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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BERLIN 002577 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR S/CT - AMBASSADOR CRUMPTON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/30/2016 
TAGS: PTER PGOV GM
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER: AMBASSADOR CRUMPTON'S VISIT TO BERLIN 
 
REF: A. BERLIN 2303 
     ¶B. BERLIN 2234 
 
Classified By: DCM John Koenig for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  The July 31 train bombing plot, the UK 
airplane bombing plot, and the Hizballah-Israel war have 
brought about public debate in Germany that gives us new 
opportunities for increased counterterrorism cooperation 
which you should explore in your discussions here.  After 
9/11, Germany began cooperating very closely with the U.S. 
and enacted numerous CT legal improvements.  While good 
cooperation has always characterized the U.S.-German 
counterterrorism relationship, both sides want to do more. 
The Merkel government plans to take more robust national 
measures and would like to intensify cooperation with us.  In 
particular, we have sought greater information sharing to 
prevent the entry into both our countries of individuals 
connected with terrorism.  Unfortunately, data privacy 
concerns and public perceptions (skeptical of a terrorist 
attack in Germany and misunderstanding the U.S.) have limited 
Germany's ability to act.  The current debate within Germany 
creates an opening for our two governments to right the 
balance.  End Summary. 
 
Current U.S.-German CT Cooperation Solid... 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Numerous USG entities, from FBI to the several DHS 
agencies on the ground here, cooperate well with their German 
counterparts in the war on terror.  To date, however, while 
informal exchanges work well, often as a function of 
excellent personal relations between USG officials and their 
German counterparts, formal agreements or data exchanges have 
been few, largely due to German concerns over maintaining 
data privacy and a strong focus on working within the EU. 
There has also been a concern that pushing hard for formal 
agreements could disrupt the information flows that take 
place and help us in the fight against the terrorists. 
 
... Although with Obstacles to Improvement 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶3. (S) Press allegations and exaggerations (e.g., charges of 
secret detention centers, allegations over renditions, 
 
SIPDIS 
discussions over German assistance to the U.S. during the 
Iraq war) have raised some objections to the cooperation both 
sides want.  A special Bundestag Committee is investigating 
some of these allegations; German officials say they 
sometimes spend half their day reviewing old files for 
information to give the Committee.  The committee's creation 
also cast a shadow over some informal information sharing, 
with some officials now fearing the press or the Bundestag 
may later disclose it, thus rendering German officials 
personally liable.  Some German law enforcement offices that 
formerly provided information quickly and informally now 
require letters rogatory. 
 
¶4. (C) Another concern is EU and German Data Privacy policy. 
Proposed EU regulations might compel data privacy 
authorities' case-by-case approval of law enforcement data 
sharing.  This possibility could significantly disrupt 
information flow.  At the same time, a German initiative -- 
the so-called Pruem agreements -- tightens law enforcement 
cooperation with select EU partners, enabling, for example, 
nearly instant electronic sharing of fingerprints and other 
key data.  Meanwhile, Germany opposed a U.S.-proposed 
fingerprint-sharing initiative.  While we have made the point 
at the Director General and working level, few German 
officials see it as illogical and unwise for Germany to take 
these steps with its EU partners, while holding back 
cooperation with the U.S. 
 
¶5. (SBU) German counterterrorism experts, including German 
leaders in the fight against terror whom you will meet, 
remain conscious of the risks Germany faces.  But another 
obstacle to better CT cooperation is public perception. 
Years of post-9/11 polls show the German public is not as 
concerned about terrorism as its leaders -- or the citizens 
of countries like the UK or the Netherlands.  One recent poll 
said only thirty-one percent of Germans fear a terrorist 
attack, 68 percent do not (the September 2002 numbers were 20 
and 76, respectively).  Opposition political parties (chiefly 
the Free Democrats - FDP - and the Greens) have maintained 
their traditional stress on strengthening civil liberties and 
opposing stronger counterterrorism legal initiatives. 
 
German Counterterrorism Landscape 
--------------------------------- 
 
 
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¶6. (C) The 9/11 connection to Hamburg spurred German legal 
changes that greatly improved their counterterrorism regime, 
e.g., new laws banned membership in foreign -- not just 
German -- terrorist organizations and simplified law 
enforcement and security agencies' access to data.  But the 
inability to convict some suspects and the remaining 
obstacles to more simplified cooperation mean that Germany 
has more to do.  The Christian Democrat - Social Democrat 
German coalition government that took office November 2005 
pledged to strengthen Germany's counterterrorism laws.  The 
first positive results are in and more progress is to come. 
 
-- A draft law broadens and simplifies German security 
agencies' access to airline, travel, vehicle, bank, and 
telecom data and renews sunset provisions from post-9/11 laws 
set to expire January 2007. 
 
-- The Interior Ministry plans a combined terrorist database 
for the German Joint Counterterrorism Center (GTAZ) to 
improve information sharing (police/security service and 
federal/state). 
 
-- The Federal Office of Criminal Investigation (BKA) will 
get more powers to investigate terrorism. 
 
-- A new law re-implements the EU Arrest Warrant (the 
Constitutional Court had called for better extradition 
protection for German nationals, which the new law includes). 
 German officials tell us they now plan to extradite to Spain 
Mamoun Darkazanli, a Hamburg-based German-Syrian national and 
suspected al-Qaida financier. 
 
-- A new law will broaden the Interior Minister's ability to 
ban organizations.  A court had overturned the ban of a 
PKK-linked publication; the Ministry is rewriting the law to 
re-impose the ban. 
 
-- The government also plans an Aviation and Maritime 
Security bill to address terrorist threats from the sky and 
the seas. 
 
¶7. (C) Some of the changes above address U.S. priorities. 
Other changes we seek are in our suggested talking points 
(below in para 11).  Additional USG priorities include longer 
prison sentences, lower burdens of proof for convictions and 
asset freezes, tighter laws against leaking classified 
information, and less onerous data privacy rules.  A DoJ 
priority has been the creation of a way for classified 
material to be used and protected in court.  In July the U.S. 
Senate ratified the U.S.-German Mutual Legal Assistance 
Treaty.  The Bundestag is to ratify it in October.  This 
agreement -- and the U.S.-EU Agreements on Mutual Legal 
Assistance and Extradition -- will improve bilateral legal 
cooperation.  We understand the U.S.-EU agreement is to go to 
the Senate for ratification soon. 
 
¶8. (SBU) The Madrid and London train bombings raised the 
concerns of the threat of "home-grown" terrorists.  Germany 
has one of the largest Muslim population in Europe -- 3.2 
million, 2.4 million of whom are Turkish.  For various 
reasons, groups with foreign ancestry are overrepresented in 
the unemployed and incarcerated.  Interior Minister Wolfgang 
Schaeuble is organizing Germany's first high-level "summit" 
with German Muslim leaders on September 27, which will likely 
include some groups known to have extremist views, such as 
Milli Gurus.  This initiative follows Chancellor Merkel's 
July Integration Summit, which focused on steps Germany could 
take to improve the conditions foreigners face in Germany. 
These efforts come as some German Muslim leaders say they 
have more interaction with the U.S. Embassy, via its Muslim 
outreach, than with German officials.  In our suggested 
points (below in para 11), we ask you to address this issue 
as well. 
 
Recent Events Prompt Discussion of CT Policies 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶9. (S) The July 31 discovery of unexploded suitcase bombs in 
German trains and the subsequent arrests in Germany and 
Lebanon have triggered new public debate about terrorist 
threats and what to do about them.  Senior official, media, 
and think tank contacts have told us this creates an opening 
for the Merkel government and the U.S. to shift the political 
balance in favor of more robust measures and cooperation. 
German and U.S. agencies are cooperating closely and while 
the investigation is ongoing, there are legitimate concerns 
that the plot was not as amateurish as some initially 
suspected.  German officials offered a 50,000 Euro reward for 
information leading to an arrest and one Bundestag member 
called for fingerprinting visa applicants.  Minister 
 
BERLIN 00002577  003 OF 003 
 
 
Schaeuble said "never has the threat been so close" and seeks 
merged CT databases, more bomb-sniffing dogs, more video 
surveillance in public places like train stations, and more 
monitoring of the Internet, including of Middle Eastern 
content.  Chancellor Merkel supported the call for more video 
surveillance.  Schaeuble also called for the Muslim community 
to report extremists in their midst but stressed Muslims are 
not under general suspicion.  Some German Muslims criticized 
his stance but 16 Muslim organizations issued a statement 
condemning the plot. 
 
¶10. (C) Hizballah's battle with Israel prompted additional 
German discussion: A pro-Hizballah demonstration in Berlin 
led city authorities to restrict pro-Hizballah propaganda 
(ref B).  German media reported more than 6,000 people, 
possibly including members of Hizballah, fled Lebanon to 
Germany.  These allegations, and the fact that some of those 
arrested in the train bombing plot recently traveled to 
Germany from Lebanon, underscore what we have been saying to 
German officials about the need for information sharing 
(Homeland Security Directive Six - HSPD-6).  Neither side 
should tolerate the possibility of attacks that could be 
prevented if we share what we know about people who might 
carry them out.  The recent UK airplane bomb plot led 
Minister Schaeuble to call for EU-wide restrictions on hand 
luggage and prompted a group of EU interior ministers, 
including Schaeuble, to call for improved EU CT efforts after 
a meeting in London.  Lastly, in August Germany arrested two 
PKK leaders, but the other CT stories predominated German 
discussion other than in the pro-PKK Kurdish media, where the 
arrests were condemned. 
 
Points to Make 
-------------- 
¶11. (SBU)  Your visit is on opportunity to sound the German 
out on the possibility of moving now to formal exchanges in 
specific areas.  We propose you make the following points. 
 
-- Bilateral counterterrorism cooperation is very strong, 
although there are limits and obstacles.  Effective law 
enforcement cooperation requires formal and informal 
information sharing.  We applaud tighter German cooperation 
with its EU partners, which shows German commitment to our 
shared counterterrorism and law enforcement objectives. 
 
-- But for Germany to take these steps while at the same time 
complicating U.S.-German cooperation with data privacy and 
other concerns makes no sense.  The vast flows of U.S.-German 
trade, investment, and traveling public argue for at least as 
much U.S.-German cooperation. 
 
-- A valuable 9/11 lesson is the need to share information 
across bureaucratic lines.  The U.S. and Germany have learned 
this lesson because the U.S. has its NCTC, and Germany its 
GTAZ, where data is exchanged like never before. 
 
-- Similarly, we should systematically share information 
internationally.  We could thwart terrorist acts in Germany 
by preventing the entry into Germany of those the U.S. 
believes to be terrorists, and vice versa.  We are prepared 
to be as flexible as possible in how we implement such a 
program. 
 
-- We agree with Germany's efforts to increase integration of 
its Muslim population, the vast majority of which oppose 
terrorism.  We hope Germany will expand dialogue with the 
Muslim community, with a goals of mutual understanding and 
finding a middle ground between Muslim concerns and German 
conventions and practices. 
KOENIG