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DE RUEHEG #5317/01 2361256
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FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0861

C O N F I D E N T I A L CAIRO 005317

SIPDIS

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/23/2011
TAGS: PREL PARM PTER MOPS EG IS IZ IR SU LE KNNP
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR GENERAL ABIZAID'S VISIT TO CAIRO

Classified By: Classified by DCM Stuart Jones for reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

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Summary
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¶1. (C) Welcome back to Cairo. Your visit allows us to
reaffirm our nations' strong mil-mil cooperation at a time
when the broader bilateral relationship and the U.S. image on
the Arab Street shows signs of strain due to the crisis in
Lebanon. In meetings with governmental and non-governmental
contacts, emboffs are now routinely subjected to sharp
critiques of U.S. policies in the Middle East and doubts
about our status as an "honest broker" vis-a-vis Arab-Israeli
issues. In spite of this tension and GOE concerns regarding
our long-term commitment to FMF, the mil-mil relationship
remains solid. Minister of Defense Field Marshal Tantawi
looks forward to exchanging views with you on Lebanon and its
reconstruction, Syria, Iran, Sudan, and the security
situation in Iraq. End summary.

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Military Issues
---------------

¶2. (C) The Field Marshal will thank you for your efforts to
ensure the continuation of the USD 1.3 billion in annual
security assistance to Egypt. Although Egypt once again
dodged a bullet this year in the Congressional budget
process, scrutiny of the program will likely continue. You
may want to stress the need to look for more opportunities to
strengthen our mil-mil cooperation and to highlight Egypt's
support for our regional objectives. You may also want to
express your support for Chief of Staff LTG Samy Enan's
upcoming counterpart visit to the U.S. As you know, a
solution to the International Medical Center problem is
within reach, but not yet final. Because there are still a
number of issues pending, we have not briefed the MoD on the
proposed solution.

------------------------
The Aftermath of Lebanon
------------------------

¶3. (C) Political reaction: While senior GOE officials
recognize the respective roles Hizbollah, Iran, and Syria
played in sparking the latest war, Egyptians across the board
are furious over the destruction caused by what they see as
Israel's use of disproportionate force. Egyptians also
criticize the U.S. for providing military support to Israel
during the crisis. Seeking to address public outrage towards
Israel, Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit said publicly that he
could not rule out the possibility that Israel had planned
the war and that the U.S. played a role in the planning. He
called on the international community to compel Israel to pay
Lebanon compensation, and led the OIC initiative seeking a UN
Human Rights Council investigation into Israel's alleged
human rights violations in Qana and elsewhere. GOE officials
believe Hizbollah can only be disarmed via an internal
Lebanese process and that the withdrawal of Israeli troops
from Sheba'a Farms (and placing the area under UN control
pending a final resolution) is critical to achieving a
lasting solution.

¶4. (C) Reconstruction: Egypt continues to provide
humanitarian support to Lebanon. They have delivered 18
C-130s of relief supplies and maintain a humanitarian field
hospital in Beirut. The hospital has treated approximately
1,000 patients a day since its late July deployment.
President Mubarak also instructed his Ministry of Electricity
to assist with rebuilding Lebanon's destroyed power grid.
Egyptian Ambassador to the U.S. Nabil Fahmy told Assistant
Secretary Welch during a recent meeting that Egypt may also

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explore sending quick-assembly Bailey-type bridges to
Lebanon. We are following up on this idea with Foreign
Ministry officials. The Field Marshal would welcome any
information you could share on the scope of support the U.S
military (logistical, communications) will provide to
Lebanon.

¶5. (C) The Syria angle: GOE officials were furious with
President Asad following his August 15 speech praising
Hizbollah and criticizing (as "half men") Arab leaders who
rebuked Hizbollah for kidnapping the Israeli soldiers. They
believe Asad's alliance with Iran and Hizbollah is misguided,
and also worry about his fragile internal situation. On the
streets of Cairo, by contrast, Asad's praise for Hizbollah as
a "resistance" (vice terrorist) group resonates. You may
want to explore this further with the Field Marshal.

-----------------------------------------
Iran: Egypt's Fear of a Shiite Influence
-----------------------------------------

¶6. (C) Egypt's concern over Iran's efforts to extend its
influence in the region has intensified in recent months.
Both Iran's chief nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani and Foreign
Minister Motakki asked President Mubarak in June and August
2006 respectively to normalize Egyptian-Iranian relations and
join in the fight against Israel and the U.S. Mubarak
adamantly refused, telling Motakki to "forget it" and giving
him a tongue lashing for supporting Hizbollah and Hamas, and
not negotiating with the P5 1 on Iran's nuclear program.
Speculation on alleged plans for U.S. military strikes on
Iran's nuclear sites continue to circulate, and Tantawi will
likely seek your views on Iran's recent response to the P5 1
package.

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Sudan
-----

¶7. (C) Egypt's help with our effort to convince Sudan to
permit UN forces in Darfur is important, and Tantawi could
influence GOE decision-making. You might mention the
importance of preventing future stalling by Sudan's President
Bashir.

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Internal Politics and Reform
----------------------------

¶8. (C) Our clear call for the GOE to lead the region, by
example, towards democracy and freedom has achieved
significant but limited results. As 2005 drew to a close, it
was reasonable to hope that, notwithstanding the manifest
imperfections of the 2005 elections, Egypt's reform movement
was on track. However, the nine months since the
parliamentary elections have not witnessed continued reform
momentum. The December conviction of presidential challenger
Ayman Nour on forgery charges (underscored by the May denial
of his judicial appeal), the February decree to postpone
local elections (which threatened to see major gains by the
Muslim Brotherhood) until the spring of 2008, and the May
decision to extend the Emergency Law for another two years,
all contributed to a widespread perception that political
reform in Egypt has slowed.

¶9. (C) We understand that the NDP plans to use its annual
party conference, September 19-20, to reiterate and
re-emphasize Mubarak's reform program. Additionally, when
Parliament reconvenes in November, it will reportedly tackle
a wide range of constitutional amendments. The party
conference and the next session of Parliament should shed
additional light on the scale and authenticity of political
reform. The Field Marshal would prefer not to discuss
internal politics with you.
RICCIARDONE