VZCZCXYZ0004
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBW #1371/01 2420749
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 300749Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9242
INFO RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO 0251
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 0492
RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB 1363
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC 1183
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0608
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0241
RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA 3516

S E C R E T BELGRADE 001371 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
SIPDIS 
STATE FOR SWCI 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: CLOSURE OF ICTY 
TAGS: ICTY PREL PROG PHUM SR
SUBJECT: ICTY ACTION PLAN UPDATE #4; AUGUST 25, 2006 
 
REF: BELGRADE 1325 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Michael C. Polt, reasons 1.4 (b,c,d) 
 
This cable describes GoS ICTY Action Plan Implementation as 
of August 25, 2006. 
 
SUMMARY 
 
¶1.  (c)  This week saw the most action to date on the media 
campaign portion of the Action Plan.  Kotunica made a public 
statement about Serbia's reolve to hand over Mladic to The 
Hague - if he isfound on the teritory of Serbia.  While the 
PM' statements were welcome, we have continued to pus him 
to be more explicit on arrest and to sustin his personal 
engagement in a stepped up campaign (septel).  Operationally, 
the GoS is expressing confidence that they may see some 
results in the near future on fugitive indictees - though not 
on Mladic. End summary. 
 
ACTIONS 
 
¶2.  (s)  Co-Action Plan coordinator Rasim Ljajic told emboffs 
during their weekly Action Plan implementation briefing that 
the GoS is working on three tracks now ) Hadzic, Tolimir, 
and Mladic.  Regarding Hadzic, he said the GoS is going after 
his financiers in Novi Sad, leaning particularly hard on one 
individual to force him to talk or go bankrupt. (NFI). 
 
¶3.  (s)  Regarding Tolimir, he said they were seeing 
additional progress over what was reported last week.  He 
said BIA chief Rade Bulatovic told him something could happen 
very soon.  He noted Tolimir's wife had been extremely well 
briefed on communications procedures, keeping very tight rein 
on her cellphone and landline conversations, making only one 
small mistake in the past two years (NFI). 
 
¶4.  (s)  Regarding Mladic, he said they had recently expanded 
surveillance measures against people known or suspected of 
being in Mladic's new support network (ref) ) to include 
some number of active military officers.  All the subjects 
under surveillance are in Belgrade.  He said he thought 
arresting the previous supporters had been a mistake, as it 
drove the network underground and forced Mladic to use new 
faces. 
 
MEDIA PLAN 
 
¶5. (c)  Ljajic was intensely interested in the Embassy's 
reaction to the Kostunica statement.  Emboffs told him that 
this was a generally positive step, but not entirely 
sufficient.  He asked what the international community still 
needed to hear.  Emboffs responded that, while unable to 
speak for all interested parties, at least three main changes 
to Kostunica's approach would be helpful:  first, he should 
eliminate the qualifiers, stopping at the need to apprehend 
Mladic and not adding the shopworn "if found on the territory 
of Serbia".  Second, Kostunica should explicitly say Mladic 
will be arrested - saying Serbia is committed to "hand him 
over" to The Hague (local media translated it as "extradite") 
does not signal to Serbia's people or its law enforcement and 
intelligence communities that the government will and should 
arrest him.  Finally, the PM and other government 
spokespeople should stop drawing parallels between Mladic and 
Dudakovic.  The Action Plan is about Hague indictees, 
especially Mladic, and that ) and that alone ) needs to be 
the focus of the statements.  Emboffs also reiterated that 
the PM's message would only register through repetition ) we 
needed to see a concerted, week-in week-out campaign, not 
just a one-off.  Ljajic seemed to take the points seriously. 
(Note Ambassador raised the issue directly with PM Kostunica 
in a 8/29 meeting ) see septel. End Note) 
 
OTHER ISSUES 
 
¶6.  (s/nf)  Ljajic said he talked to del Ponte by video link 
on August 23, and she told him (in strictest confidence, so 
please protect) she would not give a report to the EU in 
September.  She told him she could not give a positive report 
now due to lack of progress to date, but thought giving a 
negative report would be counter-productive - i.e., would 
"de-motivate" the operational people who, she said (according 
to Ljajic), seemed to be making more serious efforts.  She 
told Ljajic she would not issue a positive report until 
Mladic was located (NOTE: not captured), and preferred to 
stay quiet until that time to allow Bulatovic and other 
operational professionals to do their jobs.  Ljajic said they 
discussed Dinkic,s dilemma, about claiming he would quit the 
government - thereby forcing new elections - if talks didn't 
restart by October 1.  Ljajic surmised that, if there was 
some substantial movement (emboffs inferred that to mean 
apprehension of Tolimir or Hadzic) in the meantime, that 
might give Dinkic enough political cover to stay his decision 
temporarily. 
 
COMMENT 
 
¶7.  (c)  The statements we saw on the 25th were the most 
direct so far, and were delivered live by Kostunica himself - 
not through a government spokesperson.  We believe this to be 
a necessary, but not sufficient, element to a successful 
media campaign - a campaign that should ideally include the 
Serbian equivalent of an Oval Office address from Kostunica 
to the Serbian people.  As for Dinkic, he and other G-17 Plus 
senior officials continue to be adamant that they will 
withdraw support from the government if SAA talks do not 
resume by October 1.  Since the EU sounds increasingly 
intransigent on the matter, and with del Ponte seemingly 
unprepared to issue a report absent solid information on 
Mladic, Dinkic may soon find his hand forced. 
MOORE