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DE RUEHBO #8028/01 2432248
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P 312248Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8490
INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 7084
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 8142
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ AUG LIMA 4202
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA 9475
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 4866
RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL 3670
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHOND/DIRONDCP WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 008028 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/31/2016 
TAGS: KJUS PGOV PINR PREL PTER CO
SUBJECT: PROSECUTOR GENERAL HESITANT ON PROCEEDING WITH 
JUSTICE AND PEACE LAW 
 
REF: BOGOTA 7986 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood. 
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1.  (C) Prosecutor General Mario Iguaran told us on August 28 
that the Fiscalia's Justice and Peace Unit would not be at 
full strength until paramilitaries confirmed their commitment 
and eligibility for JPL processing.  In a separate meeting, 
JPL Specialized Unit Chief Luis Gonzalez said it had been 
difficult to convince Iguaran to give the JPL Unit the 
resources it needs to do its job.  End summary. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
IGUARAN ADDING STEPS TO THE JPL PROCESS 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Iguaran told us on August 28 that the list of 2,695 
demobilized paramilitaries requesting benefits under JPL was 
vast and would overwhelm any Fiscalia in the world.  Iguaran 
was hoping the JPL decree would permit him to segment the 
list, enabling the Fiscalia to start with 24 paramilitary 
leaders (reftel).  He said 21 of the 24 have arrest warrants; 
the three that do not are Carlos Mario Jimenez (AKA 
"Macaco"), Severo Antonio Lopez (AKA "Job"), and Jose Luis 
Zuluaga (AKA "McGiver"). 
 
¶3.  (C) Iguaran shared a preliminary analysis from the 
Fiscalia's Justice and Peace Unit, which indicated that of 
the 2,695 demobilized paramilitaries, only 14 percent have 
been "fully" identified, including full names, dates of 
birth, and cedula identification numbers.  Iguaran said he 
was considering returning the list to the Peace 
Commissioner's Office to verify identifications and to the 
Ministry of Interior and Justice to confirm the locations of 
the individuals.  After that, the Fiscalia would conduct 
"pre-interviews" in which prosecutors would ask those on the 
list a series of questions to determine if they met the JPL 
criteria.  They would also be asked to ratify their 
commitment to participate in the JPL process.  Only then 
would the Fiscalia start the JPL debriefing (version libre) 
process.  His view is that the clock for the Fiscalia to take 
the version libre and proceed with JPL would not commence 
until this "ratification" had taken place.  (Note: The GOC 
issued a decree on August 29 authorizing the Fiscalia to call 
demobilized members of the AUC in to ratify their commitment 
and eligibility for JPL.)  Iguaran speculated that the first 
version libres would take place in late September. 
 
¶4.  (C) Iguaran conceded the Justice and Peace Unit would not 
be at full strength until there was clarity on the 
implementing decree and paramilitaries confirmed their 
commitment and eligibility for JPL.  He said the Fiscalia was 
so busy implementing the new oral accusatory system and 
working on human rights cases that resources were stretched. 
Despite the strain on other units, the Fiscalia had assigned 
to the JPL unit 16 prosecutors ("Fiscales ante el Tribunal"), 
which is 80 percent of its authorized strength.  He said the 
JPL Unit had assigned 120 investigators of the 150 expected 
to work in the Unit.  The JPL units in Barranquilla and 
Medellin would be ready in two months. 
 
¶5.  (C) Iguaran said the Constitutional Court's decision had 
legitimized the peace process with the paramilitaries.  He 
intended to apply the Court's interpretation of the JPL. 
Iguaran speculated that the legal process with the 
paramilitaries should be easier than other prosecutions 
because the former AUC members have an incentive to cooperate. 
 
------------------------------------ 
JUSTICE AND PEACE UNIT EAGER TO WORK 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶6.  (C) JPL Specialized Unit Chief Luis Gonzalez told us on 
August 28 he has had a hard time convincing Iguaran to 
augment the JPL Unit.  Gonzalez noted that instead of 
providing more resources, the Fiscal was creating more delays 
in the process.  Gonzalez said the time for the JPL had 
arrived with the GOC's deliverance of the JPL lists on August 
17, but Iguaran continued to delay approval of the four 
additional prosecutors the Unit needed to fill the 
20-prosecutors requirement mandated in the Law.  Gonzalez 
said Iguaran had also promised to assign an additional 60 
auxiliary prosecutors ("fiscales seccionales") to assist the 
20 prosecutors, but only four had been approved so far. 
 
¶7.  (C) Gonzalez said that if it were not for USG support, 
the Unit would not have the basic resources and training 
needed to do the job.  To date, DOJ has provided three 
training sessions for Unit prosecutors and investigators. 
From August 14-23, DOJ hosted a training seminar for the 16 
fiscales from the JPL Unit, eight magistrate judges who have 
been selected to administer the JPL, and other government 
entities involved in JPL.  The seminar brought together the 
main actors involved in the JPL's application and addressed 
questions on the implementation of the JPL, the 
Constitutional Court's decision, the implementing 
regulations, and other Colombian laws and jurisprudence.  The 
seminar focused on victims, assets, JPL hearings, evidentiary 
and operational issues. 
 
¶8.  (C) DOJ officials were impressed with the selected 
judges, but less so with the prosecutors.  They said most 
judges were experienced, proven magstrates, who had carefully 
reviewed the JPL.  In contrast, the JPL prosecutors, with a 
few exceptions, were less experienced but appeared to be 
committed to finding practical solutions to implement the 
Law.    DOJ officials considered the selection of less 
experienced prosecutors to reflect the Fiscalia's lack of of 
commitment to JPL. 
WOOD