out carrying a 
weapon which appeared to be a machine gun.  The men pointed the 
weapon at the crowd in front of the building.  They appeared to 
be plainclothes government officials and seemed to know everyone 
in the crowd.  They urged the crowd to remain calm and dissolve; 
no shots were fired and no one was hurt.  (NOTE:  This 
contributed to the diminished numbers EmbOffs later witnessed. 
END NOTE.) 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  Despite being across the street from the police 
station, no uniformed police were visible.  At around 6:30pm 
EmbOffs revisited the site and the crowd has completely 
dissipated.  The citizens of Khorog resumed their daily business 
and many were out on the streets.  Embassy sources say a smaller 
group of about 50-60 people returned to the governor's office 
August 18 to continue protesting. 
 
WHAT REALLY CAUSED THE PROTEST? 
 
 
DUSHANBE 00001597  002 OF 003 
 
 
¶7.  (C)  Local sources and government officials told PolOff that 
earlier in the week, authorities attempted to arrest a popular 
retired colonel living in Upper Khorog, a neighborhood 
economically worse off than Lower Khorog, considered the town's 
center.  A shootout ensued and an innocent bystander was hurt. 
Ministry of Interior and Drug Control Agency officials told 
Post's Senior Law Enforcement Advisor the colonel is a 
drug-lord.  Authorities moved in to arrest him, after already 
arresting several of his associates and seizing narcotics.  The 
men involved in the argument in front of the police station 
supported the colonel and rallied the crowd in front of the 
governor's office. 
 
¶8.  (C)  In a meeting with PolOff August 18, Deputy Governor 
Bekmurodi told PolOff the governor refused to speak with the 
crowd because of security reasons and instead negotiated with a 
small group of representatives from the group of demonstrators. 
The Governor promised the representatives he would rescind the 
arrest warrant.  Conflicting reports from government officials 
make it unclear whether the colonel has been detained. 
(COMMENT:  The governor does not have the authority to rescind 
the arrest warrant.  His promise to do so was likely a temporary 
ploy to assuage the protestors.  If he was unable to deliver on 
his promise, protestors may rally on his doorstep again.  The 
protestors may also read his concession as a sign of weakness. 
END COMMENT.) 
 
¶9.  (C)  PolChief visit Khorog August 19 with Deputy Assistant 
Secretary Feigenbaum and heard even more varied accounts of the 
 
SIPDIS 
August 17 event.  Over lunch, the Mayor of Khorog told PolChief 
rival football teams were angry about the outcome of a football 
match, and chose to rumble. "Outside the governor's office?" she 
asked incredulously.  "Wasn't the demonstration aimed against 
the government?"  He shook his head.  An Embassy bodyguard asked 
around town about the protest.  One person admitted it was 
against the government, but local staff at the electricity plant 
made a point of denying entirely there had been any 
demonstration. 
 
¶10.  (C)  An AmCit expat advisor working in Khorog on energy 
issues told PolChief the demonstration was about rival 
drug-lords: the colonel and the governor.  The governor tried to 
have the colonel arrested after one of them violated an 
agreement on who could move their drugs first.  The AmCit noted 
that Khorog city was divided between the two men, and there were 
parts of the city the electrical utility collectors couldn't go 
for fear of being shot.  He noted the colonel had a reputation 
for doing good works in the neighborhood, "like Hezbollah," and 
his loyal supporters would not let the governor arrest him. 
 
¶11.  (C) Typical of state controlled media, no news agencies 
reported on the demonstrations. Demonstrations in Tajikistan are 
illegal, and a group hoping to demonstrate must receive 
permission from the government.  This is the first demonstration 
in Khorog in recent memory, and clearly no one bothered to ask 
for permission.  Demonstrations are also widely feared in 
Tajikistan by the government and the public who remember the 
initial days of the civil war triggered by rival demonstrations 
in Dushanbe's main squares. 
 
US VS. THEM 
 
¶12.  (C)  During the demonstration, one passerby told Embassy 
source that this "was the worst case of authority abuse in 
years."   During PolOff's meeting with Deputy to the Governor 
Bekmurodi August 18, he confirmed that the people were upset 
over the arrest of the colonel, but underlying tension between 
the local people and central government authorities was nothing 
new. Bekmurodi spoke at length on the history of the Pamirs and 
the people's distinct identity.  Although acknowledging that 
most people also consider themselves Tajik, he frequently spoke 
in terms of "us" and "them". 
 
¶13.  (C)  Embassy sources say one reason behind the protest is 
the central government's recent appointment of several Kulobis 
from the President's home region to high level positions in 
 
DUSHANBE 00001597  003 OF 003 
 
 
GBAO.  President Rahmonov appointed the governor and his deputy; 
both are Pamiri.  Niezmamadov has been governor for 13 years and 
generally, the people have recognized that he has done a lot of 
good for the region, but Bekmurodi insinuated that the governor 
may retire at the end of 2006.  He also commented that in the 
past few years there have been many problems in GBAO's more 
remote districts, but did not elaborate. 
 
¶14.  (C)  Bekmurodi suggested the majority of the population in 
GBAO would ideally like to be independent from Tajikistan, but 
understand they depend on the rest of the country for economic 
survival.  Many people are frustrated with the high unemployment 
and the lack of trade and economic growth the rest of Tajikistan 
is seeing.  Five years ago, the government subsidized 92 percent 
of GBAO's budget.  Today, the rate has decreased to 84 percent 
and the government's plan is to have the region's economy 
self-sustainable by 2015.  Bekmurodi admitted it would not be in 
the central government's interest to have a self-sustaining 
economy in GBAO and would likely extend subsidizing the region 
beyond 2015 in order to retain control. 
 
¶15.  (C)  COMMENT:  The colonel's arrest was the catalyst that 
sparked the protest, but the demonstrations reflect the people's 
frustration with government authorities.  Although the 
government managed to quell the demonstrations, its next steps 
are unclear.  If the government insists on arresting the 
drug-trafficking colonel, it will surely face resistance from 
the people he has helped.  However, if he eludes detention, it 
sends the message that rule of law is not upheld and drug lords 
are on equal par with the government, wielding considerable 
power.  However, if people widely believe that the governor 
himself is a drug baron, the colonel's arrest will seem less 
like a triumph over narco-trafficking, and more like a familiar 
abuse of power.  END COMMENT. 
HUSHEK