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RUEHDT/AMEMBASSY DILI 2180

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 DILI 000394 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EAP/MTS 
PACOM FOR POLAD AND JOC 
NSC FOR HOLLY MORROW 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  8/1/2016 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM ASEC MARR UN TT
SUBJECT: EAST TIMOR UPDATE JULY 24-31, 2006 
 
REF: A) DILI 387 B) DILI 275 
 
DILI 00000394  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Elizabeth S. Wharton, Political Officer, Embassy 
Dili, State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b) 
 
¶1. (U) Summary: 
Continued repercussions of Reinado arrest 
Prime Minister presents his Government Program to Parliament 
Council of State extends the "State of Crisis" through August 20 
International Commission of Inquiry: Briefing by the Executive 
Director 
End summary. 
 
Continued repercussions of Reinado arrest 
---------------------------------------- 
¶2. (U) Although the pro-Reinado demonstrations dissipated on 
Friday and have yet to resume, participants appear to have made 
good on their promise to disperse throughout the city and create 
disturbances (Ref A).  Their numbers appear to be quite small, 
in the range of a dozen to several dozens, but their effect is 
being felt more widely, with many residents reporting sharply 
increased security worries.  A dozen or more houses were burned 
since Friday, and a small number of house burnings or 
destruction  continues each night. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Members of one of the groups involved relayed to 
Embassy staff that this renewed violence was a direct response 
to the Reinado arrest and that their goals is to destroy all the 
remaining Lorosae (eastern) houses and belongings in Dili.  In 
reality, the disturbances seem to be limited to a number of 
major neighborhoods affected by the recent crisis where some 
"Lorosae"  empty houses had remained standing but nearly or 
entirely emptied of their "Lorosae" population.  The group 
members went on to explain that they have adjusted their 
activities to account for the international police, but by 
targeting a small number of houses each night and staying in 
regular contact through newly-acquired cell phones, they are 
effectively evading arrest. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The National Front for Justice and Peace (FNJP) also 
remains seized with the Reinado arrest issue and continues to 
plan demonstrations.  One of the group's leaders, Vital dos 
Santos, relayed to Emboff that they are meeting this week to 
prepare demonstrations for next week to demand the dissolution 
of Parliament and a "fair judicial process" for all involved in 
recent events.  Dos Santos described the youth group that 
organized last week's demonstrations as "separate" but sharing 
the same goals.  When organizing the anti-Alkatiri 
demonstrations in June, the FNJP remained non-violent and 
disassociated themselves from Loromonu-Lorosae dynamics.  It 
remains to be seen whether their sympathy with the pro-Reinado 
demonstrators indicates that they are now ready to dispense with 
such niceties. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Meanwhile, Reinado who last week was assigned to 30 
days preventative detention while his case is investigated, was 
moved over the weekend from the Joint Task Force (JTF) detention 
facility to Becora prison in Dili, where he is reportedly in 
solitary confinement.  According to one of his lawyers, the 
prison director is trying to have Reinado moved to a prison 
outside of Dili because of his confrontational behavior since 
arrival.  The Australian-led JTF refused his initial suggestion 
of Gleno prison (in the western district of Ermera), so he is 
now proposing Baucau prison (in the East).  JTF sources 
confirmed that they had refused the request to move Reinado to 
Gleno due to concerns that the population would attempt to 
forcibly free him.  However, they did not indicate whether the 
Baucau request would be refused as well.  A move to Baucau would 
be as problematic for different reasons.  As one observer put 
it, if Reinado is moved to Baucau "he will be lynched." 
Moreover, a move to the East would inflame Reinado's western 
supporters.  (Note: There is no "high security" prison in East 
Timor for problem inmates, and if anything the district prisons 
are less secure, so the justification for such a move is 
unclear.) 
 
 
DILI 00000394  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
Prime Minister presents Government Program to Parliament 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
¶6. (U) Prime Minister Jose Ramos-Horta on July 31 presented his 
Government program to the National Parliament, noting  in the 
presentation that his government was essentially adopting the 
same program and budget as its predecessor the Alkatiri 
government for two main reasons.  First, it is a program based 
on the National Development Plan and thus consistent with the 
nation's long-term needs.  Second, the circumstances under which 
he became Prime Minister did not allow him to implement radical 
changes.  The program and budget under discussion cover only the 
period of this government's mandate through May 20, 2007, rather 
than the full fiscal year through June 30. 
 
¶7. (C) Discussion of the program continued today (August 1) and 
will possibly last for another day or more.  An advisor to the 
President of Parliament relayed to Emboff that the number and 
nature of the questions coming from the MPs indicates that 
Parliament could vote to reject the program.  However, a 
reliable Embassy source confirmed that he observed a meeting 
between former Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri, apparently in his 
continued role as Secretary General of the ruling Fretilin 
party, and the Fretilin MPs on July 30.  Ramos-Horta and his two 
Deputy Prime Ministers were also in attendance.  Our source 
noted that this meeting indicated there is "no doubt that this 
budget and program will be passed." 
 
Council of State extends the "State of Crisis" through August 20 
--------------------------------------------- ------------------- 
¶8. (U) The Council of State on July 31 agreed to another 
extension of the "State of Crisis" originally declared by 
President Xanana Gusmao on May 30 (DILI 275).  Under the State 
of Crisis, which falls short of a formal State of Emergency, the 
President assumed responsibility for defense and national 
security, including the Ministries of Defense and Interior, the 
military, and the national police.  The current extension is 
intended to last through the deployment of a new UN mission, 
expected August 21.  In a Presidential Statement issued 
following the decision, Gusmao stated that, "Significant 
progress has been made~ However, the humanitarian situation 
continues to be very serious ~ [and] the situation is still very 
precarious, particularly in Dili." 
 
UN Commission of Inquiry: Briefing by the Executive Director 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
¶9. (U) The Executive Director of the UN Independent Special 
Commission of Inquiry, Luc Cote, last week briefed Charge and 
Emboffs on its composition and mandate.  The Commission was 
established in response to the June 8 request from then Foreign 
and Defense Minister Ramos-Horta and commenced its three-month 
mandate on July 7.  Cote provided an overview of the 
Commission's composition, noting that the three Commissioners 
--- Paulo Sergio Pinheiro of Brazil, Zelda Holtzman of South 
Africa and Ralph Zacklin of the United Kingdom --- were chosen 
partially because they had no prior experience in East Timor and 
would therefore conduct their work with no preconceptions.  The 
Commission's secretariat, however, includes several experts with 
extensive bQkground in East Timor.  It comprises six 
investigators, two legal advisors and a political advisor. 
Members of the secretariat will remain in East Timor throughout 
the Commission's mandate.  The three commissioners will come to 
East Timor twice, first from August 4-12 and again for two weeks 
in September. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Cote emphasized that the Commission's mandate is 
focused on the events of April 28-29 and May 23-25 only. 
However, it is possible -- in fact likely -- that a complete 
understanding of these events will necessitate examination of 
developments preceding and following these dates.  In 
investigating these events, the Commission will incorporate the 
work already done by international police, the UN Human Rights 
Unit, the Provedor (Ombudsman), non-governmental organizations, 
and the office of the Prosecutor General.  He does not believe 
the basic investigation of what occurred will be difficult, as 
much of the work has already been done.  What will be more 
difficult is developing conclusions regarding responsibility for 
 
DILI 00000394  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
the events, especially at the institutional and command level. 
 
¶11. (SBU) The Commission will present its report to the 
Secretary General and East Timor's National Parliament by 
 
SIPDIS 
October 7.  The Commission's terms of reference do not specify 
what will be included in the report and Cote stated that they 
are already struggling with the question of naming names.  In 
addition to its accounting of the events of April 28-29 and May 
23-25, the report will include recommendations for both East 
Timor officials and the international community.  Cote noted 
that they have endeavored to convey that the Commission is not a 
judicial organ, and as such can only make recommendations 
regarding the appropriate judicial and accountability measures. 
WHITMAN